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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH PIPE LINE COMPANY, a 
Corporation, 
Petitioner, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC SER.YICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, W. 
R. McENTIRE and STEWART M. 
HANSON, Commissioners of the 
Public Service Commission of Utah, 
and UTAH NATURAL GAS 
COMPANY, a C-orporation, 
Respondents. 
No. 7695 
Appealed from the Public Service Commission of Utah 
by Certiorari 
BRIEF FOR PETITIONER 
TO THE HONORABLE S·UPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF· UTAH: 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal to this Honorable Court by writ of 
certiorari from the proceedings, Findings and Report 
and Order, of the Public Service Commission of Utah 
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2 
in case No. 3504 before said Commission, entitled "In the 
Matter of the Application of Utah Natural Gas Company 
for a certificate of convenience and necessity." The peti-
tion for writ of certiorari was filed by U'tah Pipe Line 
Company, a corporation, an intervener in the above pro-
ceedings before the Public Service Commission of Utah 
under and by virtue of Section 76-6-16 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943. The writ of certiorari thus petitioned 
for was granted by this Court. Respondents filed their 
motions to dismiss the petition for writ of certiorari and 
the writ of certiorari granted pursuant thereto "on the 
grounds and for the reason that it affirmatively appears 
from said petition for writ of certiorari that the peti-
tioner, the Utah Pipe Line Comp·any, does not have ~ 
justiciable interest in the subject matter of the action." 
This Honorable Court has heretofore overruled said mo-
tions to dismiss, and the case is now before the Court on 
the merits. Except as otherwise indicated, all rtalics are 
supplied. 
THE RECORD ON APPEAL 
The record from the Public Service Commission 
consists of four volumes, Volume I being numbered R. 1 
to R. 493, inclusive, and comp-rising a portion of the tran-
script of the testimony; Volume II being numbered R. 
494 to R. 1039, inclusive, and comprising the transcript 
of the balance of the testimony and of the arguments 
made by counsel before the Commission; Volume III 
being numbered R. 1040 to R. 1105, inclusive, and made 
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up of the numerous exhibits received in the case; and 
\' dlume IV being numbered R. 1106 to R. 1228, inclusive, 
and comprising, among other things, the various applica-
tions, petitions to intervene, Findings and Report and 
Order of the Commission, the petition for the rehearing, 
and the petition for the writ of certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Utah Pipe Line Company, petitioner he;rein, is a 
corporation organized under the laws of the State of 
Delaware, qualified to do business in the State of Utah, 
and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Delhi Oil Corpora-
tion. Delhi Oil Corporation and Utah Pipe Line Com-
pany have their principal offices at Dallas, Texas. Utah 
Pipe Line Company proposes to construct and operate 
a natural gas pipeline system extending a distance of 
approximately 392 miles from a point near Aztec, New 
Mexico, to a point or points in and near Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and to commence the construction of such facilities 
promptly after the issuance of the necessary certificates 
of public convenience and necessity and to place the facili-
ties in operation on or before January 1, 1952 at an 
estimated overall cost of approximately $22,000,000. (R. 
1148). Utah Pipe Line Company has pending before the 
Federal Power Commission and before the Public Service 
Commission of Utah its respective applications for the 
necessary certificates of convenience and necessity (R. 
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4 
1149, R. 1184). Utah Pipe Line Company has available 
proven gas reserves approximating 1 trillion cubic feet 
to be committed to its proposed pipeline and has been 
in negotiation with industrial consumers in the Salt Lake 
City area for the sale of natural gas to them (R. 1150) 
Respondent Utah Natural Gas Company is a Dela-
ware Corporation, qualified to do business in Utah, its 
president and principal officer and stockholder being Mr. 
John A. McGuire, an attorney who resides at Lowell, 
Massachusetts (R. 19). At the commencement of the 
hearing before the commission the paid in capital of Utah 
Natural Gas Company was $1,000, all of which was sub-
scribed for by Mr. McGuire (R. 21). Because of the 
similar!ty of names, i.e. Utah Pipe Line Company and 
Utah Natural Gas Company, we will sometimes hereafter 
refer to the respondent, Utah Natural Gas Company as 
the McGuire Company and to the petitioner, Utah Pipe 
Line Company, as Utah Pipe Line. 
The McGuire Company has no gas acreage and does 
not intend to .acquire any gas reserves, its plan being to 
buy in the field from independent producers natural gas 
for delivery into its pipeline as and when structures in 
Utah may be drilled and natural gas in marketable quan-
. 
tities deve1loped (R. 27, 28). As a typical example of how 
the McGuire Company intended to operate we refer to 
Exhibit 50 (R. 1089) which is as follows: 
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"EXHIBIT NO. 50 
"N. G. Morgan, Sr. Telephones 4-5521 
4-5522 N. G. ~Iorgan, Jr. 
Dr. Paul T. Walton 
H~IORGAN & wALTON OILS 
Suite 518 Wasatch Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
December 14, 1950 
"Utah Natural Gas Company 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
"Gentlemen: 
"We agree to commit to the Utah Natural Gas 
Company all gas produced to our interests in the 
fo1llowing structures in the State of Utah, wh~ch 
we consider productive of gas: 
Clear Creek Anticline 
Scofield Reservoir Anticline 
Flat Canyon Anticline 
Joe's Valley Anticline 
Lake Shore Anticline 
"This agreement is contingent on the com-
pletion of the pipe line and its readiness to pur-
chasers within two years from January 1, 1951. 
"Before the delivery of any gas to said line, 
a mutually satisfactory contract will be negotiated 
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betwe.e·n us, pro:viding for a minimum rate of 10¢ 
per thousand for gas showing BTU content and 
pressures of standard character." 
Yours very truly, 
MORGAN-WALTON OIL & 
GAS, INC. 
By (s) N. G. MORGAN, SR. 
(s) PAUL T. WALTON 
(s) N. G. MORGAN, JR. 
ACCEPTED BY: 
UTAH NATURAL GAS CO. 
( s) John A. McGuire 
President" 
That is to say, Mr. McGuire on behalf of the McGuire 
Company obtained numerous conditional commitments 
from Mr. N. G. Morgan, Sr., Byrd-F·rost, and others to 
the effect that gas which might be developed from struc-
tures not yet drilled would be committed to the McGuire 
Company pipeline. In short, Mr. McGuire's plan was to 
obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity 
for the construction of a pipeline and as and when struc-
tures might be drilled in Utah by independent operators 
and natural gas in commerciaJl quantities developed, the 
McGuire Company would purchase in the field such gas 
for delivery into its pipeline. The McGuire Company did 
not contend before the Commission that it had committed 
adequate proven gas reserves for delivery through its 
pipeline and there is no conflict in the evidence that the 
construction of its pipeline depends entirely upon the 
results of wildcat drilling by independent operators. 
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The pipeline project. of the McGuire Company pro-
poses a pipe line to deliver 100 million cubic feet of natu-
ral gas into the Salt Lake area each day. The standard 
requirement by financial institutions interested in financ-
ing natural gas pipelines is that a proven gas supply be 
available to the pipeline for a period of not less than 
twenty years (R. 471). Therefore a pipeline p,roject plan-
ned to deliver 100 million cubic feet of natural gas each 
twenty-four hours for twenty years would need a suppiy 
equivalent to: 100,000,000 x 365 x 20. This is a tre-
mendous requirement and developed reserves less in 
quantity than those adequate for a "break even" opera-
tion would not permit the required financing (R. 460). 
Exhibit 58 (R. 1097) was produced by a witness for the 
McGuire Company and shows that it would require a 
daily sale of 76,169,958 physical units (MCF) at the 
McGuire Company's proposed rates of 23-34¢ to Utah 
industrial users and at 30¢ to other users per MCF for 
the McGuire Company to reach the break even point on 
its proposed project. 
The only claim of proven gas reserves committed 
to the McGuire pipeline consists of an insignificant 
amount of naturai gas in the Boundary Butte structure 
near the Utah-Arizona line. The insignificant quantity 
.of gas in this structure will be dealt with in detail sub-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
sequently in the brief. There is no pipeline to the Boun-
dary Butte structure and the gas in the structure is of 
an extremely low BTU content. 
While the paid in capital of the McGuire Company 
at the time the hearing began on December 11, 1950 was 
$1,000, by the time the hearing adjourned the capital 
stock issued or reserved for issue had grown to $78,760 
(Ex. 68, R. 1105). The accountant for the McGuire Com-
pany would not certify to these figures and stated that aill 
he knew about them was what Mr. McGuire had told 
him, but that it was his understanding this increase rep-
resented unclassified expenditures such as for profes-
sional services, travel expenses and other items (R. 947 
to 949). 
The McGuire Company in its amended application 
for the certificate stated that it had the ownership of or 
could by firm contracts secure the ownership and delivery 
of the required quantities of natural gas for its pipeline 
and tha;t it was financially able to perform and carry 
out the construction of the line and the required facili-
ties (R. 1111, R. 1113). Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. 
McGuire is a 1awyer and must appreciate the difference 
be~tween a firm commitment and an instrument which 
does not create any binding obligation, he produced Ex-
hibit 45 (R. 1084) as evidence of ability to adequately 
finance the project. This exhibit is as follows : 
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"Chicago Office 
231 South LaSalle Stree1t 
"LEHMAN BROTHERS 
One William Street 
NewYork4 
July 25th, 1950 
"Utah Natural Gas Company 
Suite 1311, Walker Bank Bui1lding 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
"Dear Sirs : 
"This letter is to confirm the fact that offi-
cers of your company have discussed with us the 
subject of your obtaining a financing for the con-
struction of a gas pipe line from the four corners 
area to the Salt Lake City market, and for the 
purchase of other related facilities. 
"While a number of things still remain to 
be done, such as obtaining a certificate from the 
Public Service Commission of the State of Utah, 
obtaining assurance of adequate available gas 
reserves, an engineering report covering construc-
tion and operating matters, etc., this letter is 
further to confirm that we wi'll undertake to pro-
vide adequate financing for the Company, either 
by a private placement or public offering of its 
securities, when all the necessary preparatory 
steps have been satisfactorily completed." 
"Very truly yours, 
LEHMAN BROS." 
The Byrd-F.rost interests of Dallas, Texas, were ac-
tive in support of the application of McGuire c·ompany 
but Col. Byrd testified that neither he nor his associates 
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1n Byrd-Frost had any stock interest in the McGuire 
Company (R. 735 & 932-936). At the time of the hearing 
the Byrd-Frost interests were drilling a weB. (Sitton No. 
1) at Monticello and intended to drill what is commonly 
called the Last Chance structure in Emery County. 
The Commission permitted Utah Pipe Line to inter-
vene in the McGuire Company's case but refused to per-
mit Utah Pipe Line to offer any evidence as to its gas 
reserves in New l\{exico and its proposed pipeline from 
Aztec to Salt Lake City. The Commission also failed to 
take any action with regard. to a hearing upon the appli-
cation of Utah Pipe Line (R. 1221) for a certificate:. 
The application of McGuire Company was filed with 
the Commission on May 29, 1950, (R. 1106). No notice 
of the app~ication was given and nothing was done with 
regard thereto until November 17,1950, when an amended 
application (R. 1111) was filed enlarging upon the pro-
gram of the applicant. On November 24, 26, and 28, 1950, 
notice of a hearing on the amended application was pub-
lished in the Salt Lake· Tribune, the hearing being sched-
uled for December 11, 1950. Notice was mailed to J. 
Glenn Turner, Dallas, Texas, gene.ral counse[ for Delhi 
Oil Corporation and one of the attorneys for Utah Pipe 
Line. Whether Mr. McGuire had learned of the plans 
of Delhi Oil Corporation to build through a subsidiary, 
a pipeline from the San Juan Basin of New Mexico to 
SaJt Lake City is not certain, but it is a fair inference (R. 
1028) that this accounted for the short notice and the 
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sudden necessity of speed in the disposition of the Mc-
Guire Company's application. At the beginning of the 
hearing on the McGuire application Mr. Turner entered 
an appearance on behalf of Utah Pipe Line and asked 
ieave to file its petition to intervene in the proceeding. 
The petition of Utah Pipe Line set forth that there was 
then pending before the Federal Power Commission an 
application of Utah Pipe Line for a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity authorizing the construction 
and operation of a pipeline from Aztec, New Mexico to 
Salt Lake City; that Utah Pipe Line proposed to con-
struct and operate such line and that the gas reserves 
available to Utah Pipe Line approximated 1 trillion cubic 
feet; that Utah Pipe Line was informed and believed 
that the McGuire Company had insufficien;t and inade~­
quate reserves and that if a certificate were, granted to the 
1\IcGuire Company it would be unable to furnish the serv-
ice and that any attempt by the McGuire Company to 
transport gas by its pipe line from outside Utah would 
have to be made through the Federa:l Power Commission 
(R. 1148-1153). When Mr. Turner presented the petition 
of Utah Pipe Line for leave to intervene, counsel for the 
McGuire Company strenuously objected and the foJlow-
ing occurred : 
"MR. TURNER: Mr. Commissioner, may I be 
heard with reference to that~ 
"COM. BENNETT : You may. 
"MR. TURNER: Utah Pipe Line Company ~s a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Delhi Oil Com-
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· pany. Delhi Oil Company owns substantial oil 
and gas holdings in New Mexico. 
"We exp·ect to prove, if allowed to parti-
cipa1.e in this hearing, that we ourselves have 
approximately 1 trillion feet of gas ourselves 
under our own leases. It is a matter of com-
mon knowledge - it has been the subject of 
consideTable comment, and it is generally 
known we have been negotiating for quite 
some time with industrial customeTs in the 
Salt Lake City area, and those negotiations 
are down to the last stages. We have had the 
right of way surveyed; we have taken all the 
steps-and i~t is true we just recently filed 
with the Federal PoweT Commission, but we 
expect to prove, if allowed to intervene, that 
the applicant is merely trying to preempt the 
Salt Lake City industrial market, that they 
do not have sufficient gas reserves; that it 
would be impossible to support this line unless 
it is an interstate line, and that the Federal 
Power Commission, if· it is going to be an 
interstate line, is the first body who will have 
to authorize a certificate. 
"Now we have filed our application. We 
propose to serve substantially the same mar-
ket that these gentlemen p·ropose to serve, and 
we say that it is in the public interest for this 
Commission to hear both projects and bO'th 
plans and decide which of the 2 plans it should 
allow. We think that it is obvious that you 
cou!ldn't have 2 lines coming in here, and we 
think that as a direct competitor tha~t we do 
have a direct interest in this proceeding, and 
if allowed to intervene, we will present such 
data as the Commission may desire to show 
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that we do have ·the gas, that we. are in good 
faith in wanting to serve the Utah are~a, and 
that we will take all prompt steps to that end. 
"But, we do think that if a certificate 
"~ere here given the applicant without suffi-
cient gas reserves, it would confuse the issues, 
as counsel says, and we think it would be in 
the public interest for this Commission to 
hear both of these competing projects at the 
same time .. 
"MR. CORNWALL: I think our views are ex-
pressed, ~Ir. Commissioner. 
"C.O~I. BENNETT: We will be 1n recess for 5 
minutes at this- time." 
* * :)(: * 
"COM. BENNETT : The hearing will be in ses-
sion. 
"The commission believes that the Utah 
Pipe Line Company has shown sufficient in-
terest to intervene. The Commission also feels 
that such intervention should be limited as to 
the reasons alleged-as to why the peti-
tioner's application should not be granted, hut 
in no instance should this be used as a place 
for the Utah Pipe Line Company to try and 
prove a case which the Commission does not 
have before it. 
"If they intend to petition this Com-
mission for a hearing for a pipeline, why that 
would have to be done in its usual manne-r. 
"So, while the p·etition of intervention 
willl be granted, it will be gran'ted in a limited 
manner, as set out here. 
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"MR. CORNWALL: Do I understand, Mr. Com-
missioner, that the showing which the Inter-
venor is entitled to make here will be a show-
ing going to the merits of our application, 
but, they will not be entitled to make affirma-
tive proof with respect to their proposed ap-
plication; is that the position of the Commis-
sion~ 
"COM. BENNETT: That is the position of the 
Commission." (R. 10-13) 
In other words, the ruling of the Commission was to the 
effect that Utah Pipe Line would not be permitted to 
offer any evidence with regard to its application pending 
before the Federal Power Commission nor with regard 
to its gas reserves in New Mexico or its proposed pipeline 
projeet. That ruling of the Commission ~as never 
changed and throughout the proceeding Utah Pipe Line 
was barred from presenting any evidence in its support. 
Its participation was limited to a showing of what the 
McGuire Company did not have. 
The hearing on the McGuire Company's application 
continued ~through December 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1950, and 
was then adjourned to January 29, 1951. On January 
26, 1951 Utah Pipe Line filed with the Commission its 
application entitled "In the Matte~r of the Application of 
Utah Pipe Line Company," case No. 3578, a copy which is 
attached as Exhibit "C" to the petition for the writ of 
certiorari herein, and will he found at R. 1199, and a map 
of its proposed line will be found at R. 1204. On the fo~­
lowing day, January 27, 1951, Utah Pipe Line filed with 
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the Commission a request that the Commission arrange 
with the Federal Power Commission for a "joint hearing" 
of the two applications of Utah Pipe Line (R. 1188). 
Utah Pipe Line, in its verified application for such 
certificate, again stated that in excess of 1 trrllion cubic 
feet of proven natural gas reserves in the Angel's Peak, 
Blanco, Largo and Glade areas in San Juan County, New 
Mexico, were available to Utah Pipe Line for transmis-
sion and disposition through its proposed pipeline into 
the Salt Lake area. Without considering any of the said 
matters and without granting Utah Pipe Line a hearing 
on its application and without granting or denying its 
motion for a joint hearing with the Federal Power Com-
mission and after limiting Utah Pipes Line's participa-
tion as aforesaid in the hearing upon the application of 
the McGuire Company, on March 12, 1951, the Commis,.. 
sion made its Findings and Report and Orde-r and 
granted to the McGuire Company certificate of conveni-
ence and necessity No. 925. 
The Commission recognized that the McGuire Com-
pany had not made a sufficient showing of proven gas re--
serves or of adequate financing. The Findings of the 
Commission are clear in this regard. On page 6 of the 
Findings (R. 1169) the Conrmission says: 
"The Commission further finds that the esti-
mated reserves in the area where the applicant 
has gas purchase contracts are sufficient, if 
proved, to make the construction of applicant's 
pipe line and facilities economically feasible." 
* * * * 
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"The Commission further finds that if said 
reserves are proved, the applicant can secure gas 
purchase contracts to deliver the gas so pur-
. chased and developed into its pipe line. The Com-
mission further finds that the operation of the 
pipe line will be economically feasible with the 
available market if the estimated reserves are 
proved; and that if said pipe line is economically 
feasib~e the applicant can secure the necessary 
financing for the construction of the same." 
In short, the Findings and Report are to the effect 
that the McGuire Company claimed to have adequate 
proven gas reserves, and based upon that assumption, 
the c·ommission then found that "estimated reserves-
are sufficient, if proved," and "that if said reserves are 
proved, the applicant can secure gas purchase contracts 
to deliver the gas so proved." In effect, the Commission 
, found that the McGuire Company was entirely dependent 
upon the results of limited wildcat drilling for its gas 
sup~ply. 
Although recogn1zmg that the McGuire Company 
had not made a sufficient showing of proven gas re-
serves or of the required financing, nevertheless the 
C.ommission granted the certificate and gave the McGuire 
Company one year within which to: 
" (a) File with this Commission the uncon-
ditional commi!tment of a financial house of recog-
nized responsibility committing itself to supply 
the funds necessary for the construction of the 
pipe line and facilities to be installed by Utah 
Natural Gas Company; 
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H(b) Concurrently with the furnishing of 
such committnent and as a part thereof, Utah 
Natural Gas Cotnpany shall file with this Commis-
sion the certificate of an independent geologist of 
recognized professional standing, acceptable to 
this Coimnission, that there are p-roven gas re-
serves conunitted to Utah Natural Gas Company 
adequate to justify the construction of the line and 
faci!lities · 
' 
" (c) Deposit with this Commission copies 
of any gas purchase contracts entered into with 
owners of producing gas wells; 
" (d) Deposit with this Commission a copy 
or copies of its contracts then entered into with 
a recognized responsible construction firm or 
firms for the construction of said line and facili-
ties; and 
'' (e) Pending the compliance with the con-
ditions herein imposed, Utah Natural Gas Com-
pany shall make no public offering of its stock 
or other securities." (R. 1173). 
OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE RECORD CONTAINS NO COMPETENT, SUB-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ORDER; THE 
FINDINGS AND REPORT DO NOT SUPPORT THE ORDER 
AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE. 
The Findings and Report in substance merely state 
that the McGuire Company claims to have gas reserves 
and as a consequence claims it can obtain the necessary 
financing. It is true that the evidence supports a finding 
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that the McGuire Company makes such claims. But more 
than mere claims are required to sustain the issuance 
of a certificate of convenience and necessity. 
II. THE COMMISSION UNLAWFULLY DELEGATED 
TO AN UNKNOWN AND UNDETERMINED GEOLOGIST 
THE POWER WITHIN ONE YEAR TO MAKE THE DETER-
MINATIONS REQUIRED BY LAW OF THE COMMISSION 
AND TO THEREBY PERFECT AND EXTEND THE McGUIRE 
COMPANY CERTIFICATE; THIS ACTION OF THE COM-
MISSION VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
PETITIONER. 
The order of the Commission de1egates to a geologist 
to be selected by the McGuire Company (subject to the 
Commission's determination of his qualifications) the 
power, ex parte, without hearing, without investigation 
by interested parties into his background or qualification, 
without investigation as to his interest in the controversy 
or his relationship with McGuire Company, to pe·rfect and 
extend the certificate by filing with the Commission the 
geologist's opinion that the McGuire Company has ob-
tained the required gas reserves. These are the matters 
exclusively reserved to the Commission by law for their 
determination and such delegation is unlawful and void. 
The due process clause of the Federal Constitution 
and that of the Constitution of the State of Utah re-
quired that Utah Pipe Line be· given a full hearing before 
any certificate was granted to the McGuire Company; 
the vesting by the Commission in an independent geo[o-
gist of the power to perfect and extend the certificate, 
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ex parte, does not give to Utah Pipe Line that impartial, 
fair and full hearing which both the Federal and the 
State Constitutions require. 
III. THE COMMISSION FAILED TO REGULARLY PUR-
SUE ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY .. 
The authority of the Commission is wholly statutory 
and although an administrative agency, it does not have 
unlimited authority in granting certificates of conven-
ience and necessity and particularly may not constitute 
itself a conservation and development commission for 
the State of Utah. 
IV. THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY IN THE PROCEEDINGS AND IN THE IS-
SUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE AND IN VIOLATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PETITIONER .. 
The restriction on the participation of Utah Pipe 
Line in the hearing on the McGuire application; the re-
fusal of the Commission to hear any evidence, on the 
pipeline project of Utah Pipe Line and its reserves.; 
the fai,lure to take any action on Utah Pipe Line's request 
for a joint hearing; and the order requiring Utah Pipe 
Line to stand aside and defer presentation of its pro-
ject while the McGuire Company embarked on a "hunt-
ing expedition" for natural gas, all were arbitrary and 
capricious and in excess of ~the jurisdiction and powe,rs of 
the Commission. 
Preliminary Statement Relative to Points on Appeal 
The petition for the writ of certiorari sets forth 
13 points wherein petitioner claims the Commission ex-
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ceeded its jurisdiction and failed to pursue its statutory 
authority (R. 1189-1192). These points are numbered a, 
b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, 1 and m. For the purposes of the 
argument and to save repetition Utah Pipe Line has 
grouped these points so that they may be embraced within 
the four general headings above set forth. The alpha-
betical identity of the points has been retained with 
designation in capital letters. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
I. THE RECORD CONTAINS NO COMPETENT, SUB-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ORDER; THE 
FINDINGS AND REPORT DO NOT SUPPORT THE ORDER 
AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE. POINTS A, 
B, C, AND L. 
In General 
This is the first case presented to the Supreme Court 
of Utah involving the question as to what showing must 
be made by an applicant for a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity for the construction and opera-
tion of a natural gas pipeline. While the case is of first 
impression nevertheless the requirements for a showing 
of an adequate gas supply and firm commitments for 
the necessary financing actually are no more than the 
application of the well settled rule in any type of cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity case that the 
applicant must show that it is able to furnish the pro-
posed service and that the financing thereof is eco-
nomically sound and feasible. The whole purpose of a 
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hearing upon an application for such ce:rtificate is to 
determine not only that public convenience and ne.cessity 
require the service but the applicant is in a position to 
furnish the service. Applications for certificates of con-
venience and necessity are not treated lightly. Commis-
sions and courts recognize that the granting Q·f such 
certificate materially affects the publlic welfare. 
The application of the McGuire Company 1s not 
unlike the application before the Idaho Commission in 
Re Wilcox, P.U.R. 1916C., 35, 37, involving a proposed 
construction and operation of a gas plant and where the 
Commission in disposing of the application said : 
"The whole plan or scheme of applicant Jones 
seemed to be, as we gathered from the evidence 
adduced, that he would secure a certificate of 
convenience and necessity, thereby securing the 
control of that field for a time at [east, and then 
endeavor to secure the necessary capital, either by 
subscription or by bonding the plant, with which 
to construct the plant and distribution system. 
He presented no definite tangible plan of pro-
cedure, but trusted to the future to 1take care of 
itself. In other words, it app·eared that he was 
acting purely as a promotor." 
There has grown up in natural gas pipe line cases 
three fundamental requirements which courts and com-
missions recognize must be met before a certificate for 
the construction and operation of a natural gas pipeline 
should issue. These requirements are sometimes em-
bodied in regulations of commissions ; sometimes are to 
be found onil.y in the decided cases but they are funda-
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mental and have become well settled rules of law. The 
Federal Power Commission has considered these require-
ments in a more extensive manner than probably all 
other commissions and courts combined. These rules of 
law require an applicant to show: 
1. Proven gas reserves dedicated to the pipe-
line in sufficien't quantity to justify the project 
from the standpoint of consumer and investor. 
2. Adequate financing for the construction 
and operation of the pipeline. 
3. Adequate showing of consumer demand 
for the natural gas. 
With reference to the last requirement, i.e. adequate 
showing of consumer demand, we make no contention. 
The Commission found that there was an inadequate sup-
ply of gas in the Salt Lake area; that home owners, 
schools, apartment houses, small and large industry, are 
suffering from a lack of adequate gas reserves. News-
paper photographs of people standing in line in the hope 
of obtaining a gas connection; repeated notices in the 
newspapers to the Hffect that gas is limited for new 
home construction; all are facts with which we are fa-
miliar. We wi]l, therefore, confine our argument to the 
first two requirements. 
POINT A 
"(a) THAT THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND 
NECESSITY SHOULD BE GRANTED TO THE APPLICANT, 
UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY, IN THAT THE RECORD 
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CONTAINS NO COl\IPETENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
TO SUSTAIN A REQUIRED SHOWING OF ADEQUATE 
PROVEN GAS RESERVES COMMITTED TO SUPPLY APPLI-
CANT'S PROPOSED LINE, BUT ON THE CONTRARY, THE 
EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT APPLICANT HAS AVAILABLE 
INCONSEQUENTIAL AND WHOLLY INADEQUATE SUP-
PLIES OF GAS." 
ST.A.TE~IENT UNDER POINT A 
Respondent, lTtah Natural Gas Company, proposed 
to construct a system of natural gas pipelines from the 
Southeastern area of the State of Utah :to the Salt Lake 
City area at a total cost of approximately $32,000,000 
(R .. 242 and Ex. 42). The pipeline system as proposed 
would have a maximum daily delivery capacity into the 
market area of 135,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas 
(R. 300), with a proposed actual delivery of 100,000,000 
cubic feet (R. 304) and a required minimum economic 
"break-even" delivery of 76,000,000 cubic feet per day 
over a twenty year period (R. 718, Ex. 58). It was pro-
posed that gas with a heating value of 875 British thermal 
units per cubic foot would be delivered to the consumers 
(R. 521). 
The Utah Nrutural Gas Company offered evidence 
pertaining to several different areas in an attempt to 
show that it had adequate natural gas reserves to fur-
nish the requirements of the proposed system. The areas 
primarily relied upon were rthe areas known as Boun-
dary Butte, Last Chance and Greater Monticello. As to 
Boundary Butte, all witnesses agreed that there were 
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some "proven" reserves of natural gas but there was a 
sharp conflict of testimony as to the extent of such 
"proven" reserves. 
A report on the gas reserves of Byrd-Frost, Inc.-
English interests, made by the independent consultant 
firm of Cummins, Berger and Pishny, page 20 of which, 
along with a correcting telegram (R. 1103), was intro-
duced in evidence as Exhibit 66, attributed to Boundary 
Butte a total proven recoverable reserve of 62,467,000,000 
cubic feet and to the net interest of Byrd-Fros~t, Inc.-
English 13,661,000,000 cubic feet. 
Of the total productive area estimated by witnesses 
of Utah Natural Gas Company to be in Boundary Butte, 
Utah Natural Gas Company has a gas purchase con-
tract committing gas to its proposed line from only the 
Byrd-Frost, Inc.-P. B. English interest, which accounted 
for ownership of only one-fourth of the ownership in 
the Boundary Butte structure (R. 515-516, Ex. 46). While 
there was some testimony to the effect that a trade of gas 
owned elsewhere by the Byrd-Frost, Inc.-P. B. English 
interests for the remaining three-fourths interest at 
Boundary Butte had been considered (R. 530), there 
was no evidence that such trade had or would be made. 
As to the area or s'tructure known as Last Chance, 
there was sharp conflict in the testimony a.s to whether 
or not there were recoverable "proven" reserves of 
natural gas in that structure. 
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Witnesses for petitioner testified that there were 
no proven reserves at Last Chance and not enough basic 
data to estimate reserves (R. 671, 744). A witness for 
~Iountain Fuel Supply Co. testified that at the most the 
total reserve at Last Chanee was slightly over 406,000,000 
cubic feet (R. 763). 
As to the area or structure known as Great.er Monti-
cello, all witnesses "\Vere in accord that it did not have a 
"proven" reserve of natural gas (R. 86, 92, 147, 672, 705 ), 
and the principal witness for Utah Natural Gas Company 
denoted it as a ''probable" reserve (R. 92, 14 7), with 
the admission that they were in the ''field of conjecture" 
(R.93). 
'Vitnesses for petitioner testified that there was no 
accurate estimate of reserves possible on the data avail-
able and that there was no substantial amount of gas 
proven today at Greater Monticello (R. 672, 705). 
While Utah Natural Gas Company introduced testi-
mony as to other "unproved structures" (R. 99, Ex. 1), it 
relied primarily on the foregoing to establish the natural 
gas reserves upon which its application was predicated. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT A 
(a) Public Interest as Paramount Concern. 
The U'tah statute under which the certificate of con-
venience and necessity here concerned was sought is, 
pri1narily, Section 76-4-24, U.C.A. 1943, which reads in 
part as fallows : 
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" ( 1) No ... gas corporation . . . shall hence-
forth establish, or begin construction or opera-
tion of a . . . line, route, plant or system, . . . 
without having first obtained from the commission 
a certificate that present or future public conven-
ience and necessi~y does or will require such con-
struction." 
"(3) ... The commission shall have power, 
after a hearing, to issue said certificate as prayed 
for or to refuse to issue the same, or to issue it 
for the construction of a portion only of the con-
rtemplated railroad, street railroad, serial bucket 
tramway, line, plant or system, or extension there-
of, or for the partial exercise only of said right 
or privilege and may attach to the exercise of the 
rights granted by said certificate such 1terms and 
conditions as in its judgment public convenience 
and necessity may require." 
It is a well settled fundamental in the public utility 
law of Utah thrut the interest of the public is paramount 
in determining whether or not a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity, under the above and similar 
statutes, should be issued. As this court stated: 
"It is the public good and convenience which 
is the ya.rds1tick to be used in determining the 
advisability of granting or denying a certificate 
of necessity and convenience. Mulcahy v. Public 
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P2d 298; 
Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Public Service Corn-
mission, 101 Utah 99, 118 P2d 683." Salt Lake & 
Utah R. Corp. v. Public Service Commission, et al. 
(S·up. Ct. 1944) 106 Utah 403, 149 P2d 647. See 
also, Collett et al. v. Public Service Commission, 
et al., (Sup. Ct. 1949) 211 P2d 185. 
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(b) .A.dequate Su-pply Basic Prerequisite to Pro-
tect,ion of Public Interest. 
It would seen1 basically fundamental that whe-re a 
particular applicant is seeking such a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity to perform a particular service, 
such applicant musJt show, in order to establish the public 
convenience and necessity for his particular service, that 
he can furnish the services concerning which he is seek-
ing a certificate. Such requirement has been clearly 
stated by the Public Service Commission of Missouri 
in the case of Re Achtenberg (1934) 8 P.U.R., N.S. 397. 
In that case the Commission, in consideTing and discuss-
ing the Missouri strutute authorizing the Commission to 
issue certificates of public convenience and necessity, 
which statute is partially quoted on page 407 of such 
opinion and is substantially the same as Section 76-4-24, 
U.C.A. (1943) abo-ve quoted, observed the following at 
pages 408-9 : 
"We have always regarded this statute and 
the similar statutes relating to other utilities, as 
involving conside-ration of two questions-first, 
whether public convenience and necessity require 
the proposed service; second, whe1ther the appli-
cant is a proper person to fulfill this need. The 
combination of these two elements in a finding 
constitutes a certificate of convenience and nec-
essity. * * * * But the question as to whe;ther the 
two features which have been indicated may be 
separately considered by the Commission seems, 
so far as we are ab~e to ascertain, undecided. 
On principle it seems that this division might and 
should be recognized. Going to 1the fundamentals 
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of regulation first announced in the case of Munn 
v. Illinois, (1877) 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.ed. 77, it will 
be observed that regulation proceeds upon the 
theory that the owner of p·roperty theretofore 
held in private tenure, has by volimtary act de-
voted it to some use which the state denominates 
as affected with a public interest. It seems rea-
sonable to regard one of the purposes of the 
finding of convenience and necessity as ~that of 
stamping the property so proposed to be used 
as being within the category of property affected 
with a public interest. That can only be done 
by the determination of the sttate, through its 
agent, the Public Service Commission, that the 
business is really necessary and convenient for 
the public. That question having been decided, 
the next question to be determined by the Commis-
sion is the suitability of the owner of the property 
to use it in meeting this public need. The two 
findings together consti1tute the certificate or 
franchise granted to the applicant when such cer-
tificate is issued." 
The wording of Section 76-4-24, U.C.A. (1943), indi-
cates that such a requirement was contemplated by the 
legislature . Such section states that no utility shall be-
gin cohstruction "without having first obtained from the 
commission a certificate that present or future public 
convenience and necessity does or will require such con-
struction." Fur~theTmore, the actual procedure set out 
by the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Public 
Service Commission of Utah indicates that such is the 
interpretation of its duty by that Commission. Section 
11.2 of the Rules of Prae~tice and Procedure· requires that 
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applications for certificates of convenience and necessity 
shall sho,v, a1nong other things, the financial condition 
of the applicant, the manner of financing the operation 
and the construction proposed. 
In situations where the applicant for a certificate 
desires to furnish so1ne commodity to be used by the 
public this inquiry into whether or not the applicant is 
capable of performing the service to be certificated nec-
essarily involves the very i1nportant inquiry into whether 
or not the applicant has at its disposal an adequate 
suppl~T of the commodity to be furnished to the public 
to help meet its "present or future convenience and 
necessirty." For example, the California Railroad Com-
nlission in 1933 denied an application of an individual 
for a certificate to operate as a water utility where, by 
reason of pending litigation, there existed grave doubt 
as to the right of the applicant for the certificate to 
operate a plant from the proposed source of supply and 
where, also, the applicant had failed to give reasonable 
assurance of an adequate supply of, or the ability to 
obtain additional, water to meet demands. Re Morgan, 
( 1933) 38 Cal. R. C.R. 667. 
(c) Adequate Supply Means Adequate Reserves of 
Natural Gas. 
Certainly, in situations where the activity to be 
certificated is a pipeline for the transmission of natural 
gas, the adequacy of the gas supply to meet the demands 
of the public and to insure that the continuation of the 
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pipeline will be a sound investment from the standpoint 
of the public interest will be of the utmost importance in 
determining the public convenience and necessity and the 
ability of 1the applicant to meet and fulfill that public con-
venience and necessity. The Commissions and Courts 
which have considered the problem have so held. 
The Michigan Public Utilities Commission, in the 
case of Re Grand Rapids Gas Light Co., (1936) 13 P.U.R. 
(N.S·.) 445, said at page 451: 
"In a former opinion this Commission held 
that, in order to justify the issuance of a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity for 
a gas utility to construct a natural gas pipe line 
under Act 9, Public Acts of 1929, three things 
should be established and they were briefly stated 
as follows. 
(a) The utility should establish its finan-
cial ability to cons1truct the facilities and carry 
out the enterprise. 
(b) The utility should establish that it has 
available a sufficient quantity of natural gas to 
serve the locality it seeks to serve for a reason-
able length of time. Just what that reasonable 
length of time is it is difficult to say but certainly 
it should have a sufficient supply of gas to serve 
rthe locality it proposes to serve for eight or ten 
years. 
(c) Said utility should have a market ready 
to receive the· natural gas it proposes to trans-
port." 
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Further, in connection with its requirement of ade-
quate supply, the Comn1ission stated rut page 456: 
"Public convenience and necessity wiD not 
be served if the service of natural gas must be 
terminated (through lack of supply) at the end 
of two or three years, and if the expense of the 
pipe line and equipment must be added to the 
rates charged to customers over so short a period 
of time." 
The Michigan statute was no more detailed in its 
requirements concerning public convenience and necessity 
than is the Utah Statute. 
The Tennessee Railroad and Public Utilities Com-
mission, in considering the application of Tennessee Gas 
& Transmission Co. to bring gas into the State of Tenne-
see, inquired into, and made a definite requirement of a 
showing of the adequacy of, the reserves of natural gas 
available to the applicant; and this, even though the 
statute of Tennessee specifica1ly referred to certain in-
quiries to be made by the Commission in such cases, such 
as the financial ability of the applicant, but was silent 
as to reserves. In discussing this requirement which it 
imposed, the Commission stated in its opinion, Re Tenne-
see Gas and Transmission Co., (1941) 40 P.U.R. (N.S.) 
129, at page 133 : 
"When the Federal Power Commission refers 
1to the regard due 'to the sufficiency of its avail-
able reserves of natural gas,' it is returning to one 
factor which is clearly indispensable in any case 
involving the granting to a company of a certifi-
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cate of public convenience and necessity for the. 
introduction of natural ·gas. Beyond this, the eco-
nomic feasibility of the projeClted construction 
would certainly be an essential factor. Other 
factors which are referred to, even including so 
important a matter as financial resources, are col-
lateral ones under the most normal circumstances 
which may arise in certificate cases. In other 
words, if a company has clearly adequake reserves 
of natural gas, and if a market exists in which it 
is economically feasible to sell such natural gas 
to the advantage both of the public and of the 
company, it is almost certain that financial re-
sources would be made available for construct-
ing and operating the project. Accordingly, it will 
first be necessary for the Commission to analyze 
and ascertain whether · the Tennessee Gas and 
Transmission Company has available adequate. 
supplies of natural gas . . . " 
The Federal Power Commission has, of course, con-
sidered the problem of reserves many rtimes in its delib-
erations. The statute under which jt issues certificates 
of public convenience and necessity is very similar to and 
almost equally as brief as the statute under which the 
Public Service Commission of Utah issued the certificate 
in this case. 
The applicable provisions of the United States sta-
tute, 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 717f (c) and (e) (Natural Gas Act, 
Sec. 7 (c) and (e) ) compare in substance with Sec. 76-4-24 
Utah Code Anno. 1943. 
"(c) No Natural-gas company or person 
which will be a natural-gas company upon com-
ple1tion of any proposed construction or extension 
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shall engage in the transportation or sale of nat-
ural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion, or undertake the construction or ex·tension 
of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate 
any such facilities or extensions thereof, unless 
there is in force with respect to such nrutural-gas 
company a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity issued by the Commission authorizing 
such acts or operations." 
* * * * * 
" (e) Except in the cases governed by the 
provisions contained in subsection (c) of this sec-
iton, a certificate shali be issued to any qualified 
applicant therefor, authorizing the whole or any 
part of the operation, sale, service, construction, 
extension, or acquisition covered by the applica-
tion, if it is found that the applicant is able and 
willing properly to do the acts and to perform 
the service proposed and to conform 1to the pro~ 
visions of this chapter and the requirements, 
rules, and regulations of the Commission there-
under, and that the proposed service, sale, opera-
tion, construction, extension, or acquisition, to the 
extent authorized by the certificrute, is or will be 
required by the present or future public conven-
ience and necessity; otherwise such application 
shall be denied. The Commission shall have the 
power to attach to the issuance of the certificate 
and to the exercise of the rights granted there-
under such reasonable terms and conditions as 
the public convenience and necessity may require." 
The applicable provisions of the Utah S1tatute, 76-4-
24, U.C.A. (1943) are set out above. 
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In view of the similarity of the U.S. Statute to the 
Utah Statute, of the fact that few states have dealt with 
the problem of reserves and that the problem before this 
court appears to he one of first impression in the State 
of Utah, it would be hellpful, it is believed, to observe the 
problem as handled by the Federal Power Commission. 
In its first case under the Natural Gas Act, Re 
Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co., the Federal Power Commis-
sion attempted to lay down some· of the principles by 
which it conceived itself bound under the Natural Gas 
Act. That case invo~ved the applications of two com-
panies to construct pipelines, one from the Hugoton 
gas field in Kansas to the Mesabi Iron Range in Minne-
sota and the other from North Dakota to a region on 
the N o~th Dakota-Minnesota border. 
In its opinion, Re Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co., 
(1939) 30 P.U.R. (N.S.) 321, the Commission had this 
to say about reserves at page 332 : 
"We are of the opinion tha;t applicants 
who contend that 'public convenience and neces-
sity' requires or will require the construction of 
facil~ties for the transportation of natural gas 
must show that they possess a supply of natural 
gas adequate to meet those demands which it is 
reasonable to assume will be made upon them. 
It is obvious that the public convenience and 
necessity would not be served by certificruting an 
applicant who had an insufficient supply of the 
product which it proposes to make available to 
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the publJ.ic. Cf. Incorporators of Service Gas Co. 
v. Pttblic Service Commission, (1937) 126 Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 381, 190 Atl. 653. 
The Commission then proceeded to examine and 
evaluate very carefully the available gas reserves of the 
applicants. In connection with the gas reserves of one 
applicant, Kansas-Pipe Line & Gas Co., the Commission 
observed that, although the terms of the gas purchase 
contract between the producer and applicant had be:en 
agreed upon, there was as yet no firm commitment be-
tween the producers and t.he applicant which would spe-
cifically dedicate the reserves to the applicant's pipe-
line. In its disposition of the matter the Commission re-
fused to issue certificates of convenience and necessity 
to the applicanrts,requiring additional showing by them 
of many facts in connection with the· proposed projects, 
including the requirement that the "Kansas Pipe Line & 
Gas C·o. must present to us for our further consideration 
a firm commitment for the purchase of natural·gas in the 
Hugoton gas field in the State of Kansas," 30 P.U.R. 
(N.S.) 348. 
In its recent opinion in Re Atlantic Seaboard Corp., 
(1948) 76 P.U.R. (N.S.) 410, the Commission evidenced 
its continued adherence to the principles announced in 
the Kansas Pipe Line Co. case, supra. In the Atlantic 
case the Commission had before it the applications of 
Atlantic Seaboard Corporation and Tennessee Gas 
Transmission Company seeking a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity authorizing additional facili-
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ties to expand the capac~ty of their then existing pipe-
line facilities. In considering the adequacy of Tennes-
see's gas rese-rves, the Commission observed at page 412: 
"The Commission in its opinion dealing with 
the Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Company case (1939) 
2 FPC 29 referred to certain minimum require-
ments that an applicant must meet 1to entitle it to 
a certificate of public convenience and necessity 
under §7. In that opinion, among other require-
ments to be met by certificate applicants, i1t was 
stated that 'We are of the opinion that appli-
cants who contend that "public convenience and 
necessity" require or will require the construction 
of facilities for the transportation of natural gas 
must show that they possess a supply of natural 
gas adequate to meet those demands which it is 
reasonable to assume will be made upon them. It 
is obvious· that the public convenience and neces-
sity would not be served by certificating an appli-
cant who had an insufficient supply of the pro~ 
duct which it proposes to make available to the 
public'.'' 
After reviewing Tennessee's evidence as to ~ts sup-
ply of gas the Commission determined that Tennessee 
had not shown that it had a supply of natural gas reason-
ably adequate to meet its contracted obligations to its 
customers and the demands which it was reasonable to 
assume would be made upon it. The Commission observed 
that the extensive capital expenditures proposed by Ten-
nessee would be financed principally by sale of securi~ties 
to the public and that, in reliance upon the proposed ser-
vice to be undertaken by Tennessee, substantial capital 
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expenditures were planned to be made by its customers, 
not to mention the expenditures by ~thousands of ·gas 
consumers for appliances in expectation of gas services. 
The Commission then stated, at page 414: 
"Consumers, investors and the public gen-
erally expect to and do rely upon this Commission, 
in issuing certificates of public convenience and 
necess~ty to natural gas companies, to iss.ue certi-
ficates only to companies clearly showing ability 
to perform the services proposed. Section 7 of the 
Natural Gas Act requires such finding by this 
Commission in certificate proceedings as a con-
dition precedent to the issuance of a certificate." 
The Commission denied the cer.tificate sought and 
provided for a later hearing wherein Tennessee was 
required to make additional showing as to certain facts, 
primarily gas reserves. It is true that two Commissioners 
dissented, primarily on the ground that since this was 
an application for enlarge·ment of existing capacity, and 
not an entirely new project, and since Tennessee had 
made a substantial showing as to reserves, it should be 
given a conditional certificate. It is also true, however, 
that the dissenting Commissioners recognized thlVt there 
would be a difference in the case of a new enterprise. At 
page 418 they make the following observations : 
"As a practical matter such a showing might 
well be required in the interest of the inves~ting 
or consuming public were the surrounding circum-
stances different - as in the promotion of an 
entirely new enterprise, or where a pipe line relied 
for its gas supply on an area where large addi-
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tional reserves of gas were not known to be avail-
able or in reasonable prospect. But these are not 
the circumstances of this case." 
In answering the dissent, a commissioner of the 
majority wrote the following at page 412: 
"In our 1944 report to the Committee on 
interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House 
of Representatives, entitled 'The First Five Years 
of the Natural Gas Act,' the Commission, includ-
ing Commissioner Smith, stated: 
'Where the basic reserves of an industry 
are exhaustible, as in the case of natural gas, 
it is obviously desirable ·that, before millions 
are invested in well drilling and pipe lines 
and before thousands of consumers are in-
duced to invest in appliances, there should be 
positive determination, after public hearings, 
that the enterprise is sound and the reserves 
are sufficient to insure adequate service at 
reasonable rates over a sufficiently long per-
iod to justify every dollar honestly invested. 
'If such effective regulation had existed 
during ~the earlier days of the industry, we 
might not now be confronted in certain of 
the eastern areas with petitions for the aban-
donment of service, which will leave . com-
munities unsupplied with the gas to which 
they have grown accustomed and for the 
utilization of which they have made large 
facility investments.' (Italics supplied.) 
"The minority clearly recognize· that Tennes-
see Company sought to establish a 20-year firm 
supply of gas but failed. They also recognize that 
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additions to the gas reserves, committed to supply 
its line, are necessary. But they are willing to 
accept, in this particular case, as a substitute 
for a positive determination of adequwte gas re-
serves, the assmnption that Tennessee Company 
'vill be able to acquire additional reserves . 
.. Thus, by their dissent, the n1inority would 
effectually repudiate the statemen't quoted above, 
although only recently 'they participated in a de-
cision in the Trans-Continental Pipe Line Case 
in complete accord therewith, without the dele-
terious results which they conjure up here. It 
is a \Yell-kno,vn fact that the unanimous decision 
to reopen that case for lack of a proper showing 
on the supply side had a beneficial effect on ~the 
general availability of gas for the pipe-line market 
and that Trans-Continental was able, within a 
few weeks, to come in with a showing of dedicated 
reserves affording both investors and consumers 
co1nplete protection. 
"The faet is that the Commission has a re-
sponsibility to millions of investors as well as con-
sumers to make a positive determination that ade-
quate supplies of gas are assured. For a certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity is recognized as 
a great aid to the issuance of securities because 
it implies th8Jt the e·vidence as to adequate supplies 
of gas for the term of the f~ancial obligations 
has been well tested by an impartial body." 
The same two Commissioners who dissented in Re 
Atlantic Seaboard Corporation, supra, had this to say 
concerning the importance of a determination of natural 
gas reserves in their report to Congress entitled Federal 
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Power Commission, Natural Gas Investigation (Docket 
No. G-580) Report of Commissioners Smith and Wim-
berly (1948), at page 31: 
"For individual fields or local areas, how-
ever, estimates of natural-gas reserves have al-
ways been a requirement of the industry. Before 
a pipe-line company can justify the construction 
of a line to bring gas from a particular area to a 
market, it must know that there are sufficient 
quantities of gas available to permit prof~table 
operations. Bankers and investors, before financ-
ing gas development projects, require a determi-
nation of the gas reserves of the area being con-
sidered. Regulatory commissions, having author-
ity as to methods of financing and conditions of 
service, must be apprised of the extent of the gas 
supply before appropriate authorizations for the 
construction of pipe lines or distribution facilities 
can be granted. 
"A distribution utility also has an kterest in 
the availability of gas reserves, either in local 
areas or those within feasible distance. Not only 
is there a need for the justification of capital ex-
penditures in the expansion of facilities for new 
services, but the matter of rates, utility rules and 
regulations, and other policy considerations are 
affected by the abundance or scarcity of available I I 
gas. The consumer is, of course, anxious that 
there will he large enough quantities of gas avail-
able to afford reasonable rates for service and to 
assure him a continued use of his appliances." 
While decisions of federal commissions are not con-
clusive on a state commission, they are important au-
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thority as was said by the State Commission in National 
Tube Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Company, P.U.R. 
1918 D., page 68: 
""Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, although not binding upon a state com-
mission should be considered as persuasive 
authority by it." 
On ~the basis of the foregoing and by all reasonable 
standards, it is inescapable that an applicant for a cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity t? construct a nat-
ural gas pipeline Inust first establish as the basic pre-
requisite that it has available at its disposal sufficient 
volumes of natural gas to supply the requirements of the 
proposed line. The public interest is safeguarded only 
when the supply is sufficient to give the project a usable 
life sufficiently long to insure that ~the costs to the 
public in preparing itself to use the new facility and the 
costs to the applicant of the project, which are passed on 
to the public in the rates it pays, will be amortized over a 
reasonable period. Re Grand Rapids Gas Light Co., 
supra. 
When an applicant fails to show that it has an ade:-
quate supply of gas to furnish the needs of its proposed 
line it would seem that the logical procedure for a com-
mission ~to follow would be to either dismiss the applica-
tion or reopen the proceedings at a later date for the 
taking of additional evidence on gas supply. The Public 
Service Commission of Pennsylvania dismissed the ap-
plication in such a situation in Incorporators of Service 
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Gas Company v. Public Service Commission, (1937) 190 
Atl. 653, 18 P.U.R. (N.S.) 256. In Memphis Natural Gas 
Co., 4 F.P.C. 197, 608, the Federal Power Commission 
dismissed the application for a certificate because of 
the inadequacy of the gas supply showing and subse-
quently granted a rehearing in order to afford the ap-
plicant an opportunity to make a further showing. In 
several cases where, upon initial consideration of the 
application, the supply of natural gas available to the 
applicant has been found inadequate, the Federal Power 
Commission has reopened the proceedings for the taking 
of additional evidence on gas supply and has allowed the 
applicants a period of time within which to make a 
further showing on that subject. The periods of time 
allowed for such further showings have varied from sixty 
days (Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 3 F.P.C. 442; 
Piedmont Natural Gas Corp., March 30, 1950) and three 
months (Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., Docket No. 
G-962, September 29, 1948; San Juan Pipe Line Co. and 
El Paso Natural Gas Co. ,et al., Dockets Nos. G-1067, 
et al., July 13, 1949) to as much as six n1onths (Trans-
continental Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. G-704, Ma.rch 
31, 1948). 
(d) How Adequacy of Reserves Is Determined. 
Estimating the volume of gas reserves is not an 
exact science. The test is not to determine by mathemati-
cal calculation the exact extent of the gas reserves in 
particular reservoirs. This does not mean, however, that 
the requirements for showings of adequate gas reserves 
l I 
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are lax or haphazard. ..A..\..s the Federal Po,ver Co1nmission 
puts it, Hin evaluating the evidence as to gas reserves it 
is not realistic to atten1pt a determination of the precise 
or exact volumes of gas available to a proposed project. 
Rather we are called upon ~to determine whethe·r the 
available gas supply is sufficiently adequate to support 
the project for 'Yhieh a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity is authorized." Re 11:! ichigan-Wisconsin 
Pipe Line Co., (19±7) 67 P.U.R. (N.S.) 427. However, 
the Commission feels that its determination that ade-
quate supplies are assured must be positive determi-
nation. (See quotation from "The First Five Years of 
the Natural Gas Act,", supra.) 
To make a positive determination of adequate sup-
ply, it would seem that a commission could only rel:-.r 
upon proven reserves of natural gas; that is, reserves 
in fields where actual wells had been drilled and recoveT-
able natural gas discovered. Thus, it will be noted that 
the Michigan Public Utilities Commission, in the case of 
Re Grand Rapids Gas Light Co., supra, carefully and 
conservatively considered only estimates of proven re-
serves, or reserves from fields in which wells had been 
drilled and gas discovered and from which gas was being 
produced. 13 P.U.R.(N.S.) 451 to 454. 
In this connection, the Commission made some obser-
vations relative to natural gas reservoirs, of interest 
here, at page 449 : 
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"Natural gas in Michigan comes mostly from 
what is called Michigan stray sand. It is not found 
in open spaces or in pools. The 'pay sand' under-
lying the surface of this state is not a continuous 
sheet. In some places pay sand has been found 
to be as much as 27 to 30 feet in thickness; in other 
places it is only 2 feet thick or less. A well on 
one forty may discover commercial pay sand, 
while a well a few hundred feet away is a dry hole. 
The porosity of the sand itself frequently deter-
mines the amount of natural gas which may be re-
covered from it. More natural gas is found in 
~the interstices of pay sand which is coarse than 
can be recovered from a tightly packed sand, and 
obviously more natural gas is recoverable as the 
thickness of the pay sand increases. The amount 
of reserves of natural gas in a certain area does 
not at all depend upon the amount of so-called 
'open-flow.' A large pipe driven into pay sand of 
open porosity and of considerable depth may de-
velop an open flow in excess of 30 million cubic 
feet but this does' not increase the amount of 
gas in the area or necessarily indicate the extent 
of the reserves. As a simple comparison we may 
consider a gas area as a barrel which ho~ds only a 
certain amount of contents. Boring a large hole or 
a large number of smalle-r holes into the barrel 
may remove the contents 1nore rapidly, but only 
so much can be taken out of the barrel as it origin-
ally contained. Natural gas is not being manu-
factured underground. It is there in fixed quan-
tity, and taking out the ga.s does not increase the 
quantity. In fact, if taken out too rapidly the 
amount of recove.rable gas may be substantially 
decreased and a.s in the Muskegon field, the use-
fulness of the area may be· rapidly destroyed.'' 
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The Federal Po,ver Connnission also looks funda-
Inentally to proven reserves. Re llf ichigan-Wisconsin 
Pipe Line Co., supra, at page 442 et seq.; Re J(ansas 
Pipe Line & Gas Co., supra, at page 332 et seq. 
(e) Inadequacy of Et~idence of Reserves zn this 
Case. 
In delineating the scope of its review of proceedings 
of the Public Service Connnission of Utah under Sec. 
76-6-16, U.C.A. 1943, this Court reannounced in the 
comparatively recent case of Salt Lake & Utah R. Corp. 
et al. v. Public Service Commission of Utah, et al., (Sup. 
Ct. Utah 1944) 106 U. 403, 149 P. 2d 647, the rule which 
it had prescribed for itself, as follows : 
"Under 76-6-16 U.C.A. 1943, which provides 
that · * * * The findings and conclusions of the 
con1mission on questions of fact shall be final and 
shall not he subject to review * * *' this court has 
many times said that it is limited in its review of 
a decision of the connnission to ascel"tain whether 
the connnission had proceeded according to law 
and whether it had sufficient substantial evidence 
before it upon which to base its findings. Only 
in the event that it is apparent from the record 
~that there was not sufficient substantial evidence 
before the connnission and that its order was arbi-
trary, capricious or unreasonable, will this court 
set aside its decision. Utah Light & Traction Co. 
v. Public Service Comntission, 101 Utah 99, 118 P. 
2d 683; Mucahy et al. v. Public Service Commis-
sion, et al., 101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d 298; Salt Lake 
City et al. v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 52 Utah 
210, 173 P. 556,3 A.L.R. 715; Union Pacific Ser-
vice Commission, 103 Utah 459, 135 P. 2d 915." 
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In the recent case of Universal Camera Corporation 
v. N.L.R.B. (Supreme Court of U.S. 1951), 340 U.S. 474, 
95 L.Ed. 304, the Supreme Court of the United States 
had before it an appeal involving the question of the 
extent of ~the scope of review of appellate courts of the 
United States in cases appealed from the N.L.R.B. under 
the Taft-Hartley Law and the Administrative Procedure 
Act. The Wagner Act had originally provided that "the 
findings of the Board as ~to the facts, if supported by 
evidence, shall be conclusive." Act of July 5, 1935 §10 
(e), 49 Stat. 449, 454, ch. 372, 29 USC §160 (e). The 
Supreme Court construed "evidence" to mean "substan-
tial evidence" and hence establish the so-called substan-
tial evidence rule. Washington, V. & M. Coach Co. v. 
National Labor Relations Board, 301 US 142, 81 L.ed. 
965, 57 S. Ct. 648. 
The Administrrutive Procedure Act, dealing with ju-
dicial review of administrative proceedings in general, 
provided in part under the section dealing with scope 
of revie·w that reviewing courts should deal with ad-
ministrative actions, findings and conclusions which were 
found to be violative of certain standards there set out 
(such as arbitrary or capricious, excess of statutory jur-
isdiction, unsupported by substantial evidence and 
others) in the manner outlined. Then this section pro-
vided: "In making the foregoing dert:erminations the court 
shall review the whole record or such portions thereof 
as ma.y be cited by any party, and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error," 60 Stat. 243, 244, 
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ch. 324, 5 lT.S.C. Sec. 1009(e). The Taft-Hartley Act, 
passed subsequent to the Administrative Procedure Act, 
was made to conform to the corresponding section of 
the Administrative Procedure Act above referred to. 
In the court's opinion Justice Frankfurter struted at 95 
L.ed. 312: 
"\vnether or not it was ever permissible for 
courts to determine the subs,tantiality of evide·nce 
supporting a Labor Board decision merely on the 
basis of evidence which in and of itself justified 
it, without taking into account contradictory evi-
dence or evidence from which- conflicting inferences 
could be drawn, the new legislation definitively 
precludes such a theory of review and bars its 
practice. The substantiality of evidence must 
take into account whatever in the record fairly 
detracts from its weight. This is clearly the sig-
nificance of the requirement in both statutes that 
courts consider the whole record." 
:Further, the court stated at page 314: 
"We conclude, therefore, that the Administra-
tive Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act di-
reet that courts must now assume more respon-
sibility for the reasonableness and fairness of 
Labor Board decisions than some courts have 
shown in the past. Reviewing courts must be in-
fluenced by a feeling that they are not to abdicate 
the conventional judicial function. Congress has 
imposed on them responsibil~ty for assuring that 
the Board keeps within reasonable grounds. That 
responsibility is not less real because it is limited 
to enforcing the requirement that evidence appear 
substantial when viewed, on the record as a whole, 
by courts inves~ted with the authority and enjoy-
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ing the prestige of the Courts of Appeals. The 
Board's findings are entitled to respect; but they 
must nonetheless be set aside when the record 
before a Court of Appeals clearly precludes the 
Board's decision from being justified by a fair 
es·timate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses 
or its informed judgment on matters within its 
special competence or both. 
"From this it follows that enactment of these 
statutes does not require every court of appeals 
to alter its practice. Some -. perhaps a majority 
- have always applied the attitude reflected in 
this legislation." 
It is believed that ~the Supreme Court of Utah, in 
applying its "substantial evidence" rule to orders of the 
Public Service Commission on appeal before it, has 
consistently applied such rule in the same manner as Jus-
tice Frankfurter states that perhaps a majority of courts 
have always applied the substantial evidence rule, i.e. 
to the evidence as viewed "on the whole record." The 
very manner in which this court reviewed the evidence 
in the Salt Lake & Utah R. R. Corporation case, supra, 
indicates that it reviewed all evidence in the record perti-
nent to the points complained of and then concluded that 
the Commission had and could reasonably reach the con-
clusions it did. See also Gilmer v. Public Utilities Com-
mission. (Sup. Ct. of Utah 1926) 67 U. 222, 24 7 Pac. 284, 
and the statement at the conclusion of the court's review 
in that case at page 290. 
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Summary of Inadeq~tacy of Reserves 
What, then, did lTtah Natural Gas Company show 
in the way of reserves for its proposed pipeline~ 
Upon the basis of the evidence the only structure the 
reserves of 'vhich could be classed as proven would be 
Boundary· Butte; and, of course, that gas has a very 
low B.T.U. content, falling far short of meeting the 
market requirements as set by Utah Natural Gas Com-
pany itself of 875 B.T.U. per cubic foot. Taking the most 
favorable estii,Ilate of proven reserves at Boundary Butte, 
we find that Utah Natural Gas Company's witnesses 
estimated 133,980,000,000 cubic feet of recoverable pro;v-en 
reserves. Computing the amount of such reserves avail-
able for use in the pipeline on the same basis that Utah 
Natural Gas Company used in arriving at the amount 
of net recoverable reserves available (i.e. from approxi-
m8ltely 348 billion of proven and probable reserves they 
estimated a net available for the pipeline of 255 billion) 
we find that not more than 98 to 100 billion cubic feet 
would be available for use in the pipeline over a twenty-
year period, or roughly 13 to 14 million per day. This 
figure, of course, is based upon full ownership of the 
gas at Boundary Butte. The amount of 1:.he gas at 
Boundary Butte actually committed to the pipeline, then, 
would be only about 25 billion cubic feet of reserves 
available for the pipeline, or only about 3lf2 million cubic 
feet per day over a twenty-year period. This evidence 
was contradicted by very convincing evidence, for the 
record fairly reflects that the reserves were even smaller 
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than above set out. Compare this with the McGuire 
Company's pipeline requirement of 100,000,000 cubic feet 
a day. 
This Boundary Butte gas would necessarily have to 
be mixed with gas from some other area with a very 
high B.T.U. content in order to make it usable at all. 
And what did the Utah Natural Gas Company offer~ 
The- Greater Monticello structure, a doubtful probable 
area of gas reserves about which no one knows much 
and about which Utah Natural Gas Company offered 
pitifully little evidence upon which to base any more than 
a faint hope that gas was there. The net effect was that 
the backbone of the pipeline was left without any gas 
to support it. Nor did the "stepchild" structure of Last 
Chance offer any support. This structure, apparently an 
after-thought in the planning of the pipeline project, 
could not, with its low pressure, low B.T.U. and small 
volume reserves, furnish the sustenance needed; even 
if the fantastic claims of the witnesses of Utah Natural 
Gas Company are admitted. All in all, this is certainly 
not the "stuff' upon which pipelines are built and it cer-
tainly should not be the "stuff" upon which certificates 
are issued. 
The public Service Commission of Utah in its find-
ing specifically recognized and found that the respon-
dent had failed to establish that it had adequate pro:ven 
reserves for the pipeline sought in its Findings and 
Report. The Commission stated at page 4 : 
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HThe principal structures upon which appli-
cant relies for its sources of supply are designated 
and known as Boundary Butte, ~fonticello and 
Last Chance. Witnesses for the applicant esti-
mated recoverable reserves of gas from these 
structures of one trillion, one hundred thirty-four 
billion cubic feet. In addition the evidence indi-
cates that there are other structures located at 
points and places along the course of applicant's 
proposed pipe line and in the southeasterly part 
of the State of Utah which are likely sources of 
additional supplies of natural gas. None of the 
fields from which the applicant proposes to ob-
tain gas, however, have been sufficiently explored 
to prove the extent of the reserves." 
(f) s~trnmary 
From the foregoing it 1s submitted that, in safe-
guarding the public interest as the paramount concern, 
the basic fundamental prerequisite to the issuance of a 
certificate that present or future convenience and neces-
sity does or will require the construction of a gas pipeline 
is a showing that the ap·plicant for such certificate has 
an adequate supply of natural gas to supply the needs 
of such pipeline in the form of adequate, available, proven 
reserves of natural gas. It is fuJ'Ither submitted that, 
by all reasonable and recognized standards, the Utah 
Natural Gas Company has wholly failed to show such 
reserves and that the record in this case contains no 
competent substantial evidence which would establish 
that such prerequisi~te has been met. In fact, the, evidence 
in the record shows clearly 'that respondent Utah Natural 
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Gas Company has available inconsequential and wholly 
inadequate supplies of gas for its pipeline. The Com-
mission, in its Findings and Report, so held. In view of 
the fact that the applicant, Urtah· Natural Gas Company, 
failed to establish that it had met such a fundamental 
prerequisite, the Commission erred in finding that a 
certificate of public convenience and necess~ty should be 
granted to Utah Natural Gas Company. 
POINT B 
"(b) THAT THE COMMISION ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND 
NECESSITY SHOULD BE GRANTED TO THE APPLICANT, 
UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY, IN THAT THE RECORD 
CONTAINS NO COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
TO SUSTAIN A REQUIRED SHOWING THAT FIR.M COM-
MITMENTS F R 0 M FINANCIALLY RESPONSIBLE 
SOURCES FOR THE REQUIRED FINANCING OF THE 
PIPELINE HAVE BEEN MADE, BUT ON THE CONTRARY, 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE APPLICANT HAS 
NO FIRM COMMITMENTS FOR THE REQUIRED FINANC-
ING AND CANNOT OBTAIN SUCH COMMITMENTS UNTIL 
SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROVEN GAS RESERVES 
MAY BE AVAILABLE TO APPLICANT." 
STATEMENT UNDER POINT B 
The Utah Natural Gas Company was organized for 
the express purpose of transporting gas through its 
proposed pipeline. The corporation was set up with 1000 
shares of stock outstanding wi~th a par value of $1.00 
per share, all of which was subscribed by Mr. McGuire, 
its president (R.21). President McGuire advanced money 
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or incurred indebtedness to the extent of $77,760.79 for 
expenses of the co1npany ( R. 505), and this was added to 
the capitalization of the con1pany as reflected by Exhibit 
68 (R. 943-947) and ~Ir. McGuire was to take stock in 
return ( R. 946). 
Witness niehrten, for Utah Natural Gas Company, 
in Exhibit 42, page 4, offered a proposed plan of financ-
ing "for purposes of illustration only" whereby the funds 
required for financing the $32,000}000 pipeline project 
might be raised (R. 258-9). 
Witness McGuire stated that he had undertaken to 
procure financing for the pipeline and that he had pro-
cured a commitment from a responsible financial house 
that would undertake to finance the construction of the 
line (R. 37-8). The letter (supra) from Lehman Brothers 
to Utah Natural Gas Company, dated July 25, 1950, intro-
duced as Exhibit 45, was offered as the commitment above 
referred to. 
Utah Natural Gas Company also introduced a second 
letter from Lehman Brothers to Mr. John A. McGuire, 
President, Utah Natural Gas Compay, dated January 
23, 1951, as Exhibit 53, which letteT stated, in effect, that 
Lehman Brothers had employed two individuals to make 
a report on proven gas reserves dedicated to supplying 
the pipeline. 
Utah Natural Gas Company witnesses Fell and 
Rusmisel testified in effect that the letter of July 25, 
1950 was not a firm commitment to make a loan and 
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that considerable developme~nt work remained to be done 
before they would be ready to make a commitment (R. 
457-461, 471-472.) 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT B 
The second fundamental prerequisite to the issuance 
of a certificate is a showing ,that the applicant has ade-
quate means of financing the proposed construction. 
Before a commission can reasonably say ~that the public 
convenience and necessity require a such construction" 
(76-4-24, U. C. Anno. 1943) it would seem elementary 
that it must inquire into, and be satisfied with, the ade-
quacy and soundness of the proposed financing of the 
projected construction. Logically, this entails a showing 
by an applicant that either it has the requisite ability 
itself or that it has a firm commitment to furnish such 
financing from some source which has such financial 
ability. From an observance of the Rules of Practice and 
Procedure of the Public S-ervice Commission of Utah, it 
is apparent that such commission has so conceived its 
purpose and function. Section 11.2 of such Rules requires 
that applications for certificates of convenience and 
necessity must show, in addition to other requirements, 
"a statement showing the financial condition of the ap-
plication" and "the manner in which it is proposed to 
finance the operation." The commissions and courts of 
other states have also so conceived the requirement of 
such a showing in order to safeguard the public interest 
involved. 
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The Supren1e Court of Wisconsin in 1931 had before 
it a case which involved the question of 'vhether or not a 
commission could require a showing of adequate financ-
ing in reference to proposed construction under a cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity. Union Co-operative 
Telephone Company vs. Public Service Commission of 
Wisconsin (Sup. Ot. Wisconsin 1931) 239 N.W. 409, 
P.U.R. 1932B, 269. The facts in the case reveal that the 
Ontario & Wilton Telephone Co. served a small com-
lnnnity in Wisconsin. The Company proposed a change 
in rates and the citizens, resenting this change in rates 
allowed by the Railroad Commission, organized the 
Union Co-op for the purpose of furnishing compe·ting 
telephone service. Union Co-op applied for a certificate 
and was turned down by the Railroad Commission on 
the grounds that the dissatisfied patrons had not ex-
hausted the remedies available for improvement of the 
service. This was an appeal, with the Public Service 
Commission, successor to the Railroad Commission, as 
defendant on appeal. The Public Service Commission on 
appeal did not agree with the Railroad Commission's 
reason for dismissing the application, but maintained 
that the failure to sho-\v proper financial ability was suf-
ficient reason for the denial. In reference to this point 
the Supreme Court said at P.U.R. 1932B, page 272: 
" . . . While the· Public Service Commission 
does not approve the reason assigned by the 
former Railroad Commission for the denial of 
the certificate it does approve of the determina-
tion, because there was no showing made by the 
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applicant that i't possessed the proper financial 
ability to install and maintain a competing utility. 
This seems to be a condition required by many 
Public Service Commissions before such a certifi-
cate will be granted. Re Gulick (1925) 26 CoL 
R.C.R. 312, P.U.R. 1925E, 359; Re Fulton Petro-
leum Corp. (Colo. 1930) P.U.R. 1931A, 373; Re 
Wyoming-Montana Pipe Line Co. (Wyo. 1930) 
P.U.R. 1931B, 63; Re Universal Bus Line Co. (Ill. 
1922) P.U.R. 1923B, 90; ReSt. Louis-Kansas City 
Short Line R. Co. (1925) 15 Mo. P.S .. C.R. 327 
344. The Supreme Court of Illinois set aside a 
certificate of convenience and necessity issued by 
the Public Service Commission of that state, for 
the reason that the application was not supported 
by proof showing that the applicant possessed the 
financial ability to furnish an adequate service 
or to otherwise discharge its duties as a public 
utility in the field which it was authorized to 
enter. Roy v. Illinois Commerce Commission, ex 
rel. North Shore Connecting R. Co. (1926) 322 
Ill. 452, 153 N.E. 648. Such a showing would seem 
to be a very reasonable requirement if exacted by 
the administrative body as a condition precedent 
to the issuance of the certificate, and all that can 
be said is that this would seem to furnish an addi-
tional reason justifying the withholding of the 
certificate by the Railroad Commission. The de-
termination of the Railroad Commission here 
challenged was fully justified by either of the 
considerations above mentioned ... " 
Under a statute almost identical to the Utah Statute 
here involved, the Missouri Public Service Commission, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
57 
in Re Achtenberg (1934) 8 P.U.R. (N.S.) 1937, had this 
to observe about the requirement of adequate financing, 
at pages 410-411: 
'~Respecting the suitability of the applicant 
and his associates to perform this function we 
mean, of course, no inquiry as to personal fitness 
but n1ean that before granting the certificate 
prayed, we should exainine a concrete proposal 
and ascertain 'vhether i.t is reasonably adapted 
to serve permanently the public need which we 
have found to exist. This involves the financial 
feasibility of the project generally and also the 
probable stability and soundness of the particular 
securities to be offered .to the public for sale. We 
take this responsibility seriously and are gratified 
that in the present period of unprecedented fi-
nancial distress and disorder, no secured obliga-
tion ever approved by this Commission is in de-
fault in this state. 
"The proposed financing of the applicant is 
in our judgment too uncertain and vague for us to 
place the stamp of our approval upon it in ad-
vance. The amount which the applicant will have 
to pay for the properties in question is as yet 
unascertained. The amount which can reasonably 
be anticipa;ted to be derived from the sale of pre-
ferred stock is wholly conjectural. The amount of 
the proposed borrowing from the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation is dependent upon the 
amount derived fron1 the sale of the preferred 
stock and is, consequently, equally vague. This 
Commission has not as ye:t had occasion to pass 
upon the method by which the requirements of 
the RFC may be reconciled with the principles of 
finance heretofore deemed essential by the Com-
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miSSion. The principal difficulty which we appre-
hend grows out of the requirement that such gov-
ernment loans shall be self-liquidating that is, 
that the company shall devote enough of its earn-
ings to effect retirement of this indebtedness with-
in a period prescribed by the RFC. We have not 
yet formulated a method by which this require-
ment can be reconciled with the principle that the 
utility is authorized to charge such rates as will 
yield a fair return upon the fair value of the 
property used and useful in the public service, 
and no more. The actual retirement of such a loan, 
not by way of consumption of capital by use in 
the public service, but by charging rates which 
will enable the amount of such capital to be defi-
nitely withdrawn from the project, presents a 
question of considerable difficulty for which we 
have not yet found or been obliged to find a solu-
tion. F·or these reasons we withhold expression 
of approval or disapproval of the applicant's pro-
posed financial arrangements." 
The New York Public Service Commission has had 
at least two interesting cases dealing with the point under 
discussion. In Re Buffalo Jitney Owners Association 
(1923) P.U.R. 1923C, 645, there were involved applica-
tions for certificates to institute a bus line. The appli-
cation of Buffalo was denied and one of the primary 
reasons for such denial was lack of a plan upon which to 
finance the acquisition and operation of the bus line. 
Concerning this the Conrmission said at pages 653-654: 
"* * * the petitioner has no funds with which 
to finance the enterprise and has no definite plans 
for procuring such funds. 
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''There is n suggestion that a corporation may 
be forined later 'vlrich will be capitalized at $150,-
000, about $75,000 of 'vhich it is said will be fur-
nished by the members of the association and the 
other $75,000 by citizens and business men of 
the City of Buffalo. If stock of this amount were 
sold, it would provide only $150,000 of the $350,-
000 which the association esti1nates will be re-
quired to purchase 50 busses. But there is nothing 
definite as to 'vhere any of the money is coming 
from. Even in respect of the $150,000 which the 
association hopes to raise by the sale of stock, 
nothing has been done, no subscription paper has 
been circulated, and in the words of the President 
of the association, there is 'nothing binding' so 
far as the sale of stock is concerned." 
In Re Niagara (New York Public Service Commis-
sion 1916) P.U.R. 1917A, 278, the New York Commis-
sion had before it another application for a certificate 
of convenience and necessity, this time to construct a 
railroad. In holding that the applicant had failed to 
show that public convenience and necessity required such 
construction, the Commission said this in relation to 
financing at page 286 : 
"As to financing the Niagara River & Eastern 
Railvvay, the record does not disclose any agree-
ment on the part of any person to furnish the 
necessary moneys. The only evidence produced 
before the Commission on this important subject 
is found in the :testimony of Mr. Frank A. Dudley, 
who presented certain letters and telegrams from 
three incorporators, which were claimed to be suf-
ficient to show that those who sent them could 
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be relied upon to furnish the necessary funds. 
Mr. Edward G. Connette, of Buffalo, the Presi-
dent of the International Railway Company, 
stated that 'when necessary consents from public 
authorities are obtained, I shall assist as far as 
possible in the financing of the proposition.' Mr. 
E. R. Wood of Toronto, a man of financial impor-
tance, telegraphed that 'when the company se-
cures the necessary rights and permission, I will 
be glad to assist in financing.' Mr. Clifford D. 
Beebe of Syracuse, the President of a syndicate of 
electric railroads in Central New York, wrote that 
'in refinancing the Niagara River & Eastern Rail-
road, our associates in connection with New York, 
Buffalo and Canadian interests will be prepared 
to carry our share of the cost of that enterprise.' 
The communications, which are given verbatim, 
· contain all the facts which may be claimed as a 
basis for any agreement, subscription or obliga~ 
tion on the part of any person to assist in financ-
ing this project." 
The Federal Power Commission has also con-
sidered and made requirements concerning the proposed 
financing of any project coming before it on an applica~ 
tion for a certificate of convenience and necessity. In 
its first case under the Natural Gas Act, Re Kansas Pipe 
Line & Gas Company, (1939) 30 P.U.R. (N.S.) 323, supra, 
the Commission announced certain fundamental pre-
requisites which must be established prior to the issu-
ance of a certificate of convenience and . necessity. 
The requirement of adequate natural gas reserves has 
been heretofore referred to and discussed under Point 
A. In reference to financing, the Commission had this 
to say at pages 342-343 : 
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"\"\T e believe that applicants for certificate:s 
. of convenience and necessity should show that 
they possess adequate financial resources with 
which to construct the facilities for which certifi-
cates are sought. Other regulatory Commissions 
have denied applications for certificates where 
the applicants have been unable to show adequate 
financial resources. Re Niagara River & E. R. Co. 
(X.Y. 1916) P.U.R. 1917 A, 278; Re Buffalo Jitney 
Owners As so. (N.Y.) P.U.R. 1923C, 645; Re Wyo-
m·ing-lllontana Pipe Line Co. (Wyo. 1930) P.U.R. 
1931B, 63; see also Re Carver (Colo. 1922) P.U.R. 
1923B, 242. When we consider that. one effect of 
the issuance of a certificate to construct and 
operate facilities to and in a given area is to pre-
clude from that territory other construction or 
operation except under a certificate issued by 
us, the necessity that the present applicants be 
financially able to consummate their proposed 
construction becomes the more apparent. 
"In the instant proceedings the applicants 
have stated that they intend to rely for their fi-
nances entirely upon the successful disposition of 
applications each has filed with the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation. Witnesses for both 
applicants have testified that for projects of the 
magnitude of those here under consideration the 
ordinary financial channels are closed ; that the 
sale of securities to the general public in custo-
mary fashion is impossible for this type of pro-
ject .. We pass no comment upon this latter con-
tention other than to note that neither applicant 
appears to have seriously made any attempt to 
finance through such channels. 
"Neither applicant has submitted any firm 
co1nmitment from the Reconstruction Finance 
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Corporation that that organization will loan ap-
plicants the necessary funds. The record is silent 
upon the subject of the terms, conditions, type 
of security, method of repayment, amount, and 
other details of any financing program. Under 
these circumstances we could justifiably deny the 
applications before us; certainly we cannot 
authorize the issuance of unconditional certificates 
or, without assurance on this vital point, make 
a finding that the present or future public con-
venience and necessity requires or will require the 
construction and operation of the proposed facili-
ties. 
"However, we have been informed from the 
beginning that applicants intended to finance 
through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
and there is evidence in the record to the effect 
that that body had informed the applicants that 
action on their pending applications for loans 
would be held in abeyance until applicants had 
presented their applications for certificates to 
this Commission. Unde·r these circumstances we 
do not feel it expedient presently to deny and dis-
miss the applications forthwith solely for lack of 
proper financial support. 
"We have no desire to foreclose the considera-
tion of these matters by the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation. We realize that the standards 
by which applications are judged by the two 
agencies may vary and the matters on which we 
place e.mphasis may not be the same which the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation considers 
important. 
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"Accordingly with regard to this matter we 
find that: neither applicant has made a satis-
factory showing that it possesses the requisite 
financial ability to construct the facilities for 
'vhich certificates are sought: applicants must, 
therefore, make further showing satisfactory to 
us that they have secured adequate finances with 
'vhich to prosecute the proposed undertakings be-
fore we can finally dispose of the pending appli-
cations." 
The Commission has continued to adhere to this 
requirement of a showing of adequate financing as a 
prerequisite to the issuance of a certificate of convenience 
and necessity. 
The record in the proceedings before the Commis-
sion in this case fails to show any definite plan of fi-
nancing or any firm commitment from any financially 
responsible source to guarantee that the project will be 
financed. In fact, not only does the record fail to show 
such, but it affirmatively establishes that such facts did 
not exist at the time of the hearing. The letter from 
Lehman Brothers to Utah Natural Gas Company, dated 
July 25, 1950, (Exhibit 45) was introduced to show that 
the applicant, Utah Natural Gas Company, had a firm 
commitment for financing of the gas pipeline. Actually, 
as can be readily seen from the letter it is nothing more 
than a statement by Lehman Brothers that if all the con-
ditions as there set out are met, it will undertake to 
provide adequate financing. Exhibit 53, a letter from 
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Lehman Brothers to the President of Utah Natural Gas 
Company, dated January 23, 1951, adds nothing to the 
letter it supplements, insofar as a firm commitment for 
financing is concerned. 
Mr. Mehrten, the Certified Public Accountant wit-
ness for Utah Natural Gas Company, offered for "pur-
poses of illustration only" his idea as to a possible break-
down and ratio of securities which could be used in pro-
curing funds wi:th which to finance the proposed pipeline. 
Such ideas were indeed meager and vague (R. 258-9, 
Ex. 42, page 4). In testifying in relation to such "illustra-
tion," witness Rusmisel, an executive with Lehman 
Brothers, stated at page 474 of the Record: 
"Q. Have you discussed with him (Mehrten) in 
what proportion the stock and the bank loans 
would be to make up the $3,000,000~ 
"A. Well, I have discussed this with him. I don't 
know that I attempted to tell Mr. Mehrten 
how we would vary this, because I understood 
that this was being used for illustrative pur-
poses really, and I think my own testimony 
has to be treated pretty much on the srune 
basis." 
In relation to a general plan of financing Mr. Rusmisel 
stated, at page 4 70 of the Record : 
"Q. As a matter of fact, the truth is that you 
don't have a definite plan set up and agreed 
to on this project, do you~ 
"A. No. I think it is impossible to have a definite 
plan at this time." 
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Concerning :the July 25, 1950 letter (Ex. 45) and the 
so-called "commitment" to finance supposedly containe.d 
therein, ·utah Natural Gas Company's witness Fell, a 
partner in Lelunan Brothers, testified as follows, at pages 
457-458 of the Record: 
"Q. Lehman Brothers today is not committed to 
make any loan is it~ 
"A. No Sir." 
"Q. You have given a letter of intent, isn't that 
all this is~ 
"A. Yes, but I'd like ... I think it is only fair 
to say that we have given more thought to this 
than just a letter of intent. As I said earlier, 
we do not write these letters as a means of 
obtaining a call on a piece of business." 
"Q. We are discussing whether or not there is 
a firm commitment to make a loan. That is all 
I am asking you, Mr. Fell. 
"A. This is not a firm commitment to make a 
loan as of today." 
In discussing the matter of reserves and the geologi-
cal report on reserves which Lehman Brothers would 
require as a prerequisite to financing, witness Fell testi-
fied at R. 459-61 : 
''Q. Why haven't you as yet hired the engineers 
to make this report~ 
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"A. Well, I don't believe that ... Now, this is my 
opinion, not as a geologist at all or as a petro-
leum engineer, or really knowing much at all 
about the gas and oil business ... it doesn't 
seem to me that there has been enough de-
velopment in this area probably to ... or the 
rest of the development required to build ... 
well, to complete this whole project to where 
a report at this :time would be of much use to 
you. 
"Q. In other words, it is your opinion that on 
the basis of the proven reserves up to this 
date it wouldn't support any such financing 
as we are talking about~ 
"A. The estimated proven reserves as of today? 
"Q. Y s· es, 1r. 
"A. It would not." 
* * * 
"Q. Now, you have heard the testimony, you are 
aware that some 60 per cent of the prodected 
gas comes from Greater lVIonticello, which 
the applicant itself treats as possible reserves, 
or probable reserves, isn'~t that true~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Then, rn your oprn1on, do you think that 
would require considerable development be-
fore you would be satisfied that that was a 
proven field~ 
"A. I think Monticello would require considerable 
development, or, if not Monticello, so1nething 
else. 
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"Q. I see. Then at best there is a great deal of 
""'"ork to be done before you will be ready to 
make a commitment 1 
" .. A... Yes, Sir." 
Concerning the same subject, witness Rusmisel stated the 
following at page 4 71 : 
"A. Well, that report would have to show ... 
as I understood most of the testimony that 
has been given, a large percentage of the re-
serves have been designated as estimated 
reserves. We understand that there is a great 
deal of exploration work going on now and 
planned, and that report would have to show 
that these reserves had passed from the cate-
gory of 'estimated reserves' to 'proven re-
serves,' so that we would be assured of a suf-
ficient supply of gas for the line. 
"Q. For a reasonable period of :time~ 
"A. For a reasonable period of time, that's cor-
rect. As a matter of fact, I would say in that 
connection, a minimum of 20 years." 
From the evidence in the record, it is readily seen 
that Utah Natural Gas Company did nort have itself the 
financial ability to construct the line and that it had no 
firm commitment from a financially responsible source 
for the required financing of the pipeline. In fact, the 
evidence in the record clearly shows that the financial 
source upon which Utah Natural Gas Company has 
relied will not, and cannot, furnish such commitment 
until the time when adequate proven reserves have been 
shown rto be available to the pipeline. 
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Obviously Mr. McGuire had gone to Lehman Bros. 
and stated that it would help him before the Commission 
if he had something in writing which indicated Lehman 
Bros. might be interested in the financing. The attempt 
to construe the Lehman Bros.' le'tter (Ex. 45, R. 1084) 
as a financial commitment is pure distortion. Lehman 
Bros. considered it no such commitment and the letter 
is the kind that could be written on any project no matter 
how fantastic. Further, the Commission recognized the 
inadequacy of the financial arrangements offered by the 
Utah Natural Gas Company in that it provided in its 
Findings and Report that the certificate which it was to 
grant should be conditioned upon the requirement that 
within one year Utah Natural Gas Company should "file 
wi'th this Commission the unconditional commitment of a 
financial house of recognized responsibility committing 
itself to supply the funds necessary for the construction 
of the pipeline and the facilities to be installed by Utah 
Natural Gas Company." 
It is not here being contended that complete and 
minute financial details are absolutely necessary at the 
initial hearing concerning an application for a certificate 
of convenience and necessity. Furthermore, it is not 
here being contended that in certain circumstances a 
certificate cannot be issued with the attachment of a 
condition :to later furnish adequate evidence of firm 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
69 
commitments of complete financing. In situations where 
an applicant has shown that it has available adequate 
supplies of natural gas and that the pipeline itself is 
economically feasible, a Commission might conclude that 
the procurement of adequate financing would be rela-
tively easy, and under such circumstances the C.ommis-
sion might conclude that the issuance of a certificate with 
a condition that the evidence of firm commitments for 
financing could be later shown. 
In Docket No. G-704, In the Matter of Trans-Con-
tinental Gas Pipe Line Company, Inc., Opinion No. 165, 
May 29, 1948, the Federal Power Commission had before 
it the reopened proceedings concerning the application 
of Trans-Continental for a certificate to construct a 
natural gas pipeline from South Texas to New York City 
and other points in the East. After reviewing the record 
as to other points and finding that the proposed project 
was economically feasible, the Commission said, in rela-
tion to the plan of financing, the following: 
"Trans-Continental proposes a capitalization 
consisting of Bonds and Bank Loans equalling 
78%, Preferred Stock 12%, and Common Stock 
10%. Applicant's witnesses testified that con-
versations with responsible financial institutions 
indicated that the Applicant could issue the 
twenty-year serial bonds at a cost of 3¥2% to 
334% and obtain ten-year bank loans at approxi-
mately 3%, dependent upon market conditions at 
the time of the financing. The President of Trans-
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Continental stated that he had entered into no 
firm commitments for financing the project at 
this time. We recognize that more definite com-
Initments on the part of the Applicant or financial 
institutions are not feasible or to be expected at 
this stage. 
"Applicant's witnesses testified that prefer-
red stock representing 12% of the total capitaliza-
tion could be issued at a cost to the Applicant 
slightly in excess of 5%, with the qualification 
that dependent upon market conditions at the 
time of financing, it may be necessary to issue 
Common Stock in conjunction with the sale of 
the Preferred Stock. Testimony also has been 
presented indicating that with the possible excep-
tion of the Common Stock which may be issued 
in connection with the sale of the Preferred S.tock, 
none of the Common Stock would be initially of-
fered to the public. 
"On the basis of the financial'testimony in the 
record, the recent firming of contracts providing 
for gas reserves over a probable twenty-year 
period, and the willingness of the marketing com-
panies to purchase the gas at rates which will 
carry the project, it appears that the proposed 
plan of financing is economically feasible. How-
ever, since Trans-Continental has not entered into 
any firm com1nitments concerning its proposed 
financing, it seems reasonable in the public in-
terest to require the submission by Trans-Con-
tinental of a definite plan of financing for con-
sideration by the Commission, including full des-
cription of the securities to be issued and the 
teTms and conditions of the sale thereof." 
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It will be noted in connection with the above Federal 
Power Conunission opinions that in each instance the 
Commission had before it far more definite plans of 
financing than 'vere presented in the hearing involved 
in this appeal. Furthermore, it will also be noted that in 
each instance the Con1mission was dealing with situations 
where the evidence presented by the applicants had con-
clusively established that the applicant in each case had 
adequate and sufficient supplies of natural gas to furnish 
the anticipated needs of their respective projects over 
the life of such pipe lines. It appears to be in such an 
instance only that the Federal Power Commission ":ill 
allow any'ihing less than an absolute showing of a firm 
commitment for financing a particular proposed project. 
Certainly, in a situation where an applicant has failed 
to prove that it has adequate reserves, the Federal Power 
Commission or any other Commission can ill afford to 
issue a certificate on such meager showing of financial 
commitments as was presented in this proceeding below. 
From the foregoing, it is submitted that a funda-
mental prerequisite to the issuance of a certificate "that 
present or future convenience and necessity does or will 
require such construction" is a showing that the appli-
cant for such certificate has adequate means of financ-
ing the proposed construction. This would necessarily 
mean that an applicant must either have the financial 
ability to carry out the construction itself or a firm com-
mitment from a financially responsible source commit-
ting such source to the financing of such construction. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
72 
The record in this case contains no competent substantial 
evidence which would establish that such prerequisite 
had been made. In fact, the evidence in the record shows 
clearly that respondent Utah Natural Gas Company ·has 
no firm commitments for the required financing and can-
not obtain such commitments until such time as adequate 
proven reserves are available to the pipeline. The evi-
dence here is of the same character as, and surely no 
stronger than, the evidence relied upon by applicants 
in the cases of Re Buffalo-Jitney Owners Association 
andRe Niagara, supra. The Commission, in its Findings 
and Report, in effect, so held. In view of the fact that 
the applicant, Utah Natural Gas Company, failed to 
establish that it had met such a fundamental prerequisite, 
the Commission erred in finding that a certificate of pub-
lic convenience and necessity should be granted to Utah 
Natural Gas Company. 
POINT C 
"(c) THAT THE COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS 
JURISDICTION IN GRANTING SUCH CERTIFICATE 
AFTER FINDING IN EFFECT: (1) THAT APPLICANT 
DOES NOT HAVE ADEQUATE PROVEN GAS RESERVES 
COMMITTED TO THE LINE; AND (2) THAT APPLICANT 
DOES NOT HAVE FIRM COMMITl\iENTS FOR THE RE-
QUIRED FINANCING OF THE LINE." 
STATEMENT UNDER POINT C 
The Commission found in effect that Utah Natural 
Gas Company did not have adequate proven reserves 
of natural gas available for its pipeline. Quoting from 
' I 
II 
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the Findings and Report of the Commission we find 
these statements in relation thereto: 
at page 4: 
"The principal structures upon which appli-
cant relies for its sources of supply are designated 
and known as Boundary Butte, Monticello and 
Last Chance. Witnesses for the applicant esti-
mated recoverable reserves of gas from these 
structures of one trillion, one hundred thirty-four 
billion cubic feet. In addition the evidence indi-
cates that there are other structures located at 
points and places along the course of applicant's 
proposed pipe line and in the southeasterly part 
of the State of Utah which are likely sources of 
additional supplies of natural gas. None of the 
fields from which the applicant proposes to obtain 
gas, however, have been sufficiently explored to 
prove the extent of the reserves. 
at page 5: 
"From the foregoing general findings, the 
Commission expressly finds that public conven-
ience and necessity require that the quantity of 
natural gas applicant proposes to furnish be sup-
plied to the area within the State of Utah covered 
by the application, and if adequate gas reserves 
are proved as herein provided public convenience 
and necessity require the construction, operation 
and maintenance of the pipe line and facilities 
proposed hy the applicant. 
at page 6: 
"The Commission further finds that the esti-
Inated reserves in the area where the applicant 
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has gas purchase con tracts are sufficient, if 
proved, to make the construction of applicant's 
pipe line and facilities economically feasible. 
* * * 
"The Commission further finds that if said 
reserves are proved, the applicant can secure gas 
purchase contracts to deliver the gas so proved 
and developed into its pipe line." 
The Commission then concluded that the certificate 
should issue to Utah Natural Gas Company, but upon 
the condition, among others, that: 
"Concurrently with the furnishing of such 
commitment and as a part thereof, Utah Na;tural 
Gas Company shall file with this Commission the 
certificate of an independent geologist of recog-
nized professional standing, acceptable to this 
Commission, that there are proven gas reserves 
committed to Utah Natural Gas Company ade-
quate to justify the construction of the line and 
facilities;" 
Further, the Commission found in effect that Utah 
Natural Gas Company did not have- firm commitments 
for the required financing of the line. Quoting from the 
Findings and Report of the Commission: 
at page 5: 
"Lehman Bros., a reputable and responsible 
financial house of New York City, has committed 
itself to furnish the necessary financing for the 
construction of the applicant's pipe line provided 
that a study by a geological firm acceptable to 
Lehman Bros. finds that exploration and develop-
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ment work proves that there are sufficient de-
veloped gas reserves available to make the opera-
tion of applicant's proposed pipe line economically 
feasible. 
at page 6: 
HThe Conunission further finds that the op-
eration of the pipe line will be economically feas-
ible with the available market if the estimated 
reserues are proved; and that if said pipe line is 
economically feasible the applicant can secure the 
necessary financing for the construction of the 
same." 
The Commission then concluded that the certificate 
should issue to Utah Natural Gas Company, but upon 
the condition, among others, that: 
"File 'vith this Commission the unconditional 
co1nm·itment of a financial house of recognized 
responsibility committing itself to supply the 
funds necessary for the construction of the pipe 
line and facilities to be installed by Utah Natural 
Gas Company;" 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
UNDER POINT C 
This point is closely allied with points "A" and "B" 
but because the respondents claimed before the Commis-
sion that Section 76-4-24, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
permits the Commission to issue conditional certificates 
we will elaborate on the effect of such a section where 
the fundamental requirements of adequate proven gas 
reserves and the necessary financing are not fulfilled. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
76 
Obviously the legislature never intended by Section 76-
4-24 to give the Commission a "blank check" in the issu-
ance of certificates. The legislature realized that there 
might be occasions when substantially all of the require-
ments had been met by the applicant but that some minor 
showing was lacking. To argue otherwise would be to 
in effect say that all that an applicant need do is make 
a written application to the Commission for a certificate 
and the Commission will then issue the certificate but 
impose the necessary conditions. A careful examination 
of the section which vests in the Commission the power 
to issue the certificate (Section 76-4-24) makes clear 
that public convenience and necessity would not require 
a particular service or a particular commodity from an 
applicant unless he had that which the public needed. 
That is to say, the Commission must find that public 
convenience and necessity "require such construction." 
The Commission cannot properly safeguard the pub-
lic interest by ruling, in effect, that it would be nice to 
have a gas pipeline into the Salt Lake City area supply-
ing 100,000,000 cubic feet of gas per day and, although 
you, Utah Natural Gas Company, have not shown that 
you have that much gas available nor the necessary 
financial arrangements to carry it through, we will, 
nevertheless, give you a certificate to build such pipeline 
and a year within which to find the gas which you hope 
to find and to get the financial commitments which you 
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hope Y?U can get. The statute allows no roo1n for such 
a procedure. And yet, that is exactly what the Commis-
sion did in this case. 
It is true that Section 76-4-24, U.C.A. 1943, provides 
that the Commission may attach "to the exercise of the 
rights granted by said certificate such terms and condi-
tions as in its judgment public convenience and necessity 
1nay require." As one authority pointed out, such a pro-
vision is common in such statutes, and at the time he 
wrote, he listed some twenty-three states as having such a 
provision in their statutes. Hall, Certificates of Con-
venience and Necessity, (1930) 28 Michigan Law. Rev. 
276, 296. Furthermore, the statute creating the Federal 
Power Commission has a similar provision. 15 U.S.C.A. 
Sec. 717 f (e), supra. In discussing such a provision, 
~fr. Hall had this to say at 28 Michigan Law Review, 
page 297: 
, 
"The proVIsion that 'conditions' may be at-
tached to certificates is designed to give the Com-
mission a greater regulative control over the 
particular utility than it might otherwise possess. 
That body can n1ake regulations which it would 
be unable to make under its general statutory 
control. It also enables the Commission to make 
different regulations for different applicants. 
Such a provision makes for more flexibility in 
regulation, as t.he Commission can fit the condi-
tions which it attaches to each individual case." 
Undoubtedly, legislatures intended such provisions 
as a means to allow commissions to more efficiently carry 
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out their regulatory duties under the various statutes 
involved. In accordance with such view, commissions have 
attached such conditions as the securing of necessary 
authorizations from the S·ecurities and Exchange Com-
mission to the issuance of securities, Re Michigan-Wis-
consin Pipe Line Co. (F.P.C. 1947) 67 P.U.R. (N.S.) 427, 
requiring a taxicab company to make adequate provision 
for public liability insurance, Re Sun Cab Co., P.U.R. 
1930 D, 260, the making of a certificate non-assignable, 
Re Rodgers (Colo. 1940) 35 P.U.R. (N.S.) 379, and other 
requirements relating to the methods of construction and 
the quality and exte~t of service in relation to rates and 
other such matters, Dept. of Public Utilities v. McConnell 
(Sup. Ct. Ark. 1939) 30 P.U.R. (N.S.) 53, 130 S.W. 2d 9. 
No case has been found where a commission issued 
a certificate with a condition allowing and requiring the 
applicant to later show, after the record had been closed, 
the very basic facts for which the hearing was held to 
determine. Nor does Section 76-4-24, U.C.A. (1943), 
indicate that the legislature had any such thing in mind. 
In fact, the wording of the statute indicates clearly the 
contrary. S·ubsection (3) thereof provides that the Com-
mission has power to refuse to issue the certificate or to 
issue it for all or a part of the construction requested 
and may attach to the exercise of the rights granted 
such terms and conditions as in its judgment public con-
venience and necessity may require. But, as required by 
Subsection (1), the certificate, when it is issued, must 
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be based upon the Co1nmission's determination, properly 
arrived at after the hearing provided for in Subsection 
(3), that the public convenience and necessity does or 
will require such construction. As heretofore pointed out, 
such a determination could not properly be made without 
having first determined, at least, that the applicant had 
an adequate supply of natural gas in the form of proven 
reserves committed to the pipeline. and adequate financ-
ing. This the Conrmission recognized, in effect, as is 
clearly shown by the manner in which its Findings and 
Report and Order condition everything upon the propo-
sition "if the reserves are proved," so to speak. 
If the Commission can issue such a certificate as 
it did in this case, then it has in effect done away with 
the requirement in Subsection (1) that the public con-
venience and necessity does or will require such construc-
tion and the requirement for a hearing in Subsection (3). 
Yet, it, is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that 
significance and effect should be accorded every part of 
an act, including every paragraph, sentence, clause, 
phrase and word. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 358, page 
362; Dunn v. Bryant (Sup. Ct. Utah 1931) 299 P. 253. 
What alternatives are open to a Commission in a 
situation of this sort 1 As heretofore pointed out under 
Point A, when an applicant has failed to show that it has 
an adequate supply of gas to furnish the needs of its 
proposed line, it would seem that the logical procedure 
for a coinmission to follow would be to either dismiss the 
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application or reopen the proceedings at a later date for 
the taking of additional evidence on gas supply. The Pub-
lic Service Commission of Pennsylvania dismissed the 
application in such a situation in Incorporators of Serv-
ice Gas Company v. Public Service Commission (1937) 
190 Atl. 653, 18 P.U.R. (N.S.) 256. In Memphis Natural 
Gas Co., 4 F.P.C. 197, 608, the Federal Power Commission 
dismissed the application for a certificate because of 
the inadequacy of the gas supply showing and subse-
quently granted a rehearing in order to afford the appli-
cant an opportunity to make a further showing. In 
several cases where, upon initial consideration of the 
application, the supply of natural gas available to the 
applicant has been found inadequate, the Federal Power 
Commission has reopened the proceedings for the taking 
of additional evidence on gas supply and has allowed the 
applicants a period of time within which to make a 
further showing on that subject. The periods of time al-
lowed for such further showings have varied from sixty 
days (Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 3 F.P.C. 442; 
Piedmont Natural Gas Corp., March 30, 1950) and three 
months (Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., Docket No. 
G-962, September 29, 1948; San Juan Pipe Line Co. and 
El Paso Natural Gas Co., et al., Dockets Nos. G-1067, 
et al., July 13, 1949) to as much as six months (Trans-
continental Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. G-704, March 
31, 1948). 
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In Re Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co. (1941) 40 
P.U.R. (N.S.) 129, the Tennessee· Commission, where they 
considered the evidence of finances inadequate, directed 
the applicant to present its plan of financing the project 
within 120 days from the date of their order. After stat-
ing that all requirements, other than financing, had been 
met, the Commission said, at page 145: 
"It therefore follows that if the further show-
ing made by the applicant, Tennessee Gas and 
Transmission Company, on the matter of the ade-
quacy of its financing, is satisfactory to the Com-
mission, it is then the intention of the Commission 
to authorize the issuance of a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity to the Tennessee Gas 
and Transmission Company to authorize the 
construction and operation of facilities for the 
transportation or sale of natural gas in the state 
of Tennessee in the various communities which 
it is proposed to serve, under the conditions re-
cited and set forth hereinabove with reference to 
the service of particular customers. This dispo-
sition of the application is based upon the facts 
shown in the record presently before the Com-
mission. In arriving at the final disposition of 
the case, it is intended to take into considera-
tion any changed facts and circum.stances that 
may bear upon these proceedings, either as a 
result of our direction for further showings by the 
applicant, or otherwise. Nothing in this order 
shall be construed to prevent consideration by the 
Commission of any other application. 
"It is accordingly ordered by the Commission 
that this cause be retained on the docket of the 
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Commission for such further and future disposi-
tion as may be warranted upon future proceed-
ings in this cause." 
Whatever may have been a proper procedure for the 
Commission to follow, it is submitted that the procedure 
actually followed was not it. To illustrate the futility 
of the actual manner in which the Commission handled 
this case, let us consider what might happen during the 
wild search for gas. 
As heretofore pointed out, the whole pipeline project 
of applicant depends upon a finding of tremendous, high 
B.T.U. content gas at Greater Monticello, because the 
only way the gas a:t Boundary Butte can be utilized is 
by mixing that gas with such large quantities of high 
B.T.U. gas. But suppose those reserves are not found 
at Greater Monticello, but at some other point not as 
conveniently located as Greater Monticello in relation 
to the proposed pipeline. Or, suppose the required vol-
umes of and B.T.U. content gas are found at several 
other points removed from the proposed line. Or, sup-
pose Last Chance might conceivably be the structure 
where the large volumes of gas are found (which is, 
of course, not admitted but denied). There the gas is 
very low in B.T.U. content,_ and the whole pipeline project 
would have to be revised. The possibilities of varying 
conditions could he enumerated indefinitely. In any 
of such events, the Commission, the applicant-respondent 
and all the persons concerned would have to virtually 
start over to determine whether or not the pipeline of 
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applicant 'vould be required by the public convenience 
and necessity. The order granting the certificate is speci-
fic and grants the right of construction as originally 
proposed. If the reserves were found at other locations 
as above indicated, requiring a different pipeline system, 
then the certificate would be inadequate and inaccurate 
and construction thereunder would probably be illegal. 
What does this mean~ It means that the applicant-
respondent's project and activities had not reached the 
state of development where it was ready for a certificate, 
and the Commission, in attempting to award such certifi-
cate exceeded its power under the statute. 
On the basis of the foregoing, it is submitted that 
the legislature has prescribed in Section 76-4-24, U.C.A. 
1943, that before the Commission can issue a certificate 
it must properly determine that the public convenience 
and necessity require the particular construction pro-
posed by an applicant; that this requires a de'termination 
as pointed out under Points A and B, that, at least, the 
applicant has adequate reserves and adequate financing, 
and that, by allowing the Commission to attach to a certi-
ficate "such terms and conditions as in its judgment pub-
lic convenience and necessity may require," the legisla-
ture did not intend that the Commission could, by the 
use of such conditions, allow the applicant to forego the 
::· showing of such basic prerequisites at the hearing and 
later show them after the hearing and the record had been 
closed. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
84 
Mark K. Boyle, Deputy Attorney General and coun-
sel for the Commission, summed up the matter in no 
uncertain terms: (R. 479) 
"Mr. Boyle: Isn't it true that if Lehman 
Brothers have not given a commitment and don't 
promise to give one until further exploratory work 
is done and more reserves are proven, that a 
certificate from the Commission will not by any 
means guarantee the existence or construction of 
a pipeline, and that it appears to me that the Com-
mission should have the same information that 
Lehman Brothers insists upon. * * *" 
POINT L 
"(l) THAT THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT THE 
HEARING WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT OR JUSTIFY 
THE FINDINGS AND REPORT AND ORDER OF THE COM-
MISSION." 
This point will be presented under two sub-points as 
follows: (1) the evidence ·introduced at the hearing was 
insufficient to support or justify, generally, the substance 
of the Findings and Report and Order to the effect that 
the public convenience and necessity requires the issuance 
of the certificate to Utah Natural Gas Company and, 
specifically, the finding that "if adequate gas reserves 
are proved as herein provided public convenience and 
necessity require the construction, operation and main-
tenance of the pipeline and facilities proposed by appli-
cant;" and (2) the evidence introduced at the hearing 
was insufficient to support or justify the finding that 
the project proposed by Utah Natural Gas Company 
will be economically feasible. 
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SUB-POINT (1) 
"THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT THE HEARING WAS INSUFFI-
CIENT TO SUPPORT OR JUSTIFY, GENERALLY THE SUBSTANCE OF THE 
FINDINGS AND REPORT AND ORDER TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PUBLIC 
CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY REQUIRES THE ISSUANCE OF THE 
CERTIFICATE TO UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY AND, SPECIFICALLY, 
THE FINDING THAT 'IF ADEQUATE GAS RESERVES ARE PROVED AS 
HEREIN PROVIDED PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY REQUIRE 
THE CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE PIPE-
LINE AND FACILITIES PROPOSED BY APPLICANT.'" 
STATEMENT UNDER SUB-POINT (1) 
To avoid undue repetition, the statements heretofore 
made under Points A, B, & C, are adopted as statements 
under this subpoint. In addition, it will be noted that the 
C.ommission, in its Findings and Report (Exhibit "C" to 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari) found specifically at 
page 5 thereof : 
"From the foregoing general findings the 
Commission expressly finds that public conveni-
ence and necessity require that the quantity of 
natural gas applicant proposes to furnish be sup-
plied to the area within the state of Utah covered 
by the application, and if adequate gas reserves 
are proved as herein provided public conveni-
ence and necessity require the construction, op-
eration and maintenance of the pipe line and 
facilities proposed by the applicant." 
ARGUMENT UNDER SUB-POINT (1) 
Let us assume first that Utah Natural Gas Company 
can do all that it hopes it can do in relation to its pro-
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posed pipeline system. That is, assume for the purposes 
of argument that they will find the reserves of natural 
gas they hope to find in the locations they are relying 
upon; and let us assume that they are successful in 
procuring the necessary gas purchase contracts; and 
let us assume that they are successful in procuring ade-
quate finances for the proposed construction; and that 
they are successful in constructing the project according 
to the plans and financial estimates they have offered; 
and, finally, let us assume that they are successful in 
negotiating and procuring the necessary gas sales con-
tracts to users in the Salt Lake City market at the prices 
they hope to get in order to make their project pay. As-
suming all of the foregoing, the evidence introduced at 
this hearing was insufficient to support or justify the 
findings that 'the public convenience and necessity re-
quired the issuance of the certificate to Utah Natural 
Gas Company. 
As heretofore pointed out several times (see pri-
marily Arguments under Points A, B and C), the pri-
mary duty of the Commission in proceedings of this sort 
is to look to and safeguard the interest of the public who 
will be served (or dis served) by a proposed utility serv-
Ice. 
This duty of commissions to look to and safeguard 
the public interest requires that, where conflicting appli-
cations are before it to serve substantially the same area 
with substantially the same service, a commission must 
dete·rmine which of the conflicting applicants will best 
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serve the interest of the public. When only one appli-
cant is before the commission, obviously its only duty 
is to determine whether or not that applicant and the 
service which it proposes are in the public interest. How-
ever, when two or more applicants seek to perform sub-
stantially the same service, then the commission's duty is 
to determine whether either one of the applicants and 
its project can meet the public convenience and necessity, 
and then if both can, "\vhich one will do the better job. 
And priority in time of filing applications should enter 
into the commission's determination as a factor influ-
encing its decision only after the commission has deter-
mined that the applicants can equally meet the public 
interest and requirements in all other respects. 
As has been pointed out throughout this brief, the 
Commission here had before it applicants with conflicting 
applications. From the very beginning, the Commission 
consistently foreclosed, by denial of complete interven-
tion, separate hearing of petitioner's application or joint 
hearing with the Federal Power Commission, any con-
sideration of petitioner's application whatsoever and pro-
ceeded to issue the certificate to the Utah Natural Gas 
Company. It is submitted that by so doing the Commis-
sion has failed and refused to perform its primary duty 
and it has thereby rendered itself incapable of finding 
that the public convenience and necessity require the 
construction proposed by the Utah Natural Gas Com-
pany. 
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However, we cannot indulge the assumptions that 
Utah Natural Gas Company will be as successful as it 
hopes to be. As heretofore pointed out under Points A 
and B, Utah Na;tural Gas Company has miserably failed 
to show by competent substantial evidence that it has 
either adequate proven gas reserves or adequate financial 
arrangements whereby its proposed construction is in 
any sense of the word practical or feasible. As also 
pointed out under the Arguments and Authorities under 
those Points A and B and under Point C, showing of ade-
quate proven gas reserves and adequate financial ar-
rangements are, as minimal requirements, basic pre-
requisites to a finding by the Commission that the public 
convenience and necessity does require "such construc-
tion." Tlie Commission found, in effect, as pointed out 
in the Argument and Authorities under Point C, that 
Utah Natural Gas Company had failed to show that it 
had either adequate proven gas reserves or adequate 
financial commitments. The Commission has recognized 
by conditioning its order granting the certificate to the 
effect that such needs must be shown before the cons'truc-
tion under the certificate can be in the public interest 
and required by the public convenience and necessity 
under Section 76-4-24, U.C.A. (1943), that such showings 
are necessary for valid certification. 
Under such circumstances, it is submitted that the 
evidence introduced in the proceedings is wholly insuffi-
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cient to support or justify the action and the Findings 
and Report and Order taken and entered by the C.om-
nnssion. 
SUB-POINT (2) 
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT THE HEARING WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT OR JUSTIFY THE FINDING THAT THE PROJECT PROPOSED 
BY UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY WILL BE ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE. 
STATEMENT UNDER SUB-POINT (2) 
In presenting its case in support of its application 
for a certificate before the Commission, Utah Natural 
Gas Company presented testimony of a general nature 
in an attempt to show that there would be a demand for 
gas in Salt Lake City. It presented a witness who gave 
his opinion, as a result of general surveys of the com-
munity, as to the possible demands for natural gas in 
the Salt Lake City area in the future. He concluded by 
giving estimates of certain volumes which could be used 
by three segments of the community-home and small 
commercial users, general industrial users and, if they 
were there, chemical industrial users ( R. 414-430). Other 
witnesses offered testimony to the effect that their com-
panies might or could use gas if it were available, but 
these other witnesses accounted for only a total of ap-
proximately 3 million cubic feet of gas per day (R. 353-
60, 390-394, 408-414, 430-434) . 
Mr. McGuire, president of Utah Natural Gas Com-
pany, testified that when he first considered the proposed 
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pipeline he talked with three of the large industrial users 
in the Salt Lake City area in relation to gas purchase 
contracts. In those conversations he testified that he 
proposed a price of 22lj2 ¢ per thousand cubic feet (R. 520-
521). No gas sales contracts with these large industrial 
users (or any other potential users) were offered in 
evidence by U'tah Natural Gas Company. The price pro-
posed and relied upon by Utah Natural Gas Company in 
its calculations and evidence was 23%¢ per thousand 
cubic feet to industrial users (R. 521). 
The Commission found in its Findings and Report, 
Exhibit "C" of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 
page 6 thereof : 
"The Commission further finds that the esti-
mated reserves in the area where the applicant 
has gas purchase contracts are sufficient, if 
proved, to make the construction of applicant's 
pipe line and facilities economically feasible." 
* * * 
"The Commission further finds that the op-
eration of the pipe line will be economically feas-
ible with the available market if the estimated 
reserves are proven." 
ARGUl\fENT UNDER S·UB-POINT (2) 
Couched in n~merous "ifs," the Findings and Report 
of the Commission contain the equivocal determination 
that the project outlined by the respondent is economi-
cally feasible-this in spite of the fact of complete fail-
ure to prove adequate reserves, adequate financing and 
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commitments by prospective purchasers of natural gas. 
Apparently, the sole consideration has been that there 
exists a market in 'vhich natural gas is sorely needed, and 
such consideration has been given undue weight by the 
C-ommission in its deliberations in this case. 
Once it has been proved to the satisfaction of the Com-
mission that there exists a 1narket, the serving of natural 
gas to the market being required by public convenience and 
necessity, the Commission should then require that the 
applicant prove a plan which is economically feasible, i.e., 
a plan which, in reasonable probability, will be successful. 
Such finding of economic feasibility should be based on 
clear and concise proof of ( 1) the existence of adequate 
reserves, the cost of developing same, and the ability of 
the applicant or its associates to meet such cost; (2) the 
cost of laying, operating and maintaining the necessary 
pipeline, compressor stations and related facilities, and 
the ability of the applicant to meet such cost; and (3) 
firm commitments by prospective purchasers of natural 
gas to purchase same at a price certain, as and when 
delivered, adequate enough to repay investment costs. 
The inadequacy. of proof relative to the first two 
matters has already been discussed hereinbefore. 
With reference to the third matter mentioned above, 
i.e., whether or not the respondent has firm commitments 
from prospective purchasers of its gas in the Salt Lake 
City area, the attention of t.he Court is invited to those 
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portions of the Record mentioned above, a reading of 
which will indicate that at no place in the hearing con-
cerning the respondent's application did the respondent 
offer proof of the existence of firm commitments from 
prospective purchasers of its natural gas. True, a num~ 
ber of witnesses stated that a certain volume of natural 
gas, insignificant in relation to the total proposed vol-
ume, of a certain B.T.U. content could be used by their 
companies in the operation of their plants. There is also 
testimony in the record that Mr. McGuire conferred with 
prospective purchasers of natural gas in the Salt Lake 
City area at some indefinite dates in the past, that a price 
of 'twenty-two and a half cents (22¥2¢) per thousand 
cubic feet was discussed at these conferences, and that 
such conferences never ripened into the execution o.f 
definite contracts by which prospective purchasers bound 
themselves to purchase a certain .~mount of gas of a 
certain B. T. U. content at a price certain, as and when 
delivered to their plants by the respondent. It is also 
to be noted that the above witnesses from specific com-
panies placed on the stand by the respondent, with a view 
to proving up the fact of a market which was ready 
and willing to purchase its gas, were witnesses having 
an engineering or technical background, these witnesses 
at no place in their testimony stated the price at which 
their firms or companies would purchase this gas and, 
in fact, such witnesses were unable and unwilling to at-
tempt to hind the corporations they represented. 
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It is not sufficient to say that, since natural gas is 
sorely needed in the Salt Lake City area, those corpora-
tions desiring to purchase such gas are willing to pay any 
price at which such gas is delivered. Apparently, the 
officials of the three large industrial users (Kennecott, 
American Smelting & Refining Co., and Utah Power & 
Light Co.) to whom Mr. McGuire talked knew that Delhi 
Oil Corp. had the gas and that Mr. McGuire could not 
supply them with their much needed requirements, be-
cause these officials didn't waste time by making any 
agreements with Utah Natural Gas Company. In brief, 
no matter how much natural gas is desired and needed 
in the Salt Lake City area, it is futile to authorize the 
construction of a pipeline by respondent if the company 
cannot render such service adequately and at a price 
which is agreeable to the prospective purchasers. It is 
interesting to note in this connection that, whereas Utah 
Natural Gas Company has estimated the cost of its pipe-
line to be Thirty-two 1\fillion Dollars ( $32,000,000.00), 
Utah Pipe Line, in its petition in intervention in this 
matter, the proof of which was not allowed by the Com-
tnission, estimated the cost of its pipeline to be Twenty-
Two Million Dollars ($22,000,000.00). Any rate which is 
charged by the respondent, if, as and when it delivers 
natural gas to the Salt Lake City area, must, of necessity, 
be based upon all of its costs incurred in developing re-
sources and laying, n1aintaining and operating its pipe-
line. Any rate charged on the basis of a Thirty-Two Mil-
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lion Dollar ( $32,000,000.00) pipeline will, of necessity, be 
higher than a rate charged on the basis of a Twenty-Two 
Million Dollar ( $22,000,000.00) pipeline. 
Thus, the Record in this case clearly indicates an 
utter lack of a reasonable guarantee by the respondent 
that its natural gas will be purchased when delivered to 
'the Salt Lake City area. Without proof of firm commit-
ments by prospective purchasers, how can the Commis-
sion state in its Findings and Report that respondent's 
project is economically feasible~ The argument can well 
be made that corporations in the Salt Lake City area 
will purchase natural gas, as opposed to other fuels, only 
if such purchases are of economic benefit to their oper-
ations. Natural gas, at a rate which precludes economic 
operation of a business, will receive no buyers. 
The Alabama Public Commission, having before it 
an application for the extension of an electric transmis-
sion line in Re Alabama Power Co. (1923) P.U.R. 1923 
E, 828, at page 833, made the following observation: 
"WhetheT the application is for authority to 
construct a new plant or to make an extension 
of an existing system not in the usual course of 
business, the burden is upon the applicant to show 
there is a reasonable guaranty of sufficient busi-
ness ~to warrant to the public a sufficient opera-
tion of a permanent utility enterprise 
* * * 
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~'The fact that the utility must balance the 
burden of risk of unfavorable results that may 
follo-\v the investment in either a new· plant or 
the extension of an existing system does not ex-
empt the Commission from responsibility of ex~ 
ercising its best judgment as to whether the 
authorization of the investJ;nent is justified, and 
as to ,,~hether the rights, welfare and interest of 
the general public will be advanced." 
Economic feasibility of proposed construction is a 
factor considered by other commissions. See, for example, 
Re Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co., Tenn. R. R. and 
P. U. Comm. (1941), 40 P.U.R. (N.S.) 129, at page 139. 
Also, see Re Atlantic Gulf Gas Co., Federal Power Com-
mission Opinion No. 207, Docket No. G-887, February 28, 
1951. 
Thus, in this case, on the basis of mere discussions 
of possible purchases of natural gas by industries in the 
Salt Lake City area, the Commission has found respon-
dent's project to be economically feasible-such discus-
sions centering around the need for gas and apparently 
reaching no concrete agreement as to purchases of such 
gas at a price certain. It is conceded that industries in 
the Salt Lake City area will purchase natural gas if it 
can be made available at a price which is not prohibitive; 
but, the respondent has failed to produce gas sales con-
tracts at the price at which it proposes to deliver natural 
gas, and has failed to prove that it will have enough 
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buyers at such proposed price to serve as a reasonable 
guarantee of such business to warrant a finding that its. 
projeet will be economically feasible. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Findings and 
Report do not support the Order .and the issuance of the 
Certificate. 
II. THE COMMISSION UNLAWFULLY DELE-
GATED TO AN UNKNOWN AND UNDETERMINED 
GEOLOGIST THE POWER WITHIN ONE YEAR TO 
MAKE THE DETERMINATIONS REQUIRED BY 
LAW OF THE COMMISSION AND TO THEREBY 
PERFECT AND EXTEND THE McGUIRE COM-
PANY CERTIFICATE; THIS ACTION OF THE 
COMMISSION VIOLATED THE C.ONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS OF PETITIONER. POINT D. 
POINT D 
"(d) THAT THE COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS JUR-
ISDICTION IN ORDERING THAT 'AN INDEPENDENT 
GEOLOGIST OF RECOGNIZED PROFESSIONAL STANDING 
ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMMISSION' MAY WITHIN ONE 
YEAR OF APRIL 7, 1951, FILE WITH THE COMMISSION 
A CERTIFICATE, THAT IN THE GEOLOGIST'S OPINION 
'THERE ARE PROVEN GAS RESERVES COMMITTED TO 
UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY ADEQUATE TO JUSTIFY 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LINE AND THE FACILI-
TIES' AND IN THEREBY PERMITTING SUCH GEOLOGIST 
TO CONCLUSIVELY DETERMINE THE ADEQUACY OF 
THE ALLEGED GAS RESERVES WITHOUT FURTHER 
HEARING THEREON, AND WITHOUT FURTHER DE.TER-
MINATION BY THE COMMISSION; THAT SUCH DELE-
GATION OF AUTHORITY WAS UNLAWFUL AND IN EX-
CESS OF THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSION IN THAT IT 
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PERMITS SUCH GEOLOGIST TO PERFORM THE FUNC-
TIONS AND MAKE THE DETERMINATIONS EXCLU-
SIVELY RESERVED TO THE COMMISSION; THAT SUCH 
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY WOULD PERMIT SUCH 
GEOLOGIST EX PARTE AND WITHOUT FURTHER HEAR-
ING TO FULFILL THE PRINCIPAL REQUIREMENT IN THE 
COMMISSION'S ORDER AND MAKE PERMANENT THE 
CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY NO. 
925." 
STATE:JIENT UNDER POINT D 
The Commission made the following statements in 
its Findings and Report: 
(1) "None of the fields from which the applicant 
proposes to obtain gas, however, have been sufficiently 
explored to prove the extent of the reserves" (R. 1168). 
(2) "From the foregoing general findings, the Com-
mission expressly finds that public convenience and 
necessity require that the quantity of natural gas appli-
cant proposes to furnish be supplied to the area within 
the State of Utah covered by the application, and if ade-
quate gas reserves are proved as herein provided public 
convenience and necessity require the construction, op,era-
tion and maintenance of the pipe line and facilities pro~ 
posed by rthe applicant" (R. 1169). 
(3) "The Commission further finds that the esti-
mated reserves in the area where the applicant has gas 
purchase contracts are sufficient, if proved, to make the 
construction of applicant's pipe line and facilities eco-
nomically feasible" (R-1169). 
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( 4) "The Commission further finds that if said 
reserves are proved, the applicant can secure gas pur-
chase contracts to deliver the gas so proved and de-
velop·ed into its pipe line" (R. 1169). 
( 5) "The Commission further finds that the opera-
tion of the pipe line will be economically feasible with the 
available market if the estimated reserves are proved; 
* * *" (R-1169). 
( 6) "* * * and that if said pipe line is economically 
feasible the applicant can secure the necessary financing 
for the construction of the same" (R-1170). 
( 7) "The Commission further concludes, however, 
that conditions should be imposed upon such authority 
so granted requiring that within one year from the date 
the order granting such certificate of convenience and 
necessity shall be effective said Utah Natural Gas Com-
pany shall 
'(b) Concurrently with the furnishing of 
such commitment and as a part thereof, Utah 
Natural Gas Company shall file with this Commis-
sion the certificate of an independent geologist of 
recognized professional standing, acceptable to 
this Commission, that there are proven gas re-
serves committed to Utah Natural Ga.s Company 
adequate to justify the construeJtion of the line 
and facilities;' " (R. 1170). 
In its Order granting Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity No. 925 (Exhibit D), on page 10 (R-1173) 
the Commission ordered as follows: 
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-'IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and made condi-
tions of the certificate of convenience and necessity 
herein issued that within one year from the date this 
order shall be effective, said Utah Natural Gas Compan.y 
shall 
'(b) Concurrently with the furnishing of 
such commitment and as a part thereof, Utah 
Natural Gas Company shall file with this Commis-
sion the certificate of an independent geologist 
of recognized professional standing acceptable to 
this Commision that there are proven gas reserves 
committed to Utah Natural Gas Company ade-
quate to justify the construction of the line and 
facilities.' 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That if said Utah 
Natural Gas Company shall fail within said one year 
period to comply with the conditions herein imposed, then 
the certificate of convenience and necessity hereb~ 
granted shall be null and void." 
It can readily be seen that the Commission admitted 
six times in its Findings and Report that the respondent 
failed to show sufficient proven reserves of natural gas 
entitling it to a certificate of convenience and necessity. 
In its Findings and Report, the Commission stated six 
times that respondent must yet prove an adequate gas 
supply, and gave respondent one year to prove an ade-
quate gas supply. In its Findings and Report, and in its 
Order, the Commission held that respondent can prove an 
adequate gas supply by filing with the Commission the 
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certificate of an independent geologist of recognized 
professional standing, acceptable to the Commission, that 
there are proven gas reserves adequate to justify the 
construction of the line and facilities. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT D 
The Argwnent and Authorities will be presented 
under the following subdivisions: 
(1) Such action of the Commission violates 
the due process clauses of the Constitutions of the 
State of Utah (Sec. 7, Art. 1) and the United 
States of America (Sec. 1, F·ourteenth Amend-
ment) in that it is a denial of the character of 
hearing guaranteed by such clauses. 
( 2) Such action of the Commission in effect 
leaves its finding on a material fact based solely 
on hearsay evidence. 
(3) By such action the Con1mission has ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction in that it has improperly 
delegated to an unnamed geologist, chosen and 
paid by the respondent, the Com1nission's sole and 
non-delegable power to determine the adequacy 
of the respondent's gas supply. 
* * * * 
( 1) Such action of the Commission violates 
the due process clauses of the Constitutions of the 
State of Utah and the United States of America 
in that it is a denial of the character of hearing 
guaranteed by such clauses. 
It will be noted that subsection ( 3) of Section 76-4-24, 
U.C.A. (1943), requires that the C-ommission have a hear-
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ing before it enters its order either denying or issuing a 
·certificate of eonvenience and necesity. As may be readily 
seen from Chapter 6 of Title 76, U.C.A. (1943), and 
especially Sections 1, 10 and 16 thereof, the legislature 
contemplated that such hearing be a full hearing with 
the right of all parties to be heard and to present evi-
dence, to cross-examine and rebut evidence of others, and 
with the requirement that the Commission make findings 
and issue its orders based thereon. The Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure of the Commission have so .construed 
the statutory requirements. 
It is fundamental that the requirements of due pro-
cess of law apply to administrative proceedings as well 
as to judicial proceedings. As stated in 42 Am. Jur., 
Public Administrative Law, Section 137, pages 4 79-80: 
"An administrative hearing in the exercise 
of judicial or quasi-judicial powers must be fair, 
open, and impartial. The right to such a hearing 
is an inexorable safeguard and one of the rudi-
ments of fair play assured to every litigant by the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a minimal requirement. 
There can be no compromise on the footing of con-
venience or expediency, or because of a natural 
desire to be rid of harassing delay, when that 
minimal requirement has been neglected or ig-
nored. The breadth of administrative discretion 
places in a strong light the necessity for main-
taining in its integrity the essentials of a fair 
and open hearing. When such a hearing has been 
denied, the administrative action is void. The re-
quirements of fairness are not exhausted in the 
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taking or consideration of evidence, but extend 
to the concluding parts of the procedure as well 
as to the beginning and intermediate steps." 
In fact, the very reason legislatures require hearings 
is to comply with the procedural requirements of due 
process of law. Quoting from 42 Am. Jur., supra, Section 
138, pages 481-2: 
"* * *. The manifest purpose of requiring a 
hearing is to comply with the requirements of due 
process of law. If such requirements are met 
under the circumstances of the particular proceed-
ing involved, the hearing is sufficient; and to 
render a hearing unfair, the defect or the practice 
complained of must be such as might lead to a de-
nial of justice, or there must be an absence of one 
of the elements deemed essential to due process 
of law. A requirement of a hearing in the exer-
cise of quasi-judicial powers has obvious reference 
to the tradition of judicial proceedings with re-
spect to those fundamental requirements of fair-
ness which are of the essence of due process in 
a proceeding of a judicial nature. A requirement 
of a full hearing means one in which ample op-
portunity is afforded to all parties to make, by evi-
dence and argument, a showing fairly adequate to 
establish the propriety or impropriety, from the 
standpoint of justice and law, of the steps asked to 
be taken. Under general requirements applicable 
to quasi-judicial proceedings, or under the re-
quirement of a full hearing, a party has the right 
and the hearing must afford him the opportunity, 
to defend the right involved, by argument, proof, 
and the cross-examination of witnesses, and the 
trier of the facts must reach his decision in :tc-
cordance with the facts proved. * * *" 
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In Morgan v. Un,ited States (Sup. Ct. lLS. 1936) 298 
U.S. 468, 80 L. Ed. 1288, 1\Iorgan had been a party to a 
hearing held pursuant to an order of the Secretary of 
Agriculture directing an inquiry into the reasonableness 
of existing rates charged by Inarket agencies for buying 
and selling livestock at the Kansas City Stock Yards. The 
statute under \vhich the Secretary had proceeded pro-
vided that, "after full hearing," if the Secretary was 
of the opinion that rates charged were unjust, un-
reasonable or discriminatory, he could determine and 
prescribe what rates should thereafter apply. 80 L. Ed. 
1291. On appeal 1\Iorgan was attacking the order entered 
by the Secretary as void on the grounds that he had not 
been accorded the requisite hearing. The Court, through 
Chief Justice Hughes, had this to say concerning the 
raising of the due process question at 80 L. Ed. 1293: 
"* * * in determining whether in conducting 
an administrative proceeding of this sort the Sec-
retary has complied with the statutory prerequi-
sites, the recitals of his procedure cannot be re-
garded as conclusive. Otherwise the statutory 
conditions could be set at naught by mere asser-
tion. If upon the facts alleged, the 'full hearing' 
required by the statute was not given, plaintiffs 
were entitled to prove the facts and have the 
Secretary's order set aside. Nor is it necessary 
to go beyond the terms of the statute in order to 
consider the constitutional requirement of due 
process as to notice and hearing. For the statute 
itself demands a full hearing and the order is 
void if such a hearing was denied. (Citing cases)." 
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In Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co. (Sup. Ct. 
U.S. 1938) 305 U.S. 175, 83 L. Ed. 111, the Supreme 
Court of the United States again had before it the ques-
tion, among others, of what a statutory requirement of 
a hearing meant. As stated by the Court, in an opinion 
again by Chief Justice Hughes, at 83 L. Ed. 114: 
"The Railway Labor Act, which applies to 
railroads engaged in interstate commerce, excepts 
any 'interurban' electric railway unless it is oper-
ating as a part of a general steam-railroad system 
of transportation. The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission is 'authorized and directed upon request 
of the Mediation Board or upon complaint of any 
party interested to determine after hearing 
whether any line operated by electric power' falls 
within the exception. * * *" 
In discussing the statutory prov1s1on the Court 
stated, at 83 L. Ed. 116: 
"The requirement of a 'hearing' has obvious 
reference 'to the tradition of judicial proceedings 
in which evidence is received and weighed by the 
trier of the facts.' The 'hearing' is 'the hearing of 
evidence and argument.' Morgan v. United States, 
'298 U.S. 468, 480, 80 L. ed. 1288, 1294, 56 S. Ct. 
906. And the manifest purpose in requiring a 
hearing is to comply with the requirements of due 
process upon which the parties affected by the 
determination of an administrative body are en-
titled to insist. Interstate Commerce Commission 
v. Louisville & N.R. Co. 227 U.S. 88, 91, 57 L. ed. 
431, 433, 33 s. Ct. 185. * * *" I I 
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In Alabama Po'lDer Co,mpany 1\ City of Fort Payne 
(Sup. Ct. Ala., 1939) 237 Ala. 459, 187 So. 632, 123 A.L.R. 
1337, the Alabama Supreme Court had before it an appeal 
somewhat similar to the one now before this Court. Pur-
suant to the Alabama statutes, the city of Fort Payne 
applied to the Public Works Board of Alabama for per-
mission to issue municipal revenue bonds for partial fi-
nancing of a municipal electric distribution system in 
Fort Payne. The statute provided that such permission 
could be granted only after a public hearing. The Board 
set it down for hearing and Alabama Power Company in-
tervened and contested the issuance of such bonds and 
thereafter appealed from an order consenting to such 
issuance. In connection with the Point here under dis-
cussion, the Court had this to say at 123 A.L.R. 1343: 
"We do not think it can be doubted that the 
proceedings authorized to be had before, and by, 
the Board are of a character quasi judicial, in 
which due process must be observed, and pre-
served to all persons whose legal rights may be 
involved, and concluded by the deliberations and 
determinations of the Board. Such proceedings 
require the taking and weighing of evidence, and 
a finding of fact based upon a consideration of 
the evidence, and the making of an order sup-
ported by a finding upon substantial evidence 
given before the Board. 
"Nor will any one doubt, we take it, that the 
'public hearing' provided for in the act 'has ob-
vious reference to the tradition of judicial pro-
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ceedings in which evidence is received and weighed 
by the trier of the facts.' ~ ~ *" (Citing and quot-
ing from Morgan v. United States, supra.) 
The Court concluded, at 123 A.L.R. 1345: 
• 
"We are, therefore, at the conclusion, (a) that 
the intervenor had such an interest in the proceed-
ings before the Board of Public Works as entitled 
it to intervene in the proceedings there held; (b) 
that such proceedings required a public hearing; 
(c) that they have the character of a quasi judicial 
proceeding, in which the right of due process must 
not be ignored; * * *" 
In general, "due process, of course, requires that 
commissions proceed upon matters in evidence and that 
parties have opportunity to subject evidence to the test 
of cross-examination and rebuttal." Market Street R. Co. 
v. Railroad Commission of California (Sup. Ct. U.S.., 
1945) 324 U. S. 548, 89 L. Ed. 1171, 1182. See also author-
ities cited above. 
It is true, of course, that administrative bodies such 
as the Public Service Commission of Utah, even where 
they are acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, are not limited 
by the strict rules of courts concerning procedure and 
admissibility of evidence. 76-6-1, U.C.A. (1943). But, as 
stated by Justice Cardoza in Ohio Bell Telegraph Co. v. 
Public Utilities Commission (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1937) 301 U. 
S. 292, 304, 81 L. Ed. 1093, 1101 : 
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"Regulatory comn1issions have been invested 
with broad po,vers within the sphere of duty as-
signed to them by law. Even in quasi- judicial 
proceedings their informed and expert judgment 
exacts and receives a proper deference from 
courts \vhen it has been reached "\vith due sub-
mission to constitutional restraints. (Citing 
cases). Indeed, much that they do within the 
realm of administrative discretion is exempt from 
supervision if those restraints have been obeyed. 
All the more insistent is the need, when power has 
been bestotved so freely, that the 'inexorable safe-
guard,' * * * of a fair and open hearing be main-
tained in its integrity. (Citing cases). The right 
to sttch a hearing is one of 'the rudiments of fair 
play' * * * assured to every litigant by the Four-
teenth Amendment as a minimal requirement. 
(Citing cases). There can be no compromise on 
the footing of convenience or expediency, or be-
cause of a natural desire to be rid of harassing 
delay, when that minimal requirement has been 
neglected or ignored." 
The Supreme Court of the United States had earlier 
made the following observation in Interstate Commerce 
Commission v. Louisville d!; N. R. Co. (U. S. Sup. Ct. 
1913) 227 U. S. 88, 93, 57 L. Ed. 431, 434 : 
"* * * But the more liberal the practice in 
admitting testimony, the more imperative the obli-
gation to preserve the essential rules of evidence 
by which rights are asserted or defended. In such 
cases the Commissioners cannot act upon their 
own information, as could jurors in primitive 
days. All parties must be fully apprised of the 
evidence submitted or to be considered, and must 
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be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, 
to inspect documents, and to offer evidence in ex-
planation or rebuttal. In no other way can a 
party maintain its rights or make its defense. 
In no other way can it test the sufficiency of the 
facts .. to support the finding; for otherwise, even 
though it appeared that the order was without 
evidence, the manifest deficiency could always be 
explained on the theory that the Commission had 
before it extraneous, unknown, but presumptively 
sufficient information to support the finding." 
As pointed out in United States v . .Abilene & S. R. 
Co. (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1924) 265 U. S. 274, 68 L. Ed. 1016, 
1023, by Justice Brandeis, the evidence upon which an 
administrative body acts quasi judicially must be the 
evidence adduced at the hearing and nothing can be 
treated as evidence which is not introduced as such. In 
accordance with this idea, it is firmly established that 
a fair hearing is violated where a commission makes its 
determination after taking judicial notice of certain mat-
ters without giving the opportunity to those involved of 
explaining or disputing the matters judicially noticed. 
Concerning this, we quote at length from Justice Car-
doza's opinion in Ohio Bell Telegraph Co. v. Public Utili-
ties Commission (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1937) 301 U. S. 292, 81 
L. Ed. 1093, beginning at page 1099: 
"The fundamentals of a trial were denied to 
the appellant when rates previously collected were 
ordered to be refunded upon the strength of evi-
dential facts not spread upon the record. 
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"The Co1n1nission had given notice that the 
value of the property would be fixed as of a date 
certain. Evidence directed to the value at that 
time had been laid before the triers of the facts 
in thousands of printed pages. To make the pic-
ture Inore con1plete, evidence had been given as 
to the value at cost of additions and retirements. 
Without warning or even the hint of warning that 
the case would be considered or determined upon 
any other basis than the evidence submitted, the 
Commission cut down the values for the years 
after the date certain upon the strength of infor-
mation secretly collected and never yet disclosed. 
The company protested. It asked disclosure of the 
documents indicative of price trends, and an op-
portunity to examine them, to analyze them, to 
explain and to rebut them. The response was a 
curt refusal. Upon the strength of these unkno\vn 
• documents refunds have been ordered for sums 
mounting into millions, the Commission reporting 
its conclusion, but not the underlying proofs. The 
putative debtor does not know the proofs today. 
This is not the fair hearing essential to due pro-
cess. It is condemnation without trial. 
"An attempt was made by the Commission 
and again by the state court to uphold this de-
cision without evidence as an instance of judicial 
notice. * * * Courts take judicial notice of matters 
of common knowledge. * * * For illustration, a 
court takes judicial notice of the fact that Con-
federate money depreciated in value during the 
war between the states (Wood v. Cooper, 2 Heisk, 
441, 44 7; Hix v. Hix, 25 W. V a. 481, 484, 485), but 
not of the extent of the depreciation at a given 
time and place. * * * The distinction is' the more 
important in cases where as here the extent of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
110 
fluctuations is not collaterally involved but is 
the very point in issue. Moreover, notice, even 
when taken, has no other effect than to relieve 
one of the parties to a controversy of the burden 
of resorting to the usual forms of evidence. Wig-
more, Evidence, § 2567; 1 Greenleaf, Evidence, 
16th ed. p. 18. 'It does not mean that the opponent 
is prevented from disputing the matter by evi-
dence if he believes it disputable.' 
"What was done by the Commission is sub-
ject, however to an objection even deeper. Cf. 
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 174,"175, 44 
L. Ed. 119-121, 20 S. Ct. 77 ; West v. Louisiana, 
194 U. S·. 258, 262, 263, 48 L. Ed. 965, 969, 970, 24 
S. Ct. 650. There has been more than· an expansion 
of the concept of notoriety beyond reasonable 
limits. From the standpoint of due process-the 
protection of the individual against arbitrary 
action-a deeper vice is this, that even now we 
do not know the particular or evidential facts of 
which the Com.mission took judicial notice and 
on which it rested its conclusion. Not only are the 
facts unknown; there is no way to find them out. 
When price lists or trade journals or even gov-
ernment reports are put in evidence upon a trial, 
the party against whom they are offered may see 
the evidence or hear it and parry its effect. Even 
if they are copied in the findings '\Vi thout preli-
minary proof, there is at least an opportunity in 
connection with a judicial review of the decision 
to challenge the deductions made from them. The 
opportunity is excluded here. The Commission, 
withholding from the record the evidential facts 
that it has gathered here and there, contents it-
self with saying that in gathering them it went 
to journals and tax lists, as if a judge were to 
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tell us, 'I looked at the statistics in the Library of 
Congress, and they teach me thus and so.' This 
wiU never do if hearings and appeals are to be 
more than empty forms. * * * 
"In Ohio the sole method of review is by peti-
tion in error to the Supreme Court of the State, 
which considers both the law and the facts upon 
the record made below, and not upon new evidence. 
In such circumstances judicial review would be 
no longer a reality if the practice followed in this 
case were to receive the stamp of regularity. To 
put the problem more concretely: how was it pos-
sible for the appellate court to review the law and 
the facts and intelligently decide that the findings 
of the Commission were supported by the evidence 
when the evidence that it approved was unknown 
and unknowable? In expressing that approval the 
court did not mean that, traveling beyond the 
record, it had consulted price lists for itself and 
had reached its own conclusions as to the percent-
age of decline in value from 1925 onwards. It did 
not even mean that it had looked at the particular 
lists made use of by the Commission, for no one 
knows what they were in any precise or certain 
way. Now here in the opinion is there even the 
hint of such a search. What the Supreme Court 
of Ohio did was to take the word of the Commis-
sion as to the outcome of a secret investigation, 
and let it go at that. 'A hearing is not judicial, at 
least in any adequate sense, unless the evidence 
can be known.'" (Citing cases). 
Furthermore, a commission may not base its orders 
on evidence procured on its own investigation and not 
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introduced as evidence in the hearing. In the case of 
United States v. Abilene &!; S. R. Co., Supra, the court 
said, beginning at page 68 L. Ed. 1022 : 
"The plaintiffs contend that the order is void 
because it rests upon evidence not legally before 
the Commission. It is conceded that the finding 
rests, in part, upon data taken from the annual re-
ports filed with the Commission by the plaintiff 
carriers pursuant to law; that these reports were 
not formally put in evidence; that the parts con-
taining the data relied upon were not put in evi-
dence through excerpts ; that attention was not 
otherwise specifically called to them; and that ob-
jection to the use of the reports, under these cir-
cumstances, was seasonably made by the carriers 
and was insisted upon. The parts of the annual 
reports in question were used as evidence of facts 
which it was deemed necessary to prove, not as a 
means of verifying facts of which the Commission, 
like a court, takes judicial notice. The contention 
of the Commission is that, because its able ex-
aminer gave notice that 'no doubt it will be 
necessary to refer to the annual reports of all 
these carriers,' its Rules of Practice permitted 
matter in the reports to be used as freely as if the 
data had been formally introduced in evidence. 
"The mere admission by an administrative 
tribunal of matter which, under the rules of evi-
dence applicable to judicial proceedings, would 
be deemed incompetent, does not invalidate its 
order. (Citing cases). But a finding without evir 
dence is beyond the power of the Commission. 
Papers in the Commission's files are not alway~ 
evidence in a case. (Citing cases). Nothing can 
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be treated as evidence which is not introduced 
as such. (Citing cases) . If the proceeding had 
been, in form, an adversary one, commenced by 
the Orient system, that carrier could not, under 
Rule xiii., have introduced the annual reports as a 
whole. For they contain much that is not relevant 
to the matter in issue. By the terms of the rule, 
it would have been obliged to submit copies of such 
portions as it deemed material, or to make speci-
fic reference to the exact portion to be used. The 
fact that the proceeding was technically an investi-
gation instituted by the Commission would not 
relieve the Orient, if a party to it, from this re-
quirement. Every proceeding is adversary, in 
substance, if it may result in an order in favor of 
one carrier as against another. Nor was the pro-
ceeding under review any the less an adversary 
one because the primary purpose of the Commis-
sion was to protect the public interest through 
making possible the continued operation of the 
Orient system. The fact that it was on the Com-
mission's own motion that use was made of the 
data in the annual reports is not of legal signifi-
cance. 
"It is sought to justify the procedure followed 
by the clause in Rule xiii. which declares that the 
'Commission will take notice of items in tariffs 
and annual or other periodical reports of 'carriers 
properly on file.' But this clause does not mean 
that the Commission will take judicial notice of all 
the facts contained in such documents. Nor does 
it purport to relieve the Commission from intro-
ducing, by specific reference, such parts of the 
reports as it wishes to treat as evidence. It means 
that as to these items there is no occasion for 
the parties to serve copies. The objection to the 
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use of the data contained in the annual reports is -
not lack of authenticity or untrustworthiness. It 
is that the carriers were left without notice of the 
evidence with which they were, in fact, confronted, 
as later disclosed by the finding made. The re-
quirement that, in an adversary proceeding, speci-
fic reference be made, is essential to the preserva-
tion of the substantial rights of the parties. 
"The right of the carriers to insist that the 
consideration of matter not in evidence invali-
dates the order was not lost by their submission 
of the case without argument, and by their ac-
quiesing in the suggestion that the presentation 
of a tentative report by the examiner be omitted. 
While the course pursued denied to the Commis-
sion the benefit of that full presentation of the 
contentions of the parties which is often essential 
to the exercise of sound judgment, it cannot be 
construed as a waiver by the carriers of their legal 
rights. The general notice that the Commission 
would rely upon the voluminous annual reports 
is tantamount to giving no notice whatsoever. 
The matter improperly treated as evidence may 
have been an important factor in the conclusions 
reached by the Commission. The order must, 
therefore, be held void." 
In West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission 
of Ohio (U. S. D. C. 1928) 42 F. 2d 899, the plaintiff 
brought suit for a temporary restraining order against 
the Commission to restrain it from enforcing rates of 
se-rvice established by the Commission. The plaintiff 
claimed that the order of the Public Utilities Commission 
was unfair and that its enforcement would be in viola-
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tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution. The rourt ordered a temporary injunction be-
cause the Comn1ission found, after examining its own 
records, that the rate of Fifty-Five Cents per thousand 
feet contracted by plaintiffs to be paid for natural gas 
at wholesale 'vas unreasonable and excessive in compari-
son with wholesale rates obtained by other gas companies. 
It was shown that the Commission used its own files of 
schedules of other companies as evidence supporting 
its order, but the files were not introduced in evidence 
and no opportunity was given to the plaintiffs, either to 
be heard respecting the files or to introduce testimony 
respecting the nonapplicability of the files to the situation 
confronting the plaintiffs. The court said on page 900: 
"The schedules so referred to by the commis-
sion are not brought into this record, nor could 
they, under the circumstances of the hearing, be 
brought to our attention; for it is established that 
the commission might not base its conclusions up-
on its files and other general information, unless 
the same were put in evidence in the particular 
proceeding, and opportunity given to the plain-
tiff to meet and explain them. The question is 
fully considered by a three judge court in this 
circuit, in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Railroad . 
Commission of Kentucky et al., 1 F. (2d) 805, 806, 
citing decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States on that subject, and we are con-
strained to follow its conclusions." 
In line with the foregoing, this Court has had occa-
sion to comment upon the propriety of consideration by 
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the Co1nmission of things not in the record. In the case 
of Utah Power and Light Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion (Sup. Ct. Utah 1944) 152 P. 2d 542, the Commission 
had predicated one of its holdings upon matters which 
were never made a part of the record. The court stated, 
in reference to this, at 152 P. 2d 567: 
"For example, in regard to the discussion of 
post-war electrical revenues, the Commission re-
ferred to testimony of Th1r. Gadsby in another case 
(No. 2652) which was pending before.the Commis-
sion at about this same time. Mr. Gadsby had no 
opportunity at this hearing to explain this testi-
mony to show why it would not be applicable to the 
various situations involved in this case or to deny 
the conclusions which the Commission drew from 
it. Such references to matters which the Com-
pany has had no opportunity to explain or rebut 
certainly cannot be commended. 
"In Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Co. 
v. Public Utilities Commission, 81 Utah 286, 17 P. 
2d 287, 290, a similar point was raised. The ques-
tion before the Commission was whether a rail-
road could be permitted to discontinue maintain-
ing a station agent at Faust, Utah, without im-
pairment of the services which the law required it 
to furnish to the public. At this hearing no evi-
dence was taken regarding the needs of various 
sheepmen who used the road for movement of 
livestock and feed. The Commission had had an-
other similar case a short time before this hearing. 
This earlier case involved the closing of the sta-
tion at St. John some 12 miles a'vay fron1 the 
Faust station. In the hearing on the St. John case 
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considerable evidence was introduced concerning 
the needs of the various sheepmen. In disposing 
of the case involving the closing of the Faust 
station, the Commission relied upon evidence 
which had been introduced in the St. John case. 
On certiorari this court held that this was error. 
We said: 'The evidence adduced in the St. John 
Station case in this regard cannot be considered 
as evidence adduced in this case. While the same 
counsel for the railroad may have appeared in · 
both cases, and the same witnesses testified for the 
railroad in both cases, * * * yet the cross-examina-
tion which the railroad counsel might direct in 
the Faust case to the witnesses who appeared in 
the St. John case, if they appeared in the Faust 
case, might vary materially because of the new 
witnesses who appeared in the Faust case. The 
Commission, like a jury, can consider such facts 
in relation to evidence adduced which constitute 
the common facts of life and which form the 
common knowledge of mankind and can take judi-
cial knowledge of such facts as a court may take 
judicial notice of. Such facts permit the fact 
finder to interpret evidence and articulate it to 
the general facts of life. The Commission may 
also, perhaps, take judicial notice of such facts and 
practices as are generally known throughout the 
whole field of railroad transportation; * * * but 
it cannot take its special knowledge which it may 
have gained from experience or from other hear-
ings and base any findings or conclusions upon 
such knowledge. That is fundamental.' To the 
same effect see Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 
81 Utah 511, 20 P. 2d 618." 
Why is the requirement that the evidence upon which 
quasi judicial administrative action is taken must be 
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presented as evidence in the hearing.~ As evidenced by 
the foregoing authorities, "generally, a party to an ad-
ministrative hearing is entitled to know the witnesses 
and the evidence against him. There is no hearing when 
the party cannot know what evidence is offered or con-
sidered and is not given an opportunity to test, explain, 
or refute." 42 Am. J ur., Public Administrative Law, sec-
tion 140, page 483. 
These rights to cross-examine, refute, explain or 
qualify evidence offered to prove a given assertion 
cannot be overestimated. As Professor Wigmore says 
of cross-examination in his treatise on the Law of Evi-
dence (First Edition), Vol. II, Section 1367 : 
"For two centuries past, the policy of the An-
glo-American system of evidence has been to re-
gard the necessity of testing by cross-examination 
as a vital feature of the law. The belief that no 
safeguard for testing the value of human state-
ments is comparable to that furnished by cross-
examination, and the conviction that no statement 
* * * should be used as testimony until it has been 
probed and sublimated by that test, has found 
increasing strength in lengthening experience. 
* * * Nevertheless, it is beyond any doubt the 
greatest legal engine ever invented for the dis-
covery of truth." 
But, what has the Commission done in this caseY 
It has held a hearing to determine whether or not Utah 
Natural Gas Company could show that the public con-
venience and necessity required the construction of its 
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pipeline. At the conclusion of such hearing it found that 
l~tah Natural Gas Con1pany did not have the proven gas 
reserves necessary to supply such line. By the way it 
conditioned its order it in effect found that a basic pre-
requisite to the right to build such pipeline was a showing 
of proven reserves of gas sufficient to supply such pipe-
line. In other words, the proven reserves are necessary 
before Utah Natural Gas Company has the right to con-
struct the pipeline, and, under the wording of section 76-
4-24 (1) and (3), U. C. A. (1943), before such a company 
can engage in such construction the co1nn1ission must 
have determined, after hearing, that the public conveni-
ence and necessity requires such construction. And yet, 
after the hearing has been closed, the Commission pro-
vides that such a basic fact, upon which its action has 
been predicated and will continue to be predicated, may 
be conclusively established by the filing of a certificate 
of an independent geologist that there are proven re-
serves committed to Utah Natural Gas Company ade-
quate to justify the construction of the line and facilities. 
A clearer case of the denial of a required fair hearing 
cannot be conceived. Petitioner and other opponents of 
the application will never be confronted by the geologist 
and therefore will never have the opportunity to cross- -
examine him or inquire into the facts upon which he bases 
such certificate. Petitioner and opponents, indeed the 
Commission itself, will thereby be deprived of the only 
~ test, as the experience of centuries has shown beyond 
peradventure, of the credibility of a person asserting 
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facts and of the trustworthiness of the asserted facts. 
But, even worse; "not only are the facts unknown; there 
is no way to find them out." Justice Cardoza in Ohio Bell 
Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, supra. 
Such procedure, so contrary to the recognized re-
quirements of a fair hearing in Anglo-American tradi-
tion, further deprives the Petitioner of an opportunity 
to offer evidence to prove that the assertions of the 
geologist may be unjustified in fact or to explain or 
qualify his statements. Still further, such procedure 
denies to the Commission the benefit of the enlightening 
process of cross-examination, explanation, refutation and 
qualification which the participation of opposition in-
variably affords and thereby fatally handicaps the Com-
mission in obeying its statutory duty of looking primarily 
to the public interest. Salt Lake and Utah R. Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission, et al (Sup. Ct. Utah 1944) 
106 Utah 403, 149 P. 2d 647, supra, and cases ~therein 
cited. 
( 2) Such action of the Commission in effect 
leaves its finding on a material fact based solely 
on hearsay evidence. 
The procedure followed by the Commission is faulty 
for another reason. As heretofore pointed out, the Com-
mission found that adequate proven reserves had not 
been established at the hearing by the applicant-respond-
ent. ],urther, the Commission, by its order and the con-
dition attached thereto, has required that adequate 
Ill 
I I I 
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proven reserves be established before construction can 
be cormnenced under the certificate. By doing so, it has 
recognized that a deterinination of adequate proven re-
serves is a necessary prerequisite to the determination 
required of it by the statute that public convenience and 
necessity requires such construction; which determina-
tion, in turn, is a necessary prerequisite to the commence-
ment of construction by a public utility. 
Yet, determination of whether or not there are ade-
quate proven reserves will be made by the filing of a 
certificate of a geologist \vith the Commission that such 
reserves do exist, and nothing more. That certificate, 
being an extra-judicial statement (or extra-quasi- judicial 
statement, if you wish) or assertation, offered (and ac-
cepted) for the purpose of proving the matter asserted 
would be the clearest sort of violation of the rule exclud-
ing hearsay evidence. Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. II, 
section 1364. Thus, in effect we have the Commission 
allowing its determination of a basic fact, upon which 
its quasi-judicial determination required by the statute 
depends, to be based solely upon hearsay. 
This court, in several cases dealing with appeals 
from proceedings before the Industrial Commission, has 
held that a finding of fact cannot be based solely upon 
hearsay. See Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comrnis-
sion (Sup. Ct. Utah 1942) 132 P. 2d 376, 380 and cases 
there cited. 
• 
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It will be noted that, insofar as procedure before the 
Industrial Commission is concerned, section 42-1-82, U. 
C. A. (1943), provides that the Commission shall not 
be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of 
evidence. This statute has prompted this court to hold 
that hearsay evidence is admissible before the Commis-
sion and may be considered by it but that a finding may 
not be based solely upon hearsay. The reason for this 
last restriction is, of course, that such evidence alone is 
incompetent. 
It is submitted that such rule should apply equally 
as well to the Public Service Commission. While it prob-
ably can admit and consider hearsay evidence under sec-
tion 76-6-1, U. C. A. (1943), it should not be allowed to 
base a finding of a basic fact solely upon such incompe-
tent evidence. The Commission has found that, at the 
close of the hearing, there were inadequate proven re-
serves. It has required that adequate reserves be proven 
before the certificate becomes operative. Yet, it has 
provided that conclusive proof of such adequate proven 
reserves may be established solely by hearsay evidence. 
This it ought not be allowed to do. 
(3) By such action the Commission has ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction in that it has improperly 
delegated to an unnamed geologist, chosen and 
paid by the respondent, the Commission's sole 
and non-delegable power to determine the ade-
quacy of the respondent's gas supply. 
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The Con1mission has exceeded its jurisdiction and 
statutory power in still another respect. Under section 
76-4-24, l~. C. A. (19-±3), the legislature has directed that 
the Com1nission shall hold hearings to determine whether 
or not certificates of conYenience and necessity shall be 
issued and shall 1nake the determination that a proposed 
construction is required by the public convenience and 
necessity. As heretofore pointed out, and as recognized 
by the Commission in its order and the condition attached 
thereto, such determination involves a showing of ade-
quate proven reserves of natural gas. The applicable 
statutes have no provision allowing the C-ommission to 
delegate the responsibility of making such determination 
for it. Such power to determine is more than ministerial 
and is discretionary or quasi-judicial. 
As stated in 42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law, 
sec. 73, page 387 : 
"It is a general principle of law, expressed 
in the maxim 'delegatus non potest delegare,' that 
a delegated power may not be further delegated 
by the person to whom such power is delegated. 
Apart from statute, whether administrative offi-
cers in whom certain powers are vested or upon 
whom certain duties are imposed may deputize 
others to exercise such powers or perform such 
duties usually depends upon whether the particu-
lar act or duty sought to be delegated is mini-
sterial, on the one hand, or, on the other, discre-
tionary or quasi-judicial. Merely ministerial func-
tions may be delegated to assistants whose em-
ployment is authorized, but there is no authority 
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to delegate acts discretionary or quasi-judicial in 
nature. Authority from the legislature is neces-
sary to the power of a commission to appoint a 
general deputy who may exercise quasi-judicial 
powers. If such deputy may be appointed or the 
commission is given authority by the legislature to 
deputize quasi-judicial matters to others, it may 
do so. Statutory authority to a commission to em-
ploy agents, statisticians, experts, attorneys, and 
such other assistants and employees as may be 
necessary to perform its duties does not give the 
commission authority, either directly or by im-
plication, to deputize those rna tters which are 
quasi-judicial in character." 
The question of the power of Utah commissions to 
authorize the performance by a deputy of quasi-judicial 
functions has been before this court in a number of cases. 
The leading Utah case in this regard is that of State 
Tax Commission of Utah v. Katsis (Sup. Ct. Utah, 1936), 
90 Utah 406, 62 Pac. 2d 120, 107 A.L.R. 1477. The ques· 
tion before this court related to whether the Tax Com-
mission could deputize the Commission's auditor with 
the power to recompute sales tax returns and assess addi-
tional taxes and penalties. The court inquired into the 
question of whether or not the act was ministerial or 
quasi-judicial. The statute provided for penalties of 
varying amounts, depending upon the manifest intention 
of the tax payer in filing an insufficient return. The 
court held that the determinations to be made were quasi-
judicial and could not therefore· be delegated to the audi-
tor and said at page 412, Utah Report: 
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"If the Co1mnission had power to deputize this 
matter to the auditor and had actually done so, 
it would then be the Co1nmission's act. The fact 
that the legislature gave the Tax Commission 
authority to employ agents, statisticians, experts, 
attorneys, and other assistants and en1ployees as 
may be necessary to perform its duties does not 
give the Commission authority directly or by im-
plication to deputize those matters which are 
quasi judicial in character. It takes authority 
from the Legislature to appoint a general deputy. 
If such deputy may be appointed or the Commis-
sion is given authority by the Legislature to depu-
tize quasi judicial matters to others, it may do so. 
Dorr v. Clark, 7 Mich. 310; Andres v. Circuit 
Judge, 77 Mich. 85, 43 N.W. 857, 6 L.R.A. 238; 
Wilkerson v. Dennison, 113 Tenn. 237, 80 S.vV. 765, 
106. Am. St. Rep. 821, 3 Ann. Cas. 297; Steinke 
v. Graves, 16 Utah 293, 52 P. 386. Ministerialacts 
may be delegated to othe-rs. 'Merely ministerial 
functions may be delegated to an officer or com-
mittee.' Jewell Belting Co. v. Village of Bertha, 
91 Minn. 9, 97 N.W. 424, 425, citing Harcourt v. 
Common Council, 62 N.J. Law, 158, 40 A. 690. 
" 'Where judgment and discretion are re-
quired of municipal officers they cannot be 
delegated without express legislative author-
ity.' " 
In M oor1neister v. Golding, 84 Utah 324, 27 Pac. 2d 
447, this court held the Department of Registration could 
not take testimony by deposition without the grant of 
express statutory authority. In the earlier case of Moor-
meister ,,,_ Department of Registration, 76 Utah 146, 288 
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Pac. 900, it was stated that any determination of the' , 
issue rnust be on evidence produced in an open hearing 
before the director of registration. 
Even though the power be lawfully delegated as in 
the Workmen's Compensation Act the person so depu-
tized cannot make the determination that the Commis-
sion is required to make. In Utah Copper Company v. 
Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 118, 193 Pac. 24, 13 
A.L.R. 1367 at page 1379 this court said: 
"* * * The referee does not, and cannot, make 
any award or make any binding order respecting 
an award. That is a matter left to the determina-
tion of the con1mission itself, when the testimony 
taken is submitted to and considered by the mem-
bers of the commission. Taking testimony by a 
referee is only one manner of investigating and 
ascertaining the facts involved in any particular 
proceeding." 
In the case here the geologist is authorized in the 
Commission's order to determine a fact that is the most 
important issue in the entire proceeding, i.e. the proven 
reserves. Days of trial before the Commission were 
devoted to this issue. The Commission by its order has 
effectively foreclosed Utah Pipe Line from its day in 
court. Mr. Justice Wolfe in the Mountain States Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. case on the petition for rehearing, 
105 Utah 266, 145 Pac. (2nd) 790, at page 271 said: 
I I 
! 
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"The first prerequisite of a valid rate order 
by the Commission is that it be preceded by a hear-
ing and findings. Common sense dictates that 
at such a hearing the legislature intended that 
there be evidence adduced which would be reason-
ably calculated to resolve the issues presented for 
determination. Common sense likewise requires 
a holding that the findings required by statute be 
made in accordance with the evidence so pre-
sented. If there is no substantial evidence to sup-
port an essential finding, that finding cannot 
stand and a rate order predicated upon it must 
fall. 4 • *" 
In the case of Crow v. Industrial Commission, 104 
Utah 333, 140 Pac. 2d 321, 148 A.L.R. 316, the appellant 
Crow had been injured on the job and had received six 
years' compensation from the insurance fund. The medi-
cal witnesses disagreed as to the extent of the injuries. 
This court discusses what comprises a full hearing and 
the duty upon a commission to participate in the deter-
mination of the issues and said: (page 337 A.L.R.) 
"Where there is a conflict in the testimony, 
and the weight and credibility to be given testi-
mony of the various witnesses is the determining 
factor, in order to accord a 'full hearing' to which 
all litigants are entitled, the person who conducts 
the hearing, hears the testimony, and sees the 
witnesses while testifying, whether a member of 
the board, or an examiner or referee, must either 
participate in the decision, or where, at the time 
the decision is rendered, he has severed his connec-
tions with the board, commission or fact finding 
body, the record must show affirmatively that the 
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one who finds the faets had access to the benefit 
of his findings, conclusions and impressions of 
such testimony, by either written or oral reports 
thereof. This does not necessarily require that 
all of the commissioners must be present at the 
hearing, or even that the one hearing the evidence 
must concur in the result, but his opinion on the 
testimony must be available to the com1nission in 
making its decision. This is in harmony with the 
law on this subject regarding commission and 
, quasi-judicial triers of fact in the Federal Courts. 
See 1 Vom Bauer's Federal Administrative La,v, 
318 to 322, section 310 to 313; United States ex rel 
Ohm v. Perkins, 2 Cir. 79 F. 2d 533; United States 
v. Nugent, 6 Cir., 100 Fed. 2d 215; Morgan v. 
United States, 1936, 298 U.S. 468, 80 L. Ed. 1288, 
56 S. Ct. 906; Id., 1938, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 
82 L. Ed. 1129. 
"The showing here does not meet these re-
quirements and the case is therefore reversed 
and remanded for a rehearing, with costs to ap-
plicant." 
The importance of this decision lies in the fact that 
even though there had been a proper delegation by the 
Industrial Commission, the Commission was nevertheless 
called upon to make the ultimate decision and such deci-
sion must be made from the evidence adduced at the 
hearing. In Andrew Revne v. Trade Comn~ission of Utah, 
130 Utah 155, 192 Pac. 2d 563, 3 A.L.R. 2d 169 (1948) this 
court held that a statute was an unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative authority in that it per1nitted a per-
centage of the barbers in a locality to establish barbers' 
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prices and fix the operation of barber shops. The opin-
ions in the case review at length the leading authorities 
on the delegation of powers and Mr. Justice Pratt par-
ticularly pointed out that the delegation was obnoxious 
in that the person delegated to make the determination 
would not be wholly uninterested in the result of his 
finding. That situation obtains here in that the geologist 
is to be selected by the McGuire Company. 
It is submitted that the same rule should apply here. 
The Commission by statute has been given the discre-
tionary power, after hearing, to grant or deny a certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity. If it grants the certi-
ficate it must first determine that the public convenience 
and necessity require the proposed construction. It has 
seen fit to require in this case as a preliminary to the 
effectiveness of the certificate a showing of adequate 
proven reserves of gas; and yet, it has delegated the right 
and power to make such determination to a stranger to 
the Commission, chosen and paid by applicant-respond-
ent. Clearly this is attempted delegation of a statutory, 
non-delegable power. 
Upon the basis of the forgoing, it is submitted that 
the Commission erred in providing, by a condition at-
tached to its order issuing the Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity, that the proof of adequate, proven re-
serves of natural gas required by it could be made and 
determined, after the hearing had been closed and without 
further hearing, by an unnamed geologist, chosen and 
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paid by applicant-respondent, 1n that such procedure 
denies the fair hearing required and guaranteed by the 
statutes of Utah and the due process clauses of the Con-
stitutions of the State of Utah and the United States 
of America; in that such procedure allows the determina-
tion of an essential fact to be based solely upon incom-
petent evidence .which violates the rule excluding hearsay 
evidence; and, in that such procedure is an attempt by the 
Commission to delegate a duty and a power non-delegable 
under the applicable statutes of Utah. For these reasons 
the Commission's order should be declared null and void. 
III. THE COMMISSION F·AILED TO REGU-
LARLY PURSUE ITS S·TATUTORY AUTHORITY. 
POINTS H AND I. 
POINT H 
"(h) THAT THE COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS LAW-
FUL AUTHORITY IN ISSUING SUCH CERTIFICATE IN 
THAT IT FAILED TO ACT AS A REGULATORY BODY AS 
REQUIRED BY LAW, BUT IN EFFECT CONSTITUTED IT-
SELF A DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVATION COMMIS-
SION." 
STATEMENT UNDER POINT H 
Sprinkled throughout the record are instances where 
witnesses for Utah Natural Gas Company stated or in-
timated that they, or others, would not drill wells and 
develop areas unless a certificate was issued. (For ex-
ample, see R. 205-6, 208, 235, 551). 
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In its Findings and Report, set out as Exhibit C to 
the Petition for writ of certiorari, the Commission made 
the following findings in connection with the point here 
involved. (R. 1168) 
"None of the fields from which the applicant 
proposes to obtain gas, however, have been suffi-
ciently explored to prove the extent of the re-
serves. It appears, however, that the exploratory 
drilling program in all of the fields will be greatly 
stimulated if the owners of the fields are assured 
of facilities to transport their gas to a market if 
such fields are developed." 
(R. 1168): 
"The officers of Byrd-Frost, Inc. appeared 
at the hearing as witnesses in support of the ap-
plication. During the past five years this company 
has spent in excess of $2,500,000 in the State of 
Utah in gas and oil exploration and drilling opera-
tions. The Commission finds that this company 
is financially able to carry on an extensive drill-
ing program in the fields above mentioned and 
will, if a certificate of convenience and necessity 
is granted in this case for the construction of a 
pipe line, spend between $5,000,000 and $10,000,-
000 during the coming year in an intensified drill-
ing program to determine as nearly as possible 
the extent of the gas reserves in the fields from 
which the applicant proposes to obtain its gas 
supply." 
(R. 1169) : 
"The Commission further finds that the 
granting of applicant's application is necessary 
to stimula1te an exploration and development pro,_ 
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gram to dete~rmine the extent of said reserves, 
and that one year's time is a sufficient period 
within which such exploration and development 
work should have progressed to a stage sufficient 
to determine the eXJtent of such reserves." 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER 
POINT H 
As has been pointed out several times in this brief, 
it is well settled in Utah and elsewhere that the interest 
of the public is paramount in determining whether or not 
a certificate of public convenience and necessity should 
be issued. (See Arguments under Points A, B and C). 
As further pointed out under Point C, the public interest 
involved is primarily the interest of the public in the 
territory or community which will use the service or 
commodity to be offered. 
The Public Service CQmmission was established by, 
and exists under, the statutes contained in Title 76 of 
U.C.A. (1943). It has been created by the legislature 
through those statutes as an administrative body vested 
with the power to "supervise and regulate" the public 
utility businesses in the State of Utah. 76-4-1, U.C.A. 
(1943). No place in those statutes is it given any power 
whatever to take it upon itself to provide for and regu-
late the development of natural resources in the State 
of Utah. 
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It is a well settled fundamental of ad1ninistrative and 
statutory law that administrative agencies, being crea-
tures created by statute, have no power beyond those 
conferred by the statute. As stated in 42 Am. Jur., Pub-
lic Administrative Law, 'Section 26, page 316: 
"Administrative boards, commissions, and of-
ficers have no common-law powers. Their powers 
are limited by the statutes creating them to those 
conferred expressly or by necessary or fair lin-
plication. General language describing the powers 
and functions of an administrative body may be 
construed to extend no further than the specific 
duties and powers conferred in the same statute. 
In determining whether a board or commission 
has a certain power, the authority given should 
be liberally construed in light of the purposes for 
which it was created, and that which is incident-
ally necessary to a full exposition of the legisla-
tive intent should be upheld as being germane to 
the law. In the construction of a grant of powers, 
it is a general principle of law that where the end 
is required the appropriate means are given. Im-
plication of necessary powers may be especially 
appropriate in the field of internal admi~istra­
tion. However, powers should not be extended by 
implication beyond what may be necessary for 
their just and reasonable execution. Official 
powers cannot be merely assumed by administra-
tive officers, nor can they be created by the courts 
in the proper exercise of their judicial functions." 
As stated by the S.upreme Court of Oregon in Lay-
man v. State Unemployment Compensation Commission, 
(1941) 117 P. 2d 974, 136 A.L.R. 1468, 1479 "it is an ele-
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mentary and fundamental principal, which no one will 
dispute, that a commission, created by the legislature to 
administer a statute, is wholly limited in its powers and 
authority by the law of its creation. No more unwhole-
some doctrine could be suggested than that such a body 
is vested with discretion to ignore or transgress these 
limitations even to accomplish what it may deem to be 
laudable ends. That would be to leave room for that 
'play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power' 
condemned in Y ick W o v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 
1064, 1071, 30 L. ed. 220, 226. If the statute is not work-
able then the remedy is with the legislature * * *" 
The legislature of the State of Utah has not seen 
fit to grant to the Commission the power and the duty 
of seeing that the mineral resources of the State of Utah 
are developed. The legislature is the proper body to say 
when and by whom such shall be done. It does not befit 
this Commission, or any regulatory body so constituted, 
to attempt to expand its powers beyond the scope of those 
powers specifically and carefully traced by the legisla-
ture. 
The North Dakota Board of Railroad Commissioners 
was faced with a similar problem in 1928. In the case of 
Re Montana-Dakota Power Co., P.U.R. 1929A, 369, there 
was before the Commission conflicting applications of 
Montana-Dakota and Scranton Electric for certificates 
to serve substantially the same area with electric power 
line facilities. Scranton made quite a point of the fact 
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that ~fontana-Dakota's electricity would be generated 
with gas fron1 Montana, "\Yhile Scranton would use coal 
from North Dakota to generate its electricity. In refer-
ence to this contention the Commission stated, at pages 
376-7: 
"* * * The necessity for protecting the invest-
ment in the coal mine is stressed. While witnesses 
for the Scranton Electric Company have testified 
that the proposed transmission line and local 
plants are incidental to the coal mining interest, 
we consider the electric interest as the only issue 
in these cases * * * The question which appears 
to be uppermost in the minds of those interested 
in the Scranton properties is whether the electric 
current to serve the territory covered hy the pro-
posed highline shall be generated by the use of 
gas from Montana or lignite from North Dakota. 
"While the desire to build up a large mining 
industry in the state is a commendable one, the 
question for this Commission to determine is 
which company will best serve the communities 
along the line of the Milwaukee Railway, Mar-
muth, to Hettinger, inclusive, with electric energy. 
The Commission does not believe that the people 
in those communities through unduly high electric 
light rates should be required to bear the burden 
of building up a mining industry which is depend-
ent upon the partial drying of the coal, which pro- · 
cess at this time has not passed the experimental 
stage." 
That the powers of the Public Service Commission 
of Utah are limited and the Commission has no right to 
determine state policy is emphasized in a case before the 
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Utah Commission decided in 1924 Re Clays 1914 E., P. 
U. R. Annotated, page 178. There Clay applied for a 
certificate from the Commission for authority to con-
struct and operate an aerial tramway from a railway 
terminal in Salt Lake County to Alta to convey ore, rock 
and freight. At the hearing the applicant showed there 
were a large number of companies in the Alta area un-
able to mine and mill their ores because of low grade and 
that the expense of transportation by team and wagon 
to the rail head was prohibitive; that there were large 
and valuable ore deposits to be worked and that it was 
in the public interest that mining be encouraged and that 
unless the tramway were built these valuable ore de-
posits would be lost. The Commission denied the appli-
cation recognizing that even though it would be in the 
general public welfare that mining be encouraged and 
the tramway built the Commission had no power to 
authorize such construction. 
That it is not in the province of the Comn1ission to 
determine the public policy is well settled. In Central 
Northwest Business Men's Association v. Illinois Com-
merce Commission, 168 N.E. 890 at 894, it was said: 
"It is not given to the Commission to deter-
mine the public policy of the state (citing cases). 
The finding that the operation of motor bus serv-
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ice as an extension of street car service is not de-
sirable as a matter of public policy is a finding in 
a field which the Commission may not enter." 
If the power to perforn1 an act is not clear from the 
statute, then the courts should decide against the exer-
cise of any such power. To this effect are: 
State ex rel Thatcher v. Boyle, et al., Public Service 
Commission (Mont.) 204 Pac. 378. (S.yllabus 1) 
1. Public service commissions-Administra-
tive body having limited powers. 
"The Public Service Commission is a mere 
administrative agency, and has only limited 
powers, to be ascertained from the statute creat-
ing it (Laws 1913, c. 52); and any reasonable 
doubt as to the grant of a particular p·ower will he 
resolved against the existence thereof." 
Backus-Brooks Co. v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 
et al., Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 21 Fed. 
2d, 4, beginning at page 19 says : 
"It is well settled that the powers of a state 
Commission are special and limited, and they can 
exercise only such authority as is legally conferred 
by express provisions of law, or such as is by fair 
implication and intendment incident to and in-
cluded in the authority expressly conferred for the 
purpose of carrying out and accomplishing the 
objects for which the Commission was created, 
and that any reasonable doubt of the existence of 
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any particular power in the Commission should be 
resolved against the exercise of such power. State 
ex rel. Railroad Com'rs v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 
57 Fla. 526, 49 So. 39; Siler v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 194, 29 S. Ct. 451, 53 
L. Ed. 753; Board of R. Commissioners of Oregon 
v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 17 Or. 65, 19 P. 702; 10 
c. J." 
See also the numerous authorities collected in Vol-
ume 1 of P.U.R. Digest at 555. 
Apparently the Public Service Commission of Utah 
was not, in the proceedings below, so mindful of the pub-
lic interest it is charged to protect. It hastened to award 
its certificate to an applicant who had insufficient gas 
but wanted to find some in Utah, without even consider-
ing the application of Petitioner to see what it had to 
offer. Apparently it felt justified in jeopardizing the 
interest of the consumers in the area to he served to the 
extent that they may not get any gas after all or may 
have to pay higher rates if they do get gas (see Argu-
ment under Point F) for the benefit of those few. who 
wish to see if they can find some gas in possible struc-
tures discussed in the record. Self justification is not 
enough. In doing so, it is submitted that the Commission 
exceeded its lawful authority in usurping powers it has 
not been granted and in failing to perform the principal 
duty it has been given, namely, to look first to the in-
terest of the public in the area and community to be 
served. 
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POINT I 
"(i) THAT THE COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS LAW-
FUL AUTHORITY IN ADOPTING THE VIEW THAT THE 
FIRST APPLICANT IN POINT OF TIME SHOULD BE 
GIVEN PREFERRED CONSIDERATION AND IN FAILING 
TO APPLY THE RULE THAT THE QUESTION OF PARA-
MOUNT CONSIDERATION IS AS TO WHO CAN BEST FUR-
NISH THE PROPOSED SERVICE IN THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST." 
ST ... -\TE~IENT UNDER POINT I 
The Utah Natural Gas Company, respondent, filed 
its application for a certificate of convenience and neces-
sity in this case on May 29, 1950, and on November 17, 
1950, filed an amended application, and the Commission 
immediately gave notice of a hearing upon said applica-
tion to be held on December 11, 1950. On that date, 
December 11, 1950, petitioner Utah Pipe Line Company 
filed its petition for intervention, setting forth that it 
then had on file with the Federal Power Commission an 
application for a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity to construct a pipe line from New Mexico to 
Salt Lake City, serving the same approximate area as 
that proposed to be served by the Utah Natural Gas 
Company. The hearing proceeded on the 11th of De-
ce·mber and was concluded on the 2d day of February, 
1951. During the course of the proceedings, petitioner 
Utah Pipe Line Company filed with the Public Service 
Commission of Utah its application for a certificate of 
convenience and necessity to serve the same area on the 
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26th day of January, 1951. The Commission refused to 
go into the merits of petitioner's application and limited 
petitioner's participation in the hearing merely to that 
of opposing the application of Utah Natural Gas Com-
pany, respondent. On March 12, 1951 the Commission 
entered its order granting the certificate of convenience 
and necessity to Utah Natural Gas Company. 
By its action in proceeding to the final issuance of 
the certificate of convenience and necessity to Utah 
Natural Gas Company while refusing to consider in any 
manner the application of Petitioner for a similar certifi-
cate to serve the same area, the Commission has in effect 
given a preference to the application which was filed 
prior in time. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT I 
The great weight of authority is to the effect that 
where there are several applicants for a certificate of 
convenience and necessity to perform the same service 
in the same community, the controlling question should 
be which applicant is best qualified to serve the public 
and not merely which one was the first to apply. 
The Civil Aeronautics Board, in choosing between 
two applicants for authority to serve the same air car-
rier route, has held that it must consider the comparative 
public interests and select the carrier most qualified to 
provide the needed service. Re North Central Case, 
Docket No. 415, December 19, 1946. The Colorado Public 
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Service Com1nission held, in Re Will is Application, Nos. 
8968, 8969, Decision No. 307 41 (June 23, 1948), that 
the Co1nn1ission will issue a certificate to the one of two 
rival applicants ""ho establishes most conclusively his 
preparedness and physical and financial ability to oper-
ate successfully. 
In Re Helena Bttts Applications, Docket No. 994, 
Report & Order No. 1498, 1927, the Public Service Com-
Inission of Montana held that the controlling considera-
tion in the preference of applicants for certificates should 
be the choice of that applicant best fitted to carry out 
the duties irnposed by the certificate. Likewise the New 
Han1pshire Public Service Commission held in Re White 
11/ountain Power Company, 14 N.H.P.S.C.R. 208, 1931, 
that as between two rival power utilities seeking to oper-
ate in the same territory, the one which seemed rto be 
better equipped for furnishing adequate service should 
be granted the authority. 
The illinois Supreme Court said in Bartonville Bus 
Line v. Eagle Motor Coach Line, 326 Ill. 200, 157 N.E. 175, 
that priority in the field does not of itself govern the 
granting of a certificate for motor carrier service, al-
though it is an element to be considered, but the proper 
consideration is which applicant under the facts and 
circumstances shown by evidence will best serve the 
public interests. And, in the case of In Re Gibson, 26 
Calif. R.C.R. 1925, the Public Service Commission of 
California held that the Commission gives little or no 
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consideration to the date of the filing of an application 
in reaching a decision after formal hearings upon two 
or more applications wherein the respective applicants 
seek authority to operate a stage service over similar 
or identical routes, but a careful review is given not 
only to the time, character and nature of the investiga-
tions made as to the necessity of a proposed stage 
service, but also to the experience and financial ability 
and resources of the respective applicants. 
Many states have adopted the view that the time of 
filing of the application for a certificate of convenience 
and necessity should have no bearing on which of several 
applicants should be chosen to operate in the field. The 
South Dakota S·upreme Court said in Re Dakota Trans-
portation, Inc., 291 N. W. 589, 35 P.U.R. (N.S.) 442, 
at page 450: 
"The legislature has granted no rights of 
priority in an applicant who first applies for a 
certificate. The public interest clearly did not 
require the granting of both applications for cer-
tificates to operate over the same route. The 
principal consideration was not which applicant 
was first in point of time, but an administrative 
question of deciding which applicant would better 
serve the public interest was primarily involved. 
A view of the report and decision of the Commis-
sion as to the authority granted to the Black Hills 
Transportation Company is not before. us, and 
we do not undertake to determine whether or not 
the Commission acted reasonably in such matter. 
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for certificate was not a controlling factor in de-
termining 'vhich of the two applications, if either, 
should be granted." 
And the Ohio Supreme Court said in Re Sohngen 
v. Public Utilities Commission, P.U.R. 1928 C, 753, 115 
Ohio St. 449, 154 N. E. 734, that mere priority of filing 
of an application for a certificate of convenience and 
necessity for the operation of motor busses does not 
entitle the applicant to any pre-emption of route in the 
territory traversed. 
The Washington S-upreme Court also held in Re 
State ex rel. B. & M. Auto Freight v. Department of 
Public Works, P.U.R. 1923 E. 101, 124 Wash. 234, 214 
Pac. 163, that priority in making an application for a 
certificate of convenience and necessity to operate motor 
vehicles over a particular route has no controlling effect 
in selecting the carrier which should receive a certificate. 
The North Dakota Public Service Commission has 
adopted the view that priority in the filing of applica-
tions for certificates of convenience and necessity to oper-
ate and contruct electrical properties should not be con-
trolling, and all applications timely filed should receive 
equal consideration in determining the choice of the 
applicant. Re Montana-Dakota Power Company, P.U.R. 
1929 A, 369. 
If considered at all, the time of filing of the appli-
cation for a certificate of convenience and necessity is 
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looked to only when all applicants appear to be equally 
qualified. As Mr. Hall stated in his article Certificates 
of Convenience and Necessity, (1930) 28 Michigan Law 
Review 276: 
"It frequently happens that a commission will 
have two or more applications for permission to 
serve the same territory. If public convenience 
and necessity will not be served by the issuance 
of a certificate to more than one, the Commission 
is confronted with the necessity of choosing among 
the petitioners. It is clear that mere priority in 
the time of filing an application, while a factor, 
is not the determining one in the selection of an 
applicant. Priority in service, rather than priority 
in time is the important consideration. However, 
other things being equal, priority in time of filing 
an application is controlling. It should be used, 
however, only as a last resort." 
In Re Yellow Cab and Baggage Companu. Docket 
M.R.O. 246, Report & Order No. 1510, May 9, 1928, the 
Public Service Commission of Montana held that priority 
in application filing is a material factor only when every-
thing else is equal between ap.plicants and where the 
Commission has already determined that public conven-
ience and necessity warrants the granting of a certificate 
over the proposed routes. Likewise the Arkansas Su-
prenle Court reached the same decision in the case of 
Camden Transit Company v. Owen, 1946, 209 Ark. 861, 
192 S.W. (2) 757, 63 P.U.R. (N.S .. ) 448, that the fact that 
one applicant for a certificate of convenience and neces-
sity to operate a bus line files his application before a 
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rival applicant does not create any controlling priority 
in favor of the first applicant as the filing date is merely 
one element that 1nay be properly considered by the 
Commission in determining 'vhich applicant should re-
ceive the permit. In Re W·ilcox (Idaho Public Utilities 
Comm. 1916) P.U.R. 1916C, 35, the facts were: 
On November 29, 1915, Jones filed with the Commis-
sion an application for a certificate of convenience and 
necessity to build a gas plant in Idaho Falls, Idaho. On 
December 9, 1915, Wilcox filed an application to construct 
the same type of plant for the same city. On January 10, 
1916, Wilcox filed a petition in intervention in Jones' 
proceedings. On January 17, 1916, Jones petitioned to 
intervene in Wilcox's proceedings. The Commission 
heard the applications together on January 31, 1916. 
Page 37 - ". . . We are met at the threshold 
with the proposition as to what weight should be 
given the application of Jones by reason of its 
priority alone. If all other conditions and facts 
surrounding the two applications were equal, then 
the preference should be given to the party first 
making proper ap.plication therefor ... " 
"The question that is squarely presented is, 
from all the evidence, facts and surroundings of 
these cases, which applicant is entitled to a certi-
ficate~ The preference should be given to that 
party who is acting in good faith, has the funds 
or financial backing to carry his plans into execu-
tion within a reasonable time, and who will con-
struct a modern up-to-date plant." 
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They then reviewed Wilcox's plan of financing and found 
it very satisfactory and adequate. Then, at page 38, the 
Commission said : 
"The controlling factor in a controversy of 
this kind is the public convenience and welfare. 
Making a concrete application of that rule to the 
present proceeding, the question naturally arises, 
which one of these applicants will be able to ren-
der the best service to the public~" 
They answered the question by awarding Wilcox the 
certificate. 
As will be seen from the foregoing authorities, the 
primary factors to be considered by any public service 
commission prior to the granting of a certificate of con-
venience and necessity 'Yhen there is more than one appli-
cant seeking to render the same service to the same 
community are-which of the applicants is best qualified 
to render the desired service, taking into due considera-
tion financial qualifications as well as physical, and which 
applicant is best able to serve the public interest. In 
safeguarding the public interest, only when the Commis-
sion finds that all applicants are equally qualified in 
these respects should it consider which applicant first 
filed its application for a certificate of convenience and 
necessity. 
Instead of considering the comparative qualifications 
of the Utah Natural Gas Company, respondent, and the 
Utah Pipe Line Company, petitioner, the Conunission in 
this instance apparently adopted the sole test of which 
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applicant first filed its petition and limited Utah Pipe 
Line Company's participation only to that of opposing 
Utah Natural Gas. In this instance it was impossible 
for the Commission to have considered the relative merits 
of both applications, and, in obviously adopting the view 
that the one which was prior in time should prevail, it is 
submitted the Commission erred. 
IV. THE C.OMMISSION ACTED ARBITRAR-
ILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN THE PROCEEDINGS 
AND IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE 
AND IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS OF PETITIONER. POINTS F, J & K, AND 
E, G AND M. 
POINTS F, J AND K 
"(f) THAT THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY 
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN THAT IT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
RULED ON APPLICANT'S CASE AND GRANTED SUCH 
CERTIFICATE UNTIL IT HAD FIRST GIVEN UTAH PIPE 
LINE COMPANY, INTERVENER, AN OPPORTUNITY FOR 
A FULL HEARING ON THE APPLICATION OF INTER-
VENER IN CASE NO. 3578 THEN PENDING BEFORE THE 
COMMISSION, WHICH APPLICATION PROPOSED TO SUP-
PLY NATURAL GAS TO CONSUMERS OF SUBSTANTIALLY 
THE SAME AREAS AS PROPOSED TO BE SUPPLIED BY 
APPLICANT, AND A'l A IESS COST TO THE CONSUMER. t• 
"{j) THAT TI-IE COMMISSION ACT~D A.H..HlTRARILY 
AND CAPRICIOUSLY AND IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, AND OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
.. 
'-
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IN LIMITING THE PARTICIPATION OF UTAH PIPE LINE 
COMPANY 'AS TO WHY THE PETITIONER'S (UTAH NAT-
URAL GAS COMPANY) APPLICATION SHOULD NOT BE 
GRANTED' AND IN NOT PERMITTING UTAH PIPE LINE 
COMPANY TO SHOW THAT THERE WAS THEN PEND-
ING BEFORE THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION THE 
APPLICATION OF UTAH PIPE LINE COMPANY FOR A 
CERTIFICATE TO BUILD A PIPELINE FOR THE CARRY-
ING OF NATURAL GAS FROM NORTHWESTERN NEW 
MEXICO TO SALT LAKE CITY AND INTERMEDIATE 
POINTS, AND IN NOT PERMITTING UTAH PIPE LINE 
COMPANY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT THERE-
OF, ALL AS SET FORTH IN THE PETITION FOR LEAVE 
TO INTERVENE FILED BY UTAH PIPE LINE COMPANY." 
"(k) THAT THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY 
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN NOT PROCESSING THE APPLI-
CATION OF UTAH PIPE LINE COMPANY IN CASE NO. 
3578, AND IN NOT HAVING A FULL HEARING THEREON 
OR A JOINT HEARING THEREON WITH THE FEDERAL 
POWER COMMISSION, BEFORE RULING IN CASE NO. 
3504-AMENDED." 
STATEMENT UNDER POINTS F, J AND K 
At the commencement of the hearing upon the 
amended application of lTtah Natural Gas Company in 
Case No. 3504 on December 11, 1950, petitioner, Utah 
Pipe Line Company, presented to ~the Public Service 
Commission of Utah its petition for leave to intervene in 
the proceedings, setting out in such petition that said 
Utah Pipe Line Company had then pending before the 
Federal Power Commission its application for certificate 
of convenience and necessity to bui1d a natural gas pipe-
line system extending a distance of approxirnately 392 
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miles from a point in Northwestern New Mexico near 
Aztec, ~e"T ~Iexico, to a point or points in and near Salt 
Lake City, Utah; ~that by such application to the Federal 
Power Commission it proposed to serve substantially the 
same area proposed to be served by Utah Natural Ga.s 
Company under its application before the Public Service 
Commission of Utah in case No. 3504; that Utah Pipe 
Line Company was of the opinion and did believe that 
Utah Natural Gas Company had wholly inadequate re-
serves of natural gas to furnish the requirements of 
its proposed pipeline system; and that Utah Pipe Line 
Company desired to intervene in the proceedings con-
cerning the Utah Natural Gas Company's application 
in order to show that Utah Natural Gas Company's re-
serves were inadequate and that, consequently, its plan 
was not feasible, and to show that the Utah Pipe Line 
Company had adequate reserves and could furnish the 
facilities and the natural gas and could more adequately 
meet and fulfill the convenience and necessity of the 
public, and could thereby assist said Commission in prop-
erly safeguarding the public interests. 
The Utah Natural Gas Company objected to the 
intervention of Utah Pipe Line Company in such a man-
ner, and thereupon the Public Service Commission ruled 
(R. 12) that the participation of Utah Pipe Line Com-
pany in the proceeding would be limited to the purpose 
of showing "why the petitioner's (Utah Natural Gas 
Company's) application should not be granted." 
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After such restriction of Utah Pipe Line Company's 
intervention, and between the close of the first session of 
the hearing and the beginning of the second session of 
the hearing, Utah Pipe Line Company, on January 26, 
1951, filed with the Public Service Commission of Utah 
its application entitled, "In the Matter of Application of 
the Utah Pipe Line Company," case No. 3578, wherein 
Utah Pipe Line Company set forth its proposal to con-
struct and operate a natural gas pipeline system as set 
forth in the application theretofore filed with the Federal 
Power Commission and hereinabove referred to, and 
requested that the Commission issue to it a certificate 
or other form of authorization for the construction and 
operation of the proposed facilities. 
At the same time it filed its application in case No. 
3578, Petitioner requested the Commission, in writing, to 
arrange with the Federal Power Commission for a joint 
hearing of the Utah Public Service Commission and the 
Federal Power Commission. The Utah Public S·ervice 
Commission refused to consider the request of petitioner 
for a joint hearing and made no investigation into the 
merits of said request whatsoever. 
Without considering such application of Utah Pipe 
Line Company for a certificate to supply natural gas to 
consumers of substantially the same areas as proposed 
to be supplied by Utah Natural Gas Company and at a 
less cost to the consumers, the Public Service Commis-
sion proceeded to conclude the hearing concerning thP 
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lTtah Natural Gas Company application and to issue to it 
the certificate of convenience and necessity herein com-
plained of; n1aking no attempt to inquire into the merits 
of the application of Utah Pipe Line Company in an 
effort to n1alre cel.'ltain that the Commission was granting 
the certificate to the applicant who could better serve the 
public interest, convenience and necessity it is charged 
with safeguarding. 
In the early part of the brief in our Statement of 
Facts we have detailed the events which transpired when 
Mr. Turner, General Counsel for Delhi Oil Corporation 
and appearing for Utah Pipe Line Company presented 
its petition for leave to intervene. Mr. Turner in detail 
stated to th·e Commission what Utah Pipe Line Company 
would he prepared to prove and we invite the court's 
attention to this statement (R. 1148-1153). In substance, 
Mr. Turner stated that Utah Pipe Line was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Delhi Oil Corporation; that Delhi 
owns substantial oil and gas holdings in New Mexico 
with approximately 1 trillion feet of gas available to 
Utah Pipe Line; that the holdings of Delhi are so exten-
sive as to be common knowledge and the subject of con-
siderable comment; that it is generally known that Delhi 
has been negotiating with industrial consumers of the 
Salt Lake area and that these negotiations are down to 
the last stages; that the right of way has been surveyed; 
that all steps have been taken and the necessary filings 
made with the Federal Power Commission; that Utah 
Natural is merely trying to preempt the Salt Lake City 
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industrial market and well knows that it does not have 
sufficient gas reserves; that it would be impossible for 
Utah Natural to support any line without it being an 
interstate line and that the Federal Power Commission 
would be the body that must pass upon an interstate 
line; that it is in the public in1terest that two projects not 
be completed and two lines supported; that Utah Pipe 
Line has the necessary proven gas reserves; that it is 
acting in good faith and will take prompt steps to com-
plelte its pipeline; that it is in the public interest for the 
com1nission to hear the competing projects at the same 
time. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT F 
Section 76-4-24 U.C.A. (1943) as construed by this 
Court in Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, et al., 
101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d 298, and other cases, provides 
that the paramount concern of the Commission in cer-
tificate cases is the public interest. It is submitted that 
the Commission cannot properly protect such interest 
where conflicting applications are pending and are being 
urged without considering the merits of all such appli-
cations before granting a certificate. 
While the Utah courts have not, up until the present 
time, had an opportunity to pass directly upon the ques-
tion raised by this point, the Illinois Supreme Court in 
the case of Black Hawk Motor Transit Company v. Illi-
nois Commerce Commission, (1943) 48 N.E. 2d 341, 49 
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P.U.R.(N.S.) 438, held that where there are two applica-
tions pending to render the same service to the sarne 
approximate area, the Commission should hear the evi-
dence on the merits of both applications before granting 
a certificate of convenience and necessity to either appli-
cant. The facts of that case were that the Illinois High-
way Transportation Company, appellee, had filed an 
application with the illinois Cormnerce Commission for a 
certificate of convenience and necessity to extend its 
operations as a motor carrier between Peoria and De-
catur. The appellant, Black Hawk 1\fotor Transit Com-
pany, was made a respondent to this petition, inasmuch 
as it already operated partially along the proposed new 
route. On November 13, 1940, six days prior to the 
hearing on the above petition, Black Hawk filed an appli-
cation for a certificate to operate a similar service he-
tween Peoria and Decatur. Black Hawk's petition came 
on for hearing on December 3, 1940, and was continued 
over to January 3, 1941. On December 5, 1940, the 
hearing on the Highway Transportation Company's ap-
plication was resumed, at which time Black Hawk filed a 
motion to consolidate the two cases so that the evidence 
taken in each case would be considered in both cases. 
On December 11 the Commission denied the motion to 
consolidate and on January 3, 1941 the petition of the 
appellant Black Hawk Motor Transit Company again 
came on for hearing, at which time appellant renewed its 
Inotion to consolidate. On January 8, 1941, the Illinois 
Commission entered an order in the appellee's proceed-
ing granting the petition of appellee, Highway Transpor-
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tation Company, for a certificate of convenience and 
necessity to operate a bus line between Peoria and De-
catur. Then, on January 22, 1941, there was a further 
hearing of appellant's petition, at which time counsel for 
appellee entered a motion to dismiss the application of 
appellant for the reason that a certificate h~d already 
been granted to appellee, Highway Transportation Com-
pany, involving substantially the same route. Appellant, 
Black Hawk, then filed a motion for rehearing in appellee 
Highway Transportation Company's case for the reason 
that the Commission had granted the certificate before 
the hearing on its application had been concluded and all 
of its evidence was in. On February 25, 1941, the Com-
mission granted appellant's motion for rehearing in the 
Highway Transportation Company's case and on March 
4, 1941, both cases came on for hearing and both Black 
Hawk and Highway Transportation Company presented 
more evidence. On March 18, two separate orders were 
entered by the Commission, one affirming the granting of 
a certificate 1to appellee, Highway Transportation Com-
pany, and the other denying the application of appellant, 
Black Hawk Motor Transit Company. Black Hawk per-
fected its appeal and the~ Supreme Court of Illinois had 
the following to say in regard to the right of consolida-
tion of cases involving applications for a certificate of 
convenience and necessity to perform the same service 
in the san1e community: 
". . . The refusal to consolidate or to inte-
grate the evidence is subject to review, but only 
to the extent of determining whether the discre-
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tion "\Ya::; abused, and, if abu~ed, \Yhether the result 
"\Yas injurious or prejudicial to appellant's right 
to a fair and impartial hearing. 
~~counsel for appellee concede in their brief 
and argument that if in either proceeding the 
parties "\Yere denied an opportunity to present 
con1petent and proper evidence it would require a 
reversal. Our consideration n1ust, therefore, be 
directed to that question. 
~' ... There are three forms of consolidation 
of cases recognized by the authorities: (1) Where 
several cases are pending involving substantially 
the same subject matter, a method of avoiding 
the trial of each case separately is to stay the 
proceedings in all but one, the decision in the 
others to be settled by that reached in the one 
trial; (2) 'Yhere several cases involve an inquiry 
into the same event in its general aspects, the 
cases may be tried together, but vvith separate 
docket entries, verdicts, and judgments, the con-
solidation being limited to a joint trial; and (3) 
where several actions are pending which might 
have been made the subject of a single proceeding, 
the cases, by consolidation, become merged into 
one in which the rights of the parties are deter-
mined. See Lumiansky v. Tessier, (1912) 213 
Mass. 182, 99 NE 1051, Ann. Cas. 1913E 1049. 
The instant case comes within the second classi-
fication above mentioned and our inquiry must be 
limited to the questions of whether appellant has 
been prejudiced by the Commission's refusal to 
integrate the evidence and consolidate the hear-
ings on the two applications as a joint proceeding, 
and whether the refusal to consolidate amounted 
to an abuse of discretion. 
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"When the applications of both utilities are 
viewed in connection with all the amendments and 
consents to restrictions to be included in any cer-
tificate issued by the Commission, they both cover 
substantially the same extended service and route. 
Both parties proved and the Commission found 
that the service petitioned for is required from the 
standpoint of convenience and necessity. The con-
trolling question in controversy before the Com-
mission was which utility was entitled to the, cer-
tificate, and a determination of that question could 
only be fairly made from a consideration of all the 
evidence in both cases and appellant's counsel was 
led to believe that such would be done. But, on 
January 8, 1941, while appellant's proceeding was 
still pending, the Commission entered an order 
granting a certificate to the appellee. This action 
demonstrated that the evidence in the two cases 
was not considered together. The Commission, 
however, acknowledged the error by granting a 
rehearing, and on March 18, having all the evi-
dence in the two records before it, simultaneously 
entered an order in each case. It cannot, there-
fore, be reasonably said it did not consider all the 
evidence." 
Other courts have also considered the general prob-
lem here involved. In the case of Hazard-Hyden Bus 
Company v. Black, 169 SW2d 21, the Division of Motor 
Transportation of Kentucky had before it eight applica-
tions for certificates to operate bus lines over approxi-
mately the same area, which had all been filed during 
1937. No one pressed for a hearing on the applications 
and none was held until February 3, 1942, at which time 
the application of the Hazard Hyden Bus Company was 
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set for hearing, the Conunission announcing that it would 
consider at that time only the application as it applied 
to a certain area in 'vhich the other applicants were not 
interested. However, the Co1nmission received evidence 
relating to the proposed bus service over the entire area, 
including that in 'vhich the other seven applicants desired 
to render the same service and granted a certificate to 
Hazard-Hyden. Since the applicants were not present 
at this hearing and did not offer evidence in their own 
behalf, they filed motions for rehearing, which were 
denied, and an appeal was perfected to the Circuit Court 
of Kentucky wherein the order granting the certificate 
was reversed so that a new hearing could be held, at 
which time all of the applicants could offer evidence as 
to the merits of their petitions. The Hazard-Hyden Bus 
Company appealed to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
and that court said at page 23 : 
"KRS 281.410 provides that an appeal may 
be taken to the Franklin circuit court from the 
action of the Division of Motor Transportation 
within twenty days after the rendition of the 
order of the division. Certainly, during this time 
or until an appeal has been taken, the Division of 
Motor Transportation has jurisdiction to correct 
any error or mistake on its part or for cause 
shown to set aside the order. The facts disclose·d 
by the record show that the appellees did not have 
a full and complete hearing before the Division 
of Motor Transportation, and the circuit court 
correctly referred the case back to the division." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
158 
In the case· of Crowell & Spencer Lumber Company 
v. Public Service Commission, 157 La. 676, 102 So. 866, 
the Louisiana Court held that a commission order entered 
in a proceeding in which some of the parties had not 
appeared and in which another party had made only a 
perfunctory defense after the case had been ordered to 
trial over its objection that an injunction operated as a 
bar to the proceeding, should be set aside so that all 
parties in interest might have an opportunity to be heard 
before the Commission. 
Under the public utility law and practice of Utah 
still another reason exists. As will be observed from the 
amended application of Utah Natural Gas Company and 
the petition to intervene and applications of Petitioner, 
the proposed pipeline systems of the two would deliver 
approximately the same amount of gas to the ultimate 
market, but the line and facilities of Utah Natural Gas 
Company would cost approximately $32,000,000 whereas 
Petitioner's line and facilities would cost only approxi-
mately $22,000,000. The evidence presented before the 
Commission soon disclosed, as pointed out in the state-
ments and arguments under Points A and B, that the 
difference in cost was largely made up by the necessity 
of treating and compressing the gas to be used, if found, 
by Utah Natural Gas c·ompany. 
From the opinion and decision in the case, of Utah 
Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, (Sup. 
Ct. Utah 1944) 107 Utah 155, 152 P. 2d 542, it will be 
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seen that the Conunission, with this court's approval, 
considers the ''prudent investment value" rather than 
the "fair value" as the basis upon which to dete:rmine 
utility rates to be charged to the public. From the very 
beginning of the hearing it was obvious that there was 
a wide discrepancy in the amount of money which would 
have to be invested in the respective projects. Yet, the 
Commission refused to hear any evidence in relation to 
the project which was offered as the more economical 
one and proceeded to certificate the project which would 
cost at least $10,000,000 more than the othe·r under the 
most favorable circumstances. How can such action, hy 
any stretch of the imagination, be considered as com-
pliance with the paramount duty of looking to the public 
interest. 
Commissions, under similar statutes and circum-
stances, have held time and time again that the public 
interest involved requires a determination of which ap·-
plicant can best serve the community at the least possible 
cost to the consumer. In Re N. Central Case, C.A.B., 
Docket No. 415, December 19, 1946, the prime considera-
tion was which applicant is most qualified to provide the 
needed service; in Re Willis, Application Nos. 8968, 8969, 
Docket No. 30741, June 23, 1948, the Colorado Commis-
sion decided it would issue the certificate to one of two 
rival applicants who established most conclusively his 
preparedness and financial ability to operate success-
fully; in Re Wilcox, P.U.R. 1916C, 35, the Idaho Com-
Inission held that a certificate for the construction of a 
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gas plant should be granted to the one who had assured 
himself of the feasibility of the enterprise and had the 
necessary capital at his command; and in Re Helena Bus 
Application, Docket No. 994, Report and Order No. 1498 
(1927), the Montana Commission stated that the con-
trolling consideration in the preference of applicants for 
certificates should be the choice of that applicant who is 
best fitted to carry out the duties imposed by the certi-
ficate. (The foregoing cases are discussed under Point I.) 
Petitioner's application did not receive equal con-
sideration with Utah Natural Gas Company in the pro ... 
ceedings below. Petitioner's role in the proceedings 
below was restricted to that of opposing the application 
of Utah Natural Gas Company and it had no opportunity 
to show the Commission that its gas reserves were proven 
and that they were many times gre:ater than the unproven 
reserves of Utah Natural Gas Company. Petitioner did 
not have an opportunity to show the Co1nmission belo'v 
its highly adequate financial qualifications as compared 
with those of respondent, Utah Natural Gas Company. 
Furthermore, Petitioner was not allowed to show that 
its project would serve the public more adequately, and 
at a "prudent investment" of much less than the project 
of Utah Natural Gas Company. Indeed, the PetitioneT 
was not allowed to show, and the Con1mission had no way 
of knowing, which project would best serve the public 
interest the Commission is required to protect. 
Upon the basis of the foregoing, it is submitted that 
the action of the Commission in granting the certificate 
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to Utah Natural Gas C.ompany without first considering 
the application of Petitioner was arbitrary and capri-
cious. 
ARGU~fENTAND AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT J 
In Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Public Service 
Commission, 105 Utah 230, 142 P. 2d 873, the appellant 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. alleged that the commission 
acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in refusing to allo'v 
appellant to make a comparison between toll charges of 
independent operators and its own charges. The Supreme 
Court, at page 265, held "It was error not to allow 
Mountain States to make a comparison in this case." 
The commission had, after a hearing, ruled that Moun-
tain States should adjust their intra-state rates to ;their 
inter-state rates which were considerably lower. Moun-
tain States had sought to show how its intra-state rates 
compared with rates charged by independents, but was 
denied this right. 
In this case, Petitioner sought to intervene, alle·ging 
among other things that it could supply natural gas at 
a lower cost to consumers than could Applicant-Respond-
ent. 
Certainly it would seem that one of the prime. factors 
concerned in determining which of two applicants could 
better serve the public interest would be the cost of the 
natural gas sold to the public. Yet, in spite of the fact 
that Petitioner had alleged in its petition to .intervene 
that it was ready and willing to show that it could 
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furnish gas at a lower cost to the consumers than could 
Utah Natural Gas Company, it was denied the chance to 
prove it. The Commission was. charged with the duty 
of considering the public interest and yet, with Petitioner 
asking for permission to so prove, the Commission com-
. pletely ignored the claim of Petitioner that it could serve 
the public better at a lower cost. In failing to inquire 
into this vital factor in protecting the public interest 
when it could easily have done so by allowing Petitioner 
to intervene, the Commission clearly acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously. 
Especially is this true in light of the subsequent pro-
cedure followed by the Commission. Having restricted 
Petitioner's intervention to nothing more than that of 
a protestant, the Commission proceeded to hear the appli-
cation of Utah Natural Gas Company, to ignore Petition-
er's application for a certificate and its application for 
a joint hearing with the. Federal Power Commission, and 
proceeded to issue the certificate here complained of to 
the Utah Natural Gas Company without ever having 
considered the~ factors which Petitioner so clearly brought 
to the attention of the Commission in its petition to inter-
vene. 
ARGUMENT UNDER POINT K 
In its request to the Commission for a joint hearing 
with the Federal Power Commission, the petitioner 
pointed out fuat : 
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(1} The Natural Gas Act provides for cooperative 
procedure, which in no wise impairs the jurisdiction and 
authority of the State Commission. 
(2) The Federal Power Commission wrote a letter 
on December 21, 1950, asking the Utah Public Service 
Commission whether or not the latter desired a joint 
hearing. 
(3) Section 1.37 (c) of the Federal Power Com-
mission's Rules and Regulations, provides: 
"(c) Conferences. Inasmuch as experience 
has proved that infonnal conferences are the 
means most often used to enable commissions to 
work together to promote good regulations, af-
fording means whereby common understandings 
may be reached, and the imposition of inconsistent 
or conflicting regulations upon companies subject 
to both Federal and State control may be avoided, 
and means whereby State co:m..-rnissions may secure 
the assistance in-State regulatory work which sec-
tions 209 and 17, respectively, of the Federal 
Power and Natural Gas Acts authorize the Fed-
eral Power Commission to extend, any commis-
sion, Federal or State, should always feel free to 
suggest a conference to anorther commission, con-
cerning any matter of regulation subject to the 
jurisdiction of either, with respect to which it is 
believed that a cooperative conference may be in 
the public interest. The commission desiring a 
conference upon any such matter should notify 
other interested commissions without delay, and 
thereupon the Federal Power Commission or a 
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State commission, as may be agreed, will promptly 
arrange for a conference in which all interested 
commissions will be invited to be represented." 
The Commission is undoubtedly not as experienced 
in the matter of certifying gas pipelines as is the Federal 
Power Commission. As heretofore pointed out, the 
statutes under which the two Commissions operate are 
very similar, each being charged with safeguarding the 
p.ublic interest. By holding a joint hearing with the 
Federal Power Commission, indeed, by just conferring 
with the Federal Power Commission, the Public Service 
Commission of Utah could have availed itself of the vast 
experience of the Federal Power Commission in deter-
mining which of the two applicants then before it could 
better serve the public interest. It is difficult to see 
how any commission charged with the duty of protec~ 
ing the public interest in such situations could deem the 
public interest adequately protected without inquiring 
into the merits of any application made to it under the 
terms of the statute. Especially would this seem true 
where there we~re conflicting applications before it for 
substantially the same certificate to serve substantially 
the same segment of the public. In the case now before 
this Court the Commission steadfastly refused to con-
sider the p.roposal of Petitioner in any form and pro-
ceeP.ed to issue the: certificate to the applicant who had 
presented a conflicting application. It is. submitted that 
1n so doing and by refusing even so Inuch as to direct 
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an inquiry· to the Federal Power Co1nmission as to the 
advisability and feasibility of a joint hearing, the Com-
mission acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 
POINTE 
"(e) THAT THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY 
AND CAPRICIOUSLY AND UPON INADEQUATE NOTICE 
IN PERMITTING THE APPLICATION OF UTAH NATURAL 
GAS COMPANY TO LAY DORMANT UNTIL THE 17TH 
DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1950, AT WHICH TIME THE APPLI-
CATION WAS AMENDED, AND ~N THEN SETTING THE 
CASE FOR HEARING FOR DEMEMBER 11, 1950, AFTER 
NOTICE BY PUBLICATION ON NOVEMBER 24TH, 26TH 
AND 28TH, 1950, OF THE PROPOSED HEARING." 
STATEMENT UNDER POINT E 
On May 29, 1950, Utah Natural Gas Company, re-
spondent, filed an application with the Public Service 
Commission of Utah entitled, "In the Matte~r of the 
Application of Utah Natural Gas C·ompany for a Certifi-
cate of Convenience and Necessity." In such applica-
tion Utah Natural Gas Company applied for a certificate 
to construct, operate and maintain a 22-inch natural gas 
pipe line extending from the area in and around San 
Juan County in the S.outheastern portion of the State of 
Utah, Northerly and Westerly through portions of the 
Counties of San Juan, Emery, Carbon, Wasatch and 
Utah, and into the County of Salt Lake at a point at or 
near Salt Lake City. In addition to said main pipe line, 
applicant stated that it proposed to construct such lateral 
lines as should be necessary to effect delivery of such 
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natural gas to the consumers or purchasers thereof. Such 
application was given case No. 3504 and was allowed to 
remain on the docket of the said Public Service Commis-
sion without any action whatsoever until the date here-
inafter noted. On November 17, 1950, Utah Natural Gas 
Company filed an amended application altering the prod-
ect for which it sought a certificate of convenience and 
necessity by making application for a secondary gas pipe 
line of 8% inches max:imum size, in addition to its re-
quested main gas line of 18 inch max:imum size, from the 
San Juan County area, extending from alleged gas fields 
in the Counties of Sevier, Wayne and Emery, "northerly 
and westerly to Salina in the County of Sevier, thence 
southerly from Salina to Richfield, thence northerly from 
Salina through Gunnison, Manti, Ephra:im and Moroni, 
connecting with said main line at Fountain Green in 
the County of Sanpete." 
Notwithstanding the fact that the first application 
was allowed to lay dormant upon the docket of the Public 
Service Commission for many months, and notwithstand-
ing the fact that material changes were made in the pro-
posed application of Utah Natural Gas Company by the 
filing of its amended application, nevertheless the Com-
mission immediately gave notice of a hearing upon said 
application and set said amended application for hearing 
on December 11, 1950. 
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ARGlT:JIENT AND .A.lTTHORITIES UNDER POINTE 
lJtah Xatural Gas Co1npany, in allowing its original 
application to lay dor1nant for aln1ost six 111onths without 
requesting a hearing thereon, demonstrated to the public 
in general, and to petitioner in particular, that no action 
"~ould be taken on respondent's application for son1e 
time, or that "\Yhen a hearing was requested, petitioner 
would have ample time in which to work out and decide 
upon its necessary course of action in order to file its 
own application if it was to be heard at the same time 
as that of respondent. However, on November 17, 1950, 
respondent materially amended its original application 
and it "\Vas then set down for an immediate hearing by 
published notice made beginning on November 24. Peti-
tioner could have had only 17 days to analyze the effect 
of respondent's amended application upon its own pTo-
posed activities, in addition to planning its own proced-
ure as to opposing the application of respondent and 
proposing its own application. Petitioner realized that 
its application for a certificate of convenience and neces-
sity to serve the same approximate area with natural gas 
should be considered, along with that of respondent, in 
order that the Commission might consider the merits of 
both applicants in regard to the financial feasibility and 
physical practicality of the two proposed pipe lines and 
award the certificate to the applicant more qualified to 
serve the public interest. It must be remembered that 
Petitioner is not a resident of Utah. Petitioner's home 
office is in Dallas, Texas, a considerable distance from 
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Utah, so that any correspondence between the two points 
requires about three days mailing time. As a result, 
Petitioner had even less time than would appear within 
which to prepare the necessary papers and forward them 
to Utah and to formulate its plan of procedure. 
In setting the hearing on the application of the Utah 
Natural Gas Company so soon after the filing of the 
amended application by respondent, the Commission in 
effect deprived this Pet~tioner, and any other interested 
party, of the opportunity of filing its application in time 
to have it considered immediately along with that of the 
respondent. Petitioner, Utah Pipe Line Company, has 
been prejudiced by this hasty action of the Commission 
in that its application for a cert~ficate of convenience 
and necessity for an interstate pipe line is still pending 
before the F·ederal Power Commission and the Federal 
Power Commission is likely to disfavor the· granting to 
petitioner of a certificate for an interstate line·, in view of 
the fact that a certificate has already been granted by 
the Utah Commission to another company to serve the 
same area as that proposed to be served by this peti-
tioner. 
Even more serious, however, is the prejudicial effect 
upon the interest of the. public involved. In so important 
a matter as the construction of a natural gas pipe line of 
the magnitude proposed, how could the public be bene~ 
fitted by so much haste in setting down the application 
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and forcing it to final conclusion with the issuance of a 
certificate without considering the conflicting application 
of Petitioner' 
The ~Iontana Public Service Con1n1ission in the case 
of Re Montana-Dakota Utilities Company, 32 P.U.R. 
(N.S.) 121, said at page 128: 
"Before a hearing is held in deterinining the 
reasonableness of utility rates the public and :the 
Utility should be given reasonable notice of the 
hearing by the Commission. Justice requires that 
all parties to the proceeding have a reasonable op-
portunity to prepare and present their respective 
interest." · 
This was a rate regulation matter and the Commis-
sion went on to say that from the record it appears that 
the parties had 22 days within which to prepare their 
cases after actual notice of the hearing and that the 
Commission thought this was ample time in view of the 
fact that as early as two months prior to the actual notice 
date. the utility had knowledge of the fact that a hearing 
on its rates would be held in the very near future. Such 
was not the case with Petitioner in this instance. Because 
of the long period of time during which respondent's 
Utah Natural Gas Company, application was allowed to 
lay dormant with no request for a hearing, this petitioner 
had no reason to anticipate when the hearing on respond-
ent's application would be set and especially the rapidity 
with which a setting would be made immediately after 
such application had been amended. 
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The Utah Commission has said in the case of Re 
Ogden Gas Company, P.U.R. 1929B, 127, that it is the 
duty of the Commission in all cases where applications 
are made for permission to serve in the capacity of a 
public service utility to permit other interests that will 
be affected to be represented and h.eard at a hearing 
which should be public according to the provisions of the 
statute. Such was not the case in the present matter 
before this court. By setting the hearing on the amended 
application of the respondent, Utah Natural Gas Com-
pany, only 17 days after the request for same·, the Com-
mission in effect deprived this petitioner of an opportun-
ity to file its application for a certificate to serve the same 
area as that proposed to be served by respondent, and 
to have its application considered along with that of 
respondent. It is submitted, therefore, that the Com-
mission acted arbitrarily and capriciously and upon in-
adequate notice in permitting the application of the Utah 
Natural Gas Company to lay dormant from the 29th day 
of May, 1950, to the 17th day of November, 1950, at which 
time the application was amended, and in setting the case 
on that drute for hearing on December 11, 1950. 
POINT G 
"(g) THAT THE COMMISSION ACTED ARTIBRARILY 
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN ISSUING SUCH CERTIFICATE 
IN THAT THE EFFECT OF SUCH ISSUANCE IS TO PER-
MIT UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY TO PRE-EMPT THE 
MARKET FOR NATURAL GAS PENDING THE RESULT OF 
WILDCAT DRILLING BY APPLICANT'S ASSOCIATES." 
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STATE~IENT UNDER POINT G 
In its findings and re.port n1ade in Case No. 3504 -
amended, the Commission found that ''the applicant 
(Utah Natural Gas Company) will not be engaged in the 
exploration for or production of natural gas at the 
sources, but will rely for its supply upon gas produced 
by others." 
The Commission found that "none of the fields frorn 
which the applicant proposes to obtain gas, however, 
have been sufficiently explored to prove the extent of 
the reserves." 
The Commission further found that the applicant, 
Utah Natural Gas Company, had gas purchase con1tracts 
with Byrd-Frost Inc., and others, "all of whom are 
owners of substantial oil and gas acreage in the fields 
above 1nentioned. While, as set forth above, these fields 
are not yet proved, the Commission finds that one year 
is a sufficient time in which the owners of said fields could 
do sufficient exploration and develop·rnent work to ade-
quately determine the gas reserves therein." 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT G 
The obvious effect of the issuance of the certificate 
here involved without finding as a basis for such issuance 
that the Utah Natural Gas Company has the gas reserves 
to serve and to satisfy the S·alt Lake City market and 
that Utah Natural Gas Company has the financial com-
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mitments and ability to build and to operate a pipeline 
from the supposed source of its gas supply to the Salt 
Lake City area, is to grant to such company a market for 
gas pending the problematical outcome of its exploratory 
. work within the unproven fields from which it proposes 
to secure natural gas. 
As hereinbefore set out, an applicant for a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity in a case such 
as this, must prove to the satisfaction of the Utah Public 
Service Commission the following: 
1. A market for its gas; 
2. Gas reserves sufficient to serve and to satisfy 
such market; and 
3. Adequrute financing, either through its own r~ 
sources, or the resources of those who have 
committed themselves to grant financial aid in 
the construction and operation of the proposed 
natural gas pipe, line. 
Here only one of these basic ingredients of a proper 
showing was proved before the Commission, i.e., the 
existence of a market. 
As heretofore poinJted out, the determination of the 
Commission in such case should be based on concrete 
facts, which facts can then form the basis for the issu-
ance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. 
Speculation and conjecture should have no standing be-
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fore the Conuuission, yet the Findings and Report of 
such body is a bundle of hopes, desires and "ifs". Mere 
proof of a market is not sufficient to form the basis for 
the granting of a certificate-yet such is the case here. 
Public service commissions should fully understand 
the effect of the issuance of a certificate of p.ublic con-
venience and necessity. As succinctly stated by the Fed-
eral Power Commission in Re Kansas Pipeline & Gas Co., 
(1939) 30 P.U.R. (N.S.) 321, at page 342: 
"When we consider that one effect of the 
issuance of a certificate to construct and opeTate 
facilities to and in a given area is to preclude from 
the territory other construction or operation ex-
cept .under a certificate issued by us, the necessity 
that the present applicants be financially able to 
consummate their proposed construcrt:ion becomes 
the more apparent." 
If such statement is made by a commission whose main 
problem in the case before it is a determination of 
whether or not there is adequate financing, such state-
ment could, a fortiori, be made in the case here before 
us involving a commission, which, by the very wording 
of its Findings and Report, was troubled with both the 
problem of adequate financing and the even greater prob-
lem of adequate reserves. 
It is obvious that only one natural gas pipeline will 
extend from the Four Corners Area to the Salt Lake 
City market. Such being the case, it is incumbent upon 
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the Commission, in granting a market to one of con-
flicting applicants to determine which applicant shall 
best serve this area. The Utah Statute looks not to the 
applicant but to the convenience and ne·cessity of the 
public and clearly contemplates that applications forcer-
tificates shall be granted on that basis alone-not on 1the 
basis of the desires and speculative plans of an appli-
cant. Utah Pipe Line Company was not given the proper 
consideration in this case, and neither was the public. 
The public, being the beneficiary of the proper decision, 
or the victim of an improper decision, is en1titled to due 
consideration of all applications by the Commission. Such 
consideration would, of necessity, require a comparison 
of the finances and reserves of various applicants who 
propose to serve the Salt Lake City area. Having before 
it. only the evidence presented by Utah Natural Gas 
Company, the C:ommission could not find rthat such com-
pany is best able to serve the public convenience and 
nece:ssity. 
Reduced to its bare facts-or lack of such facts-
this case involves an applicant who, although failing to 
prove adequate reserves and adequate financing, has been 
given by the Commission a hunting license, the practical 
effeet of which is to allow such applicant to attempt to 
secure proof of facts which should have been proved at 
the time of the hearing on its application~ Nowhere in 
the Law Reports can be found a certificate couched in 
terms of speculation, hope: and desire, as here. Granted 
that public convenience and necessity requires the issu-
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ance of a certificate tto a party or parties who can ade-
quately transport gas to the Salt Lake City area, the 
next query should logically be whether or not the appli-
cant now before the Comn1ission can best serve the public 
convenience and necessity in such respect. With only one 
applicant before the Commission, as here, and with a 
conflicting application being given no consideration by 
the Commission, as here, it was impossible to determine 
whether Utah Natural Gas Comp·any could best serve the 
public. And yet, the Commission issued the cert,ifica.te 
and thereby has, in effect, permitted Utah Natural Gas 
Company to pre-empt the market during the one year 
period allowed by the Commission. In so doing, the 
Co1nmission has acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 
POINT M 
"(m) THAT THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMIS-
SION AND IT.S FINDINGS AND REPORT AND OR.DER, 
AND EACH OF THEM, ARE CONTRARY TO THE LAWS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND IN VIOLATION OF SEC-
TIONS ONE AND SEVEN OF ARTICLE ONE OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND IN VIOLA-
TION OF SECTION ONE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES." 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITES UNDER POINT M 
(a) Laws of the State of Utah. 
The Legislature has prescribed m Sec. 76-4-24, 
U.C.A. (1943), that before a commission can issue a cer-
tificate it must properly determine after a hearing held 
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for such purpose that the; public convenience and neces-
sity require the particular construction proposed by an 
applicant. This requires, of course, a determination 
that the particular applicant has the wherewithal to 
meet the requirement, which in the instance of a gas 
pipeline would mean, as a minimum, adequate proven 
gas reserves and adequate financial commitments. The 
Commission has, in effect, by the mru;mer in which iJt has 
made its findings and conditioned the certificate, recog-
nized that such showings must be made by the applicant. 
The statute in no way indicates that the commission 
could allow the applicalllt to forego the showing of such 
basic prerequisites at the hearing and later show them 
after lthe hearing and record had been closed. In fact, 
the clear import of the statute is to the contrary. Fur-
thermore, as pointed ou't in the Argument and Author-
ities under Point I, the· Commission has, in fact, followed 
a course of proceedings which has given priority to the 
applicant filing first in time, consistently foreclosing con-
side·ration of Petitioner's conflicting application. 
(b) Due Process Clauses of the Constitutions of the 
State of Utah and the. United States. 
As heretofore pointed out undeT Sec. (a) of the 
Argument and Authorities under Point D, by allovving 
the determination of 1the question of adequate proven 
gas reserves through the filing of a certificate after the 
hearing had been closed by an unnan1ed geologist, the 
Commission has denied the hearing provided for in the 
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statute and required as a fundamental procedural right 
under the due process clauses of the Constitutions of 
both the State of lTtah and the United States. 
(c) Section One of Article One of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah. 
Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
provides in part as follows: 
"Section 1. 
All men have the inherent and inalienable 
right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; 
to acquire, possess and protect property." 
The law is well settled that corporations are "per-
sons" within the meaning of constitutional provisions 
forbidding the deprivation of property without due pro-
cess of law. Covington and Lexington Turnpike Road 
Company e.t al. vs. A. P. Sandford et al., (U. S. Sup·. Ct. 
1896) 164 U. S. 578, at page 592, 164 Sup.. Ct. 560 at 
page 565. The word "man" in such a Constitutional pro-
vision has also been held to include corporations. Day-
ton Co. and Iron Co. vs. Barton, (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1899) 
53. S. W. 970, 971, 103 Tenn. 604. Use of the word "man" 
as in Section One of Article One of the Utah Constitution 
is the same type of use as Constitutional framers have 
used before. 1t is patent that the framers of the Utah 
Constitution when speaking of the inalienable right of 
men to acquire, possess and protect property must have 
had in their minds that such right would extend to and 
include all legal entities, including partnerships, associa-
tions, corporrutions and trusts. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
178 
Although it may be true that some courts have held 
that a certificate of convenience and necessity is not 
property in the ordinary sense of the word, it cannot be 
denied that .the holder of a certificate can acquire prop-
erty by virtue of such. In fact, a public utility cannot 
acquire property contemplated by Section 76-4-24 without 
having first secured such a certificate. 
In the proceeding below Petitioner was completely 
foreclosed throughout from affirmatively presenting its 
case. It had no op·portunity to show that it was, in fact, 
entitled to the ce:rrtificate. While Petitioner may still 
have the "technical" right to insist upon the processing 
of its application, such insistance would be a futile ges-
ture, and, indeed, a very hollow right. The certificate 
has been issued and the devilment done. 
Thus, in effeCJt, the Utah Public Service Con1mission, 
by its arbitrary and capricious action, has failed and 
refused to allow Utah Pipe Line Company to acquire, 
possess and protect property within the State of Utah. 
Had there been a comparison of Utah Pipe Line Com-
pany's case with that of the Respondent and had there 
been a determination that the Respondent in truth and 
in fact should be granted a certificate of public conven-
ience and necessity based on clear and concise evidence 
pointing up that itt could best serve the public conven-
ience and necessity of the State of Utah, Utah Pipe Line 
Company would have no standing before this Court other 
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than to protest the adequacy of proof presented by the 
Respondenrt. In this instance, however, Utah Pipe Line 
Con1pany has been effectively foreclosed from exercising 
its right granted to it by virtue of its permit to do busi-
ness within the State of Utah by the Constitution of the 
State of U tab.. 
CONCLUSION 
The public interest in the determination of this case 
by this court cannot be over-emphasized. For many 
years the Utah public has waited for the time when ne·w 
homes, schools, apartment buildings and large and small 
industry would have an adequate supply of natural gas. 
Any action by a commission which delays the arrival of 
that time should nort be treated lightly. Time is of the 
essence. The gas is needed now. Obviously the more 
gas supply behind any projected pipeline, the greater 
the stability to industry and the greater the security 
to the home user of gas. A major industry may come 
to Utah if an adequate reserve supply for 20 years or 
more is dedicated to the line. It will not be attracted if 
that industry must depend on an uncertain and inade-
quate gas supply. Ultimately the public interest will 
demand rthat the enormous gas reserves of Utah Pipe 
Line be admitted through the Utah gate, and that Utah 
l~ipe Line Company build its line. If in due time gas 
is developed in Utah from wildcat drilling, that gas, if 
found in adequate quantities, will not be lost to Utah, 
but will extend the usef~ life of petitioner's pipeline. 
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It must be apparent that it is not in the public interest 
for !two pipelines to he built and paid for by the public. 
It must also be apparent that to build the line enormous 
reserves are required. An inadequate supply is the 
equivalent of no gas at all because at the beginning a 
full supply is required to finance the line. 
Mr. Irwin Clawson, attorney, representing some 29 
industrial users of gas, whose only interest in the pro-
ceeding was to see that the Commission obtained more 
gas for the area (R. 1018), after listening to the testi-
mony and at its close, told the Commission that he did 
not care whether the gas supply came from Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company, Utah Natural Gas Company or 
Utah Pipe Line Company; that "What we want is more 
gas" and said: 
"On behalf of my clients I suggest to the 
Commission that the public interest and necessity 
demands that before a decision is reached that 
the Commission see what the market affords, and 
tP.en on the basis of the knowledge thus obtained, 
grant the certificate. And we urge at this time 
that before. a decision is reached that the Com-
mission hear the Utah Pipeline and make their 
decision on the basis of the combined evidence, 
and that the Commission require the Utah Pipe--
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line to as quickly as possible 1nake their showing 
as to what they've got so that the Commission can 
reach a decision on so1nething that needs a deci-
sion very shortly." (R. 1020, 1021) 
The extensive drilling in the Counties of Duchesne, 
Uintah, Box Elder, Utah, Summit, Millard and Wash-
ington by major oil companies and by wildcatters and 
far removed from the projected location of the pipeiine 
of Utah Natural shows that such drilling will occur when 
geologists for those companies conclude ~the discovery of 
oil is possible or probable and further shows that no 
certificate or lack of certificate from the Public Service 
Commission of Utah for a pipeline is going to influence 
this drilling. 
In this case, where Utah Natural has wholly faiied 
to make a sufficient showing of adequate gas reserves 
or of required financing; where the Commission has 
failed to permit Utah Pipe Line to have any hearing 
on its projected line; and where the Commission has 
delegated to a geologist the power to make the basic 
determination which is the foundation of all grants of 
certificates of convenience and necessity for a natural 
gas pipeline, the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction 
in granting the certificate, violated the constitutional 
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rights of petitioner, acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
in the proceedings and failed to follow the rules of fair 
play. 
Respectfully submi~tted, 
Of Counsel 
C. W. WILKINS 
J. GLENN TURNER 
Attorneys for 
Utah Pipe Line Company, 
Petitioner. 
CHENEY, MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
920 Continental National Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
TuRNER, ATwoon, WHITE, McLANE & FRANCIS 
Suite 1711 
Mercantile Bank Bldg. 
Dallas 1, Texas 
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